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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the cooperation and competition between a global
power (the United States) and a regional power (China) in Southeast Asia from 1991
to 2015. The research explores the interests of the US and China, focusing on how
collective benefits can be maximised so as to meet the national interests of Vietnam.
By means of an empirical analysis of American, Chinese and Vietnamese foreign
policy through extensive interviews with ASEAN politicians and diplomats, this
thesis argues that, contrary to some accounts, Vietnam is not forging closer ties to the
US to counter-balance the rise of China. Rather, the thesis argues that Vietnam has
adopted a steady policy of power balancing. This is in accordance with recent
Vietnamese foreign policy, which is based on diversity and multilateralism.
While there are numerous and wide-ranging discussions within the Vietnamese
government about the impact of the Sino-American relationship on the country, they
are largely based on internal sources of information. This thesis brings new
perspectives from Southeast Asian politicians, diplomats and scholars in the region.
The dissertation presents, for the first time in English, an analysis of regional voices
from Southeast Asia and Vietnam that consider the impact of Sino-American
interactions in the post-Cold War period to 2015, as well as giving recommendations
for the region and Vietnam into the future.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction
This thesis explores Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia from 1991

to 2015 and its implications for Vietnam. This 24-year time frame begins with the
significant starting point of 1991 when Vietnam ended its international isolation
imposed by the international community after Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia
(late 1978 - September 1989). In that year Vietnam normalised relations with China
in 1991, and in 1995 with the United States of America (US). The year 2015 is
selected as the end point, due to its importance in Vietnam’s relations with the US
and China. The year 2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the normalisation of
Vietnam-US diplomatic ties (11/7/1995 - 11/7/2015) and the 65th anniversary of the
establishment of Vietnam-China diplomatic ties (18/1/1950 - 18/1/2015). Thus, the
year 2015 brings the thesis up to the present day, making it a contemporary study in
the research field of international relations.
Since the mid-20th Century, the study of the developing relations between
China and the US in international relations has been of great interest to scholars
because of their important roles in world politics. While the US is the current global
superpower with its comprehensive economic, military and political strength, China
has increasingly been considered as a new giant in Asia with different strategic
interests in various parts of the world. Within this period of transformation in global
politics from the “new world order,” the Sino-American relationship has been of
enormous importance to the national interests of many states. One particular area that
has attracted both American and Chinese interest is Southeast Asia, due to its
significant geographic, economic and political position. The US, the largest
developed country, is trying to maintain the status of a current superpower while
China, the biggest developing state, is drawing global attention for its potential
power. Some scholars argue it is inevitable that there will be a strategic competition
between Washington and Beijing.1 The implications of Sino-American interests in a

1

Chen, O., ‘The US’ Political Challenges on China’s National Security in the 21st Century’s First
Decade’, Asian Social Science, 7(6), 2011, pp.103-109 at 108.
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particular region like Southeast Asia for the last two decades have become a matter
of concern for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
In an era when the centre of gravity of the world is shifting from the west to
the east, Southeast Asia is located in an area that will be of strategic significance for
China and the US in the next twenty to fifty years. Geographically, Southeast Asia
possesses a huge wealth of natural resources, including oil and other energy, which
are vital substances for the economic development of China and the US. 2 China
needs oil from a diversity of sources, including Southeast Asia, due to its economic
ascension. According to Karen Ward, a senior global economist from HSBC Bank,
the world may have no more than half a century of oil left at the present consumption
rates. One tremendous pressure is from China, where growth trends may see as many
as one billion more cars on the road by mid-century.3 According to Womack, China’s
energy needs are estimated to grow by more than 50% by 2020. As a result, China
will have to import a large portion of its oil needs, and it is diversifying the oil
supply source. Vietnam is now China’s sixth largest oil supplier, with 5.6% of the
total in 2002.4 Meanwhile, as the world’s naval power, the US has benefited from the
free and safe navigation of Southeast Asian sea-lanes, through which passes onethird of the global trade and 66% of the world’s oil and natural gas.5
Southeast Asia is situated on an important sea transportation route, with
international sea-lanes including the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits and the South
China Sea. A high-ranking Indonesian political official6 claimed that approximately
50,000 vessels per year pass through the Malacca Straits connecting the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. Every day, vessels carrying around 11 million barrels of oil from the
Middle East to East Asia sail through these sea-lanes. Moreover, Southeast Asia has
a population of approximately 600 million people, with a growing middle class in a
2

Interview Dr Rizal Sukma, Director of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta,
Indonesia, 12 June 2012.

3

Rudolf, J.C., ‘Less than 50 Years of Oil Left, HSBC Warns’, 30 March 2011. Available at
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/less-than-50-years-of-oil-left-hsbc-warns/? (Date of visit 7
July 2015)
4

Womack, B., ‘China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry’, Cambridge University Press, p. 49

5

Koh, T., ‘The United States and Southeast Asia’, pp. 35-54 at 40.

6

H.E. Dr.MarzukiAlie, SE, MM, the 14th Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Republic of
Indonesia
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dynamic commercial area. It is a potential market for products from both the US and
China. In terms of security, the Malacca Straits makes Southeast Asia an important
region, as controlling this strait means taking control of a shipping route of the global
economy.7
In terms of politics, Southeast Asian states, and to a lesser extent ASEAN
itself, play important roles in debates and practices of regional security, democracy
and human rights. There are also a number of potential flashpoints from border
disputes, both maritime and land, particularly in the South China Sea with disputes
over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. For these reasons, the Asia-Pacific is
considered to be one of the most dynamic regions in the world. 8 Consequently,
Southeast Asia is an important factor in the strategic foreign policy of China and the
US.
China borders Central Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia,
but Southeast Asia is historically linked to China and shares favourable
characteristics with China in culture, history and religion. Chinese communities are
also a typical presence in this region, especially in the business and commercial
classes of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The
overseas Chinese occupy a place of significance in Southeast Asian economies and
they play a crucial bridging role between Mainland China and the region. According
to the Director General of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies,
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the S.R Vietnam, Dr. Hoang
Anh Tuan, China regards Southeast Asia as a significant area within which it can
develop its influence. Within Southeast Asia it is thought that if China can control its
relations with countries in the region, it can create the conditions to broaden its
influence at a global level. The way China aims to use Southeast Asia is even
compared with the Monroe Doctrine, under which the US sees its neighbouring Latin
American and Caribbean states as coming under an American “sphere of influence.”
Similarly, Southeast Asia may be regarded as an area under China’s “sphere of
7

Information in this paragraph is taken from the interview with H.E. Dr.MarzukiAlie, Jakarta,
Indonesia, 12 June 2012.
8

Feng, H., ‘ASEAN’s relations with Big Powers’, in Samuel C.Y. Ku (eds), Southeast Asia in the new
century: An Asian Perspectives, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, National Sun Yat-Sen University,
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, p.214.
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influence.” China has aimed to enhance bilateral relations with Southeast Asia to
portray itself as a peace-loving great power in order to enhance its prestige in the
international arena. It was a much-needed boost after the Tiananmen Square
massacre of 1989. 9 It is therefore important for China to cultivate favourable
perceptions in its relationship with Southeast Asia.
For the US, Southeast Asia is a significant region because of its location at the
intersection of two of the world’s most heavily travelled sea-lanes—the east-west
route links the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while the north-south route connects
Australia and New Zealand to Northeast Asia. These sea-lanes are vital for US forces
stationed from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
Maintaining freedom of navigation of these waterways is regarded as a top US
strategic objective.10 As a result, the US returned to the region in the first decade of
the 21st century when Southeast Asia was considered a “second front” in the US-led
global war on terror. During the George W. Bush Administration, the US had
planned for increased engagement with Southeast Asia. However, it was only under
President Barack Obama that a comprehensive “return to Southeast Asia” policy was
realised.11
Among the countries in the region, Vietnam is of particular interest to both
China and the US, due to its special strategic location and its relations with these two
powers over different periods in history. This thesis explores the dynamics of this
developing regional complexity for Vietnam, concentrating on the opportunities and
challenges posed. Geographically, Vietnam lies on the Indochina peninsula by the
Pacific Ocean: to its north is the border with China, to the east is the “East Sea”
(“South China Sea”), to the west is Laos and to the southwest is Cambodia. With a
long coastline of 3,260 km, and occupying half of the islands in the Spratly group,

9

Interview Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan, Director General of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic
Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the S.R Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam, 13
February 2012.

10

Sokolsky, R., Rabasa, A. and Neu, C.R.,The Role of Southeast Asia in US Strategy towards China,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2001.

11

Hung, M.T & Liu, T.T.T., ‘US Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia Under the Obama Administration:
Explaining US Return to Asia an Its Strategic Implications’, USAK Yearbook, 5, 2012, pp. 195-225 at
195.
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Vietnam is the closest state to the centre of maritime routes through the South China
Sea.12
With its location at the centre of the region, Vietnam is in the most
geographically advantageous position as the gateway to China and Southeast Asia.
After Indonesia and the Philippines, Vietnam has the third largest population in
ASEAN with 90.388 million people in 2013. 13 After joining ASEAN in 1995,
Vietnam has become an active member, holding significant prestige and an
influential position in this association. Economically, Vietnam has experienced
impressive growth and development. It has a very stable political system and a
foreign policy defined by the motto: “Vietnam is a trustworthy partner and a
responsible member of the world community.” 14

This foreign policy reflects

Vietnam’s shift from international economic integration into overall international
integration.
Moreover, Vietnam borders the South China Sea and has the potential to
benefit from the pace of development in a significant part of the Asia-Pacific, the
most dynamic economically developed region of the world. This is an advantage for
Vietnam in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. As a result of its
stability, growth and position, Vietnam has become the darling of foreign investors.
Thus, Vietnam forms part of the strategic policy framework towards Southeast Asia
of both the US and China. These states’ competitiveness against each other drives
their policies toward Vietnam. With its crucial geographical, economic and political
location, Vietnam is caught in the relationship of the global and regional powers.15
Consequently, Vietnam has been a victim of geo-political interests and suffered
successive wars during its drive towards reunification in 1975. It was in the front line
between the former USSR and the US during the Cold War, and it is now positioned
between the current superpower (the US) and a potential emerging power (China).

12
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Vietnam’s national interest and self-interest must operate alongside practical
approaches to both powers; this is a pragmatic step in its foreign policy. This thesis
investigates how Vietnam has sought to secure national benefits for its national
stability, which will contribute to peace, stability, prosperity and development of
Southeast Asia as the region moves towards a single community. Since 1991,
Vietnam has been able to engage with the two powers. The ties between the
communist parties of China and Vietnam seem cordial with the finalization of the
land border arrangement at the end of 1999, and the ratification of a Tonkin Gulf
Demarcation in December 2000.16 The author aims to explore beneath that surface of
Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relationship.
However, more recent negotiations demonstrate a relatively complicated
approach to the territorial disputes of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as the
discussions over other continental shelf claims in the South China Sea and the Gulf
of Tonkin. With the US, the year 1995 opened a new page in bilateral relations with
the normalization of diplomatic ties. Increased US-Vietnam military cooperation and
a considerably warm US-Vietnam bilateral relationship in the past decade has caught
China’s attention as Washington aims to remind Southeast Asia, and Beijing, of its
useful power balancing role in the region. 17 Therefore, competition between two
leading powers in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period has made this a period
of importance for diplomatic analysis.
1.2

Thesis Question
The thesis will explore the relations between Vietnam, China and the US and

attempts to answer a specific question: Does Vietnam move closer to the US more
than China in the course of its development after normalizing bilateral ties with both
powers? So as to address the central question, the author aims to analyse the
following issues:
1. What is Vietnam’s position in China’s foreign policy?
2. What is Vietnam’s position in US foreign policy?
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3. How do China and the US interact with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold war
era?
4. How do China and the US interact with Vietnam, and what is the
Vietnamese response?
5. What are the implications for Vietnam from the interests of US and China in
Southeast Asia?
6. How can Vietnam benefit from sitting between a global power and a
regional power?
These questions are raised in the context that the US has signalled a return to
the Asia Pacific as its new diplomatic strategy. This policy was stated by US
President Barack Obama in a speech to Australia’s Parliament on 17 November 2011
that “Let there be no doubt: in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States
of America is all in” and it is a “deliberate and strategic decision” that is “here to
stay.”18 This commitment has both positive and negative impacts for Vietnam, as a
strategic country located next to China.
In this context, the central argument of this thesis is that Vietnam is not
moving closer to the US than to China since its diplomatic normalization with the
two great powers. There is more harm for Vietnam if it chooses to ally itself with the
US to counter the rise of China. This is because China is eternally close in proximity
as Vietnam’s large northern neighbour, while the US is forever geographically
distant. The Vietnamese are those who understand China more than any other
country in the world, due to their traditional connection during the one thousand
years of Chinese domination in the past. The Vietnamese have a traditional saying
that “distant water will not quench a fire nearby” (Nước xa không cứu được lửa gần)
which means the same in Chinese (远水救不了近火, literally “water from far away
could not put out a close-by fire”). The Vietnamese also have another saying that
“better a neighbour nearby than a brother far away” (Bán anh em xa mua láng giềng
gần). Vietnam balances its foreign policy direction with both major powers, China
and the US.
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One scholar, Frederick Z. Brown, is of the view that Vietnam is shifting
towards the US to gain more leverage with China. 19 According to Brown, the
rapprochement between Vietnam and the US has been “step-by-step” and
“reciprocal.” 20 According to Brown, the rapprochement was developed gradually
from the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1995 to the signing of a Bilateral
Trade Agreement (BTA) in 2001, and further enhanced by Vietnam’s entrance into
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007. Most notably, the landmark of
rapprochement was noted at the 2008 visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen
Tan Dung to Washington, when President Bush spoke about the positive
development of the growing US-Vietnam friendship with more bilateral trust and
commitment to support the national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of
Vietnam.21 The message from Bush reassured Dung that the US did not support anticommunist Vietnamese exiles in the US in their effort to overthrow Vietnam’s
current socialist government.
Another advocate who has claimed Vietnam is attempting to be closer to the
US to restrain the aggressiveness of China is William Choong, a noted contributor to
the Straits Times and currently the Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for AsiaPacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia) in
Singapore. Choong has argued that Vietnam sought to “repair and build relations
with the US as a strategic insurance against China” by granting permission for
American naval ships to visit its ports, and by hosting the official visit of the US
Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta.22
However, this thesis argues that the claim that Vietnam is getting closer to the
US is a one-sided and superficial view. Such a viewpoint is subjective and looks only
at the outside appearance without analysing the matter with any great depth.
Adopting an insider’s perspective, this thesis argues that the rapprochement between
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Vietnam and the US does not come at the expense of China. The current
rapprochement in bilateral relations between Vietnam and the US has been a
dynamic development in the geopolitical atmosphere of Southeast Asia. The
Vietnamese officials’ visit to USS George Washington, a nuclear super-carrier, in
May 2014 is a symbolic example of an improving Vietnam-US security cooperation.
However, the closer cooperation in various sectors between Vietnam and the US
does not mean an overt enthusiasm to be an ally of the US. Vietnam still pursues the
“three nos” defence policy 23 , which prevents Vietnam from forming a defence
alliance with a third party. Moreover, there are negotiations between the US and
Vietnam on the former providing nuclear fuel and technology, without the usual
constraints on enriching uranium to prevent proliferation. Vietnamese officials,
however, insisted that US-Vietnam cooperation would not have an adverse effect on
neighbouring states.24
Yet, according to Carl Thayer and Evelyn Goh, Vietnam has to be cautious
about its military cooperation with the US in a way not to provoke China. Beijing’s
hostile reaction to Hanoi’s granting of naval basing rights to the Soviet Union in the
1970s, and the general history of conflict with China, means that Hanoi has to be
cautious:
In 2010, even while it sought US authority to pressure China over the South China
Sea disputes, Hanoi maintained close strategic ties and even deference to Beijing.
The Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister assured China that Vietnam would not
form an alliance with another country, allow foreign bases in its territory, or develop
relations with another country targeted at a third party.25
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No military alliances, no allowing any country to set up military bases on Vietnamese territory and
no relying on one country to oppose a third party.
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Ha Hoang Hop examined whether Vietnam’s bilateral relationship with the
US would affect its ties with China. 26 Ha claimed that “while some leaders in
Vietnam may want to use relations with the US as a counterbalance to China, it is
most unlikely that Vietnam’s comprehensive partnership with the US will negatively
affect Vietnam-China relations.”
The DirectorGeneral of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies,
Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the S.R Vietnam, Hoang Anh
Tuan, confirms the argument of this thesis that Vietnam is not moving closer to the
US than China. This is because the US has the strategy of deepening relations with
Southeast Asia due to its own interests in the region. Vietnamese military
enhancement with the US is seen as a natural requirement for national defence and a
method of enhancing leverage for Vietnam in its interactions with world powers.
Thus, Vietnam’s military cooperation with the US does not mean that it favours
Washington more than Beijing. Rather, Vietnam follows a foreign policy of
multilateralism and diversification as an active member of ASEAN.27
Hoang also believed that Vietnam should not get closer to the US at China’s
expense, or vice versa, since Vietnam benefits from both relationships. Vietnam
should seek to advance its own national interests so as to boost its bilateral ties with
both China and America. 28 In his response to the “Vietnam-US Rapprochement”
viewpoint from Frederick Z. Brown, Hoang also argued that the new friendship
between Hanoi and Washington should neither be seen as countering the influence of
third parties nor internationalising the South China Sea territorial disputes. 29 By
examining the relations with both the US and China, this research will make policy
recommendations for Vietnam on how to make full use of the relationships between
the global and regional power to maximize benefits.
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Similarly, with the close connection in politics, economics and security
between Southeast Asia and the US, the region treats the US as a principal power for
regional stability. Many countries in ASEAN believe that US troops should be
maintained in the Asia-Pacific region for regional security and prosperity and, more
importantly, to counterbalance China. Looking from an objective perspective, the
relationship between the US and Southeast Asian countries has been considered
“rapprochement,” “re-engagement” or “revitalization” because of the commitment to
enhance bilateral relations with countries in the region by the Obama
Administration. 30 According to Simon 31 , despite a severe US economic downturn
since 2007 and the prospect of considerable cuts in national defence budget spending
to 2020, the Obama Administration is still enhancing its security presence and
commitment in Asia and especially towards Southeast Asia. This policy was stated
clearly during President Obama’s official visit to Australia in November 2011 when
he noted, “Reduction in US defense spending will not, I repeat, will not come at the
expense of the Asia-Pacific.”32
However, it is not in ASEAN’s interest to see heavy American involvement
in Southeast Asia again. ASEAN fears the US may take a leading role in ASEAN’s
internal affairs, and Southeast Asian states do not desire foreign interference in what
they see as their domestic politics. Southeast Asia and China have also improved
their relationship after the Cold War, although this relationship still has some
limitations. The main barrier is the “China Threat” because Southeast Asia fears the
traditional geopolitical influence from Chinese dominance in the region. This threat
can be seen through some territorial and maritime disputes between China and some
members of ASEAN such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
From the relationship of ASEAN with the US and China, it can be seen that
Southeast Asia understands China’s ambition for influence in the region, but it also
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wants to take advantage of the American desire to prevent or limit any possible
Chinese expansion. ASEAN also wants China and the US to function as a system of
checks and balances to maintain regional peace and stability. 33 Above all, by
analysing American and Chinese ties with Southeast Asia, this study helps to propose
outcomes for the region through a strategy of balancing both powers. From historical
experience, it is not to the benefit of Southeast Asia to be allied with one power
exclusively. In the context of ASEAN engaging with the US and China, ASEAN is
very well aware of the fact that there are two major powers: one is on the rise and the
other one is being challenged. Since the formation of ASEAN in 1967, it has always
been careful not to be seen as favouring one power over another.34Consequently, the
Southeast Asian nations should have equidistant relationships or equally close
relationships with great powers that share the same interest in this region.
From a practical viewpoint, stability and security were not achievable for
Southeast Asian countries by allying with some big powers or in a group to oppose
some others. Thus, Southeast Asian has been a “Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality” (ZOPFAN) in its relations with the big powers. This principle of
balancing big powers will be the region’s aim until 2020.35 This thesis argues that
within the strategic competition occurring between two large powers, an appropriate
foreign policy for Southeast Asian states is to work towards permanent security,
stability and development through harmonization and soft power diplomacy.
Accordingly, this thesis is significant generally as it addresses the question of
how to balance both the US with China, the latter being a major issue for Vietnam
since the end of the nineteenth century. In the past, Vietnam came under the strong
influence of China, the largest and most powerful of its neighbours. While regionally
powerful, China experienced political and military pressure from western countries
during the 19th and 20th centuries and was forced to open itself to Western influences.
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Since China’s greater openness and transparency from the 1980s, the question of
following China or heading towards the US has perplexed countries in the region,
especially after the Cold War, when the US became the global superpower and China
emerged as the rising Asian power. This is an objective fact that Southeast Asia and
Vietnam are faced with, as the US has special interests in the region by its “AsiaPacific Strategy” and China is a close neighbouring regional power. Consequently,
this research is significant as it studies the impacts of Chinese and American interests
in Southeast Asia and Vietnam.
Specifically, this thesis is important for two main reasons: Firstly, for
academic institutions, the research provides essential updated references about the
nature of the relationship of cooperation and competition between the US and China
in Southeast Asia over the past 20 years. This study also provides a means for
assessing the impact of Sino-US relations on Southeast Asia and Vietnam in the past,
and it aims to identify the approaches adopted by the region and by Vietnam both at
present and prescribes an approach for the near future. Secondly, for Vietnamese
policymakers, the research will provide useful knowledge about international politics
and relations after the Cold War. This work will help policymakers to propose
suitable external policies and foreign diplomacy based on diversity and
multilateralism. On the basis of this research information, domestic politicians in
Vietnam can discover the political acumen and flexibility to avoid being drawn into
the rivalries of big powers. Strategically, it assumes that the leadership of Vietnam
can seek to balance the rising power of China and avoid military invasion with
efforts to create favourable conditions for internal economic modernization.
In the meantime, according to Thayer 36 , the eighth plenum in mid-2003
resolved to provide the policy rationale for Vietnam to enhance bilateral cooperation
with the US. According to this resolution, two ideological concepts are defined: đối
tác (partners of cooperation) and đối tượng (objects of struggle). As a result, on the
basis of sound comprehension of each partner or object, the implementation of each
specific policy will be carried out. The enhanced bilateral ties with the US can create
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more leverage for Vietnam in the relationship with China, but it should be kept at a
safe distance. The optimum policy for Vietnam should be to maintain equidistant
relations or equally close relations with China and the United States.
Above all, the implications for Vietnam from this thesis has to focus on the
advantages of its relationship with the US and China in Southeast Asia that is
consistent with preserving national independence, state sovereignty and Vietnam’s
socialist orientation in line with a policy of multilateralism and diversification as
guided by the 11th congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.37
1.3

Literature Review
Academic research has largely focussed on the Sino-American, Sino-

Vietnamese, or American-Vietnamese relationships. There is a 1995 study on “China
and South China Sea Disputes” by Valencia. In 1997, “China Rising: Nationalism
and Interdependence” by Goodman and Segal was published. In 2004, the Asia
Foundation had a study about “America’s Role in Asia: American View.” In 2007,
William W Keller and Thomas G Rawski wrote about “China’s Rise and the Balance
of Influence in Asia.” In 2009, there was a study on “Southeast Asia in the Sino-US
Strategic Balance” in the journal Contemporary Southeast Asia. 38 These are valuable
documents from the available collection of literature discussing major powers and
their influence in Asia.
However, the triangular relationship between Vietnam, the US and China has
been rarely addressed. There exists only a single study so far – “Vietnam between
China & the United States (1950-1995)” by Nguyen Hong Thach.39 This study is an
empirical analysis about the way for Vietnam to move forward between a regional
power and a global superpower. Thus, there is a gap in research about the new
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characteristics of Sino-American interactions for Southeast Asia, which has a direct
impact on Vietnam.
As the world enters the post-Cold War era from 1991, Sino-American relations
also experienced competition and cooperation. When the US and China compete
with each other, Vietnam will have increased negative impacts. Adversely, the two
powers’ bilateral cooperation can help to bring about positive impacts in Vietnam.
Also, there is a need for an updated assessment and a dynamic development of
applied international relations theory using newer material. As a corollary, the need
for a more informative study with a new approach to the current triangular
relationship is becoming essential for international and regional studies.
The aims of this study are twofold. The first contribution is providing an
updated reference about the nature of the relationship of cooperation and competition
between the US and China in Southeast Asia since 1991. The second purpose is to
analyse the impact of Sino-American relations in the region on Vietnam by
implicating proper approaches for Vietnamese policymakers. These academic
suggested external policies are expected to supply Vietnamese strategists with
political acumen and flexibility to make Vietnam advance and avoid being drawn
into rivalries of big powers based on diversity and multilateralism.
1.3.1. Vietnamese Foreign Policy
While remaining socialist politically, Vietnam has opened itself to capitalist
regional and global markets. Vietnam now also plays a more important role in
regional affairs and achieves a more active position in the international arena due to
its practical foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Through the seventh (1991),
eighth (1996), ninth (2001), tenth (2006) and eleventh (2011) national congresses of
the CPV, Vietnam has shown an active foreign policy through regional and
international integration in the cause of its national development.
The year 1991 marked an important turning point in Vietnam’s foreign policy
history with the new foreign strategy launched at the Seventh National Congress,
from 24-27 June 1991. Recently, Thayer noted that Vietnam pledged to “diversify
and multi-lateralise economic relations with all countries and economic
organizations” as “Vietnam wishes to be a friend of all countries in the world
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community, and struggle for peace, independence and development.” 40 In an
interview with a political official41, Vietnam’s foreign policy is one of diversification
and multilateralism. “Diversification” means this policy is carried out in every sector
from economic, political, security and military spheres, including cooperation
between the Communist Party of Vietnam and other Parties in the world.
‘Multilateralism’ means Vietnam wants to broaden external relations with all foreign
countries.
This diversified and multi-lateralised strategy has brought about positive
results for Vietnam’s foreign policy at this period. In October 1991, the Agreements
on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed by
Cambodia and 18 other signatories, including Vietnam, paved the way for Vietnam
to improve bilateral relations with regional countries.42 The Paris Agreements on the
Cambodian peace process was welcomed as a rationale for ending the Cold War that
existed since China’s incursion in February 1979. The break-through result of the
Cambodia conflict also brought about gestures of goodwill in Sino-Vietnamese and
American-Vietnamese bilateral relations. 43 This is because in China’s mind-set,
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia was interpreted as Hanoi’s “pursuance of
regional hegemony’ and was regarded by Beijing as the ‘fundamental cause for the
deterioration of relations between the two countries.”44
As a result, the solution to the Cambodia conflict gave Vietnam the opportunity
to improve bilateral relations with great powers and other regional nations. Le Hong
Hiep suggested that the most important achievement of Vietnamese diplomacy in the
early 1990s is the normalisation of ties with China in 1991, which significantly
helped Vietnam out of its international isolation and facilitated Vietnam’s improved
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relations with the US and ASEAN. 45 Nguyen Vu Tung also claimed that the
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989 and the
conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991 facilitated Vietnam’s
normalization of relations with ASEAN.46Accordingly, the multi-directional foreign
policy has brought about fruitful results for Vietnam in 1995: its diplomatic
normalisation with their former adversary, the US, and its official membership in
ASEAN.
In 1996, Vietnam’s foreign policy at the Eighth National Party Congress (28
June to 1 July 1996) was slightly adjusted from the wish “Vietnam wishes to be a
friend” to the affirmation “Vietnam is a friend” of all countries in the world
community. This is a more pragmatic approach in Vietnam’s active foreign policy.
As Thayer stated, the foreign strategy of the Vietnamese in this congress proved the
practical perspectives of policy strategists.47 Indeed, this pro-active strategy prepared
favourable conditions for Vietnam to integrate further into the world community.
Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN laid the basis for stronger cooperation with other
Asia-Pacific nations. As a result, Vietnam was encouraged by other ASEAN
members to join APEC at the Kuala Lumpur Ministerial Meeting in November
1998.48
At the Ninth National Party Congress (19-23 April 2001), there was a stronger
affirmation in Vietnam’s foreign policy. From the desire “Vietnam wishes” stated in
the Seventh Congress to the words “Vietnam is a friend” of the Eighth tenure, there
are more commitments about the trustworthiness of Vietnam with the reaffirmation
that “Vietnam is a friend and a reliable partner to all countries in the world
community.”49 It brought about advantages for Vietnam’s economic integration into
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regional and global economies. In 2001, Vietnam was granted normal trade relations
on a year-by-year basis with the US. In mid-2003, the CPV Central Committee’s
eighth plenum resolution called for deepening Vietnam’s defence cooperation with
the US.50
At the Tenth National Party Congress (18-25 April 2006), Vietnam continued
its foreign policy of “multi-lateral and diversified relationships while staying
proactive in integrating into the world economic community and expanding in
international cooperation in other fields.” 51 This foreign policy also suggests
Vietnam’s comprehensive attempt at integration with the wider world. With this
approach, a number of multi-lateral diplomatic successes were reached, such as the
chairmanship of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2006,
WTO membership in 2007, non-permanent membership on the United National
Security Council in 2008-2009, and chairing ASEAN, including hosting the ASEAN
Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in 2010.
The Eleventh National Party Congress (12-19 January 2011) strongly
reaffirmed that “Vietnam is a trustworthy partner and a responsible member of the
world community” and that “Vietnam is ready to make friends with countries in the
international community, for peace, independence and development.” 52 The more
specific phraseology demonstrates the progress in Vietnamese foreign policy: from
the passive manner of “the wish,” to the active fulfilment of the deeds, and then to
the pro-active well-prepared strategy to have bilateral cooperation with countries in
the world community.
Since then, Vietnam’s adoption of multilateralism and diversification in its
foreign policy has been advantageous, as the nation has became a strategic partner of
a number of countries. Vietnam has set up diplomatic ties with over 181 out of 193
members of the United Nations and has trade ties with nearly 230 out of 255
countries and territories worldwide. The country is today an active member of more
than 70 regional and international organisations. To date, Vietnam has established 98
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representative offices in five continents.
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Vietnam has established strategic

partnerships with 15 nations including major powers and neighbouring countries,
such as Russia in 2001 (then upgraded to comprehensive strategic partnership in
2012), Japan in 2006 (then upgraded to Extensive Strategic Partnership in 2014),
India in 2007, China in 2008 (then upgraded to comprehensive strategic partnership
in 2009), South Korea and Spain in 2009, the UK in 2010, Germany in 2011, and
Italy, France, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore in 2013 and Malaysia in 2015.
Vietnam and the Netherlands became strategic partners in climate change adaptation
and water management in 2010. Vietnam has comprehensive partnerships with 4
countries – Australia in 2009, New Zealand in 2010, and Denmark and the US in
2013. For the time being, Vietnam has entered into negotiations to join TPP (TransPacific Partnership) and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership).
1.3.2. China-US Relations
From 1991 to 1997, the Sino-American relations experienced competition
and co-operation. According to Yan, the relationship between the two great powers
in this period was described as a “false but nice description of China-US strategic
relations” in the “policy of pretending to be friends” or “neither-friend-nor-enemy”,
as written in the book titled “Same Bed Different Dreams” previously.54
The year 1991 marks a new situation in international relations after the Cold
War, when China and the US competed with each other but still acknowledged the
necessity of bilateral cooperation. In spite of the contradiction in political ideologies,
the two great powers are well aware of each other’s value in maintaining the stability
and strategic balance for economic development. According to Chen, the economic
relationship between China and the US is more complementary and less competitive
than that of China and Japan. Moreover, China and America share more common
interests in the maintenance of peace and stability in both Southeast and Northeast
Asia. The two great powers also share mutual concerns over international
cooperation and collective security issues such as arms control, the prohibition of
weapons of mass destruction, crackdowns on drug trafficking, and the environment.
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Chen supposed few possibilities of worsening bilateral cooperation between China
and the US during the Clinton administration.55
In the Clinton tenure, re-establishing “strategic dialogue” was a key
component of the new policy initiative of a ‘comprehensive engagement’ with China.
After no high-ranking visits were exchanged between the two great powers for 10
years, Chinese President Jiang Zemin officially visited the US in November 1997
and US President Clinton reciprocated in July 1998. The Chinese and American
governments then agreed to “build towards a constructive, strategic partnership for
the 21st century”.56
However, the constructive strategic partnership between China and the US
could hardly resolve the deeper issues faced by the two powers. Peng57 theorized that
there are five structural contradictions in Sino-American relations: the difference in
ideology between socialism and capitalism, the dissimilarity in culture between the
East and the West, the geopolitical competition between the west Pacific Ocean and
the Euro-Asian continent, the contradiction over the Taiwan issue, and the potential
conflict between a rising power and the existing dominant superpower. Among these
differences, the most notable and basic contradiction is the strategic conflict of
interest between the US, which favoured a uni-polar system with its domination, and
China, which wished to be a major force in a multi-polar world.
As a result, the ‘constructive strategic partnership’ has been criticised inside
the US since 1999. According to Sambaugh, in a criticism of President Clinton’s
China strategy, the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush replaced the
phrase “strategic partnership” with “strategic competition.” Winston Lord, a former
US official under Clinton’s tenure, even considered the strategic partnership to be
“erased from the vocabulary of US-China relations.” The clearer description of SinoAmerican relations in this period could be called “strategic competitors,” but not
necessarily “strategic adversaries.” This means that China and America, in spite of
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their cooperation in limited sectors, will still compete.58 According to Yuan, until
mid-2005, the ‘China threat’ was discussed in the US and phrases such as ‘China’s
Rise,’ ‘a strong China,’ and ‘the world of China’ have replaced ‘China issue,’ ‘a
weak China,’ and ‘China of the world.’59
Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the complexity of SinoAmerican relations has continued, which made China-US relations appear friendlier
than they actually were. Though American military strength is far stronger than that
of China, the US still needed China’s cooperation in international political and
economic affairs. Thus, the Sino-American relationship is defined by “cooperation
based on competition.”60 There are over 60 platforms of dialogue and cooperation
between China and the US, including the Strategic Economic Dialogue. The two
sides have reached a number of economic consensuses, most notably the “Ten-year
Plan of Energy and Environmental Cooperation.”61
In Southeast Asia, the triangular relationship between the US, China and
Southeast Asia reveals a complicated nexus of sophisticated interests between a
global hegemon and a regional power. Thanks to these strategic interests, the leaders
of both countries have remained committed to a path of constructive engagement
together with respective efforts geared toward improving each side’s influence and
national interests through various private channels. Thus, in spite of significant
differences with strongly competing interests, both powers see the benefit of positive
Sino-American engagement without disruptive confrontation with the other.62 This
shows that balancing the interests of great powers in the region can benefit Southeast
Asian nations.
At the regional level, the literature will focus on the academic literature
dealing with US-China engagement with ASEAN-centric multilateral institutions,
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including ASEAN Plus, the three key regional trading states: the People’s Republic
of China, Japan and the Republic of South Korea (ASEAN+3); ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), which is the main forum for discussing security, and the East Asia
Community (EAC), which is emerging as a free trade zone. On the basis of the USChina interactions with regional principal mechanisms, different approaches and
frameworks launched by China and the US towards the region are investigated.
As a rising dominant power in the region, China has exercised regional
multilateral diplomacy since the 1980s. China became a member of Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 and was a founding member of ARF in
1994. China’s intention in these diplomatic moves has been to prevent its neighbours
from allying with the US, with respect to the issues encompassing Taiwan.
Furthermore, China seeks to diffuse the fear that it is a threat by using multilateral
channels through regional institutions in order to consolidate friends and strengthen
its role as a leading economic power in the region.63 The “Shanghai Five” of China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1996 expanded into the “Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation” (SCO) with the admission of Uzbekistan in 2001.64
At the same time, as the global hegemon, the US has made China uneasy and
by undertaking recent significant diplomatic initiatives to rebalance towards the Asia
Pacific in general, and Southeast Asia in particular. The US supported the
establishment of ARF to discuss security.65 The Bush Administration (2001-2009)
strongly supported APEC. Bush began to use the annual APEC leaders’ summit to
engage multilateral meetings and also attended ASEAN leaders’ meetings from
November 2005. At the APEC Summit Meeting in November 2006, Bush urged
APEC members to consider forming an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area.66
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The highlight of US multilateral policy towards the Southeast Asian region is
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed by the US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton at the 16th Annual ARF on 22 July 2009 in Phuket, Thailand. The
TAC creates favourable conditions for the US to engage with Southeast Asia in
general and ASEAN in particular. On the one hand, the TAC paves the way for the
US to join the East Asia Summit and be involved in the East Asia community based
on the current “10+6” framework (10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan, South
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand). On the other hand, the TAC also helps
American economic recovery by exploring a wider market in East Asia, which is
considered to be the world’s fastest growing region in terms of economic growth,
and it is likely to overcome the Global Financial Crisis earlier than other parts of the
world.
Another initiative that proves the US gave higher priority to engaging with
Southeast Asia is President Obama’s big push for a TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)
in mid-November 2011 during the APEC forum in Hawaii. The TPP is the
multilateral free trade agreement that seeks to reduce and finally eliminate trade
tariffs among member countries. The bar for joining the TPP is set high, with big
differences over tariffs that created a severe challenge to China’s current
management systems and mechanisms, which put a fair distance between China and
joining TPP.
Zhang examined a number of difficulties for China: the rules of trade in
goods, trade in service, investment rules on the border issues; standards unification,
environmental protection, labour standards, state-owned enterprise governance,
government procurement, intellectual property rights, and electric commerce as well
as internet freedom and other related issues.67 As a result, the TPP may be difficult
for China to join for many years. Later that month, President Obama became the first
US President to attend the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, where he stressed the US
commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the

67

Zhang, J., ‘How far away is China from TPP’, 25 November 2013
http://www.pecc.org/resources/2018-how-far-away-is-china-from-tpp?path (Date of visit 6 January
2015)

35

need to settle regional disputes by following international law, including the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).68
In general, China and the US each gain different benefits in developing
bilateral and multilateral ties with Southeast Asian nations. For China, it is a matter
of building a good neighbour policy and a regional development strategy to seek
common prosperity throughout Southeast Asia in an atmosphere of a “harmonious
Asia”. It was reported that the bilateral trade volume between China and ASEAN in
2010 had increased 36 fold in comparison from 1991, the year when formal bilateral
relations were established. According to Ma Mingqiang, Secretary of the ASEANChina Centre, the trade volume of China and ASEAN was US$267 billion in the first
three quarters of 2011. China has now become ASEAN’s largest trade partner while
ASEAN is numbered third among China’s trade partners.69
For the US, the traditional alliance and close trade ties in current years play
an important role in its relationship with Southeast Asian states. The Foreign Trade
section of the US Census Bureau notes that Southeast Asia, as an entity, has become
a major partner for US trade in goods. Specifically, US trade with Southeast Asia for
the last twenty years have tripled from US$45.9 billion in 1990 to US$176 billion in
2010.70 For Southeast Asian countries, what made the US presence desirable was the
size and wealth of the market for ASEAN exports, American technological
advancement, and the potential for US investments. Thus, ASEAN warmly
welcomed the US back to Southeast Asia so that this region could gain a greater
presence against the regional power China. However, the policy of maintaining
balance among big powers is the strategy that Southeast Asian nations are seeking.71
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On the basis of the analysis of Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia, both
bilaterally and regionally, this thesis aims to conclude with applicable policies and
strategies for Vietnam to maximise its national advantages.
The political and security perspectives show that the national interests of China
and the US in Southeast Asia can have positive and negative impacts. The positive
impact is that when the two powers are in strategic competition, they need other
smaller countries to gain leverage against their competitor. Consequently, both
powers need to enhance bilateral ties with countries in the region. The negative
impact is when the two powers have too severe a level of competition, forcing
countries in the region to decide whether to follow China or the US. At that point, the
bilateral relationship of ASEAN with China and the US will be affected. If one
country is close to China, this will affect its ties with the US adversely; if one
country is close to America, this will affect its ties with China.72 Southeast Asian
states face significant consequences if there is a situation of growing rivalry between
China and America’s interests in the region. Rizal Sukma, Director of the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta revealed why they are worried:
ASEAN will be polarized because of different national interests. Some countries may
be very close to China because of the economic dependence and so on. Some
countries are already very clear, they are American allies: the Philippines, Thailand,
and Singapore. Then we also have countries that choose to be neutral: Indonesia,
Malaysia. The polarization can take place. Once ASEAN is polarized, ASEAN will be
less effective. If ASEAN can no longer maintain its strategic centrality, ASEAN will
stop centrality. These are the possibilities and challenges of the growing China US
rivalry that we face.73

Moreover, it is predicted that if China and the US compete to spread their
influence in the region, Southeast Asia can be in “the stage of the war of influence”
between the two countries. Countries in Southeast Asia will be divided into two
opposing sides, one with the US and the other with China. If this happens, ASEAN
will be polarized, resulting in the marginalization of ASEAN’s role as one of the
pillars of security in East Asia.74 Hence, as Pitono Purnomo, former Ambassador of

72

Interview Hoang Anh Tuan, Hanoi, Vietnam, 13 February 2012

73

Interview Rizal Sukma, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 June 2012

74

Interview MarzukiAlie, Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 June 2012.

37

the Republic of Indonesia to Vietnam, notes, Southeast Asian states can gain regional
benefits when “China and America are the two great powers and the two major
powers in the region, so our policy is we try to encourage them to engage positively
in Southeast Asia by complementing each other for the development of the region.”75
Therefore, from the implications of Chinese and American interests in the region,
Southeast Asia should have appropriate strategies and policies in dealing with these
two great powers by making an autonomous region that is not dominated by major
powers.
1.3.3

Vietnam’s Relations with China and the US
Vietnam is a country with a long history of continuous fighting and struggling

against foreign invaders seeking to disrupt the sovereignty of the nation. Located at a
strategically vulnerable, yet important, position in Southeast Asia, Vietnam has
attracted the attention of regional powers and global powers in their strategic
rivalries. Vietnam places its national benefits as a top priority, so exercising tact in
diplomacy regarding its relations with China and the US is necessary for balancing
its interests. Tactful diplomacy means making efforts to maximise the positive
bilateral relationship with both China and the US on economic and political issues.
First, a stable environment for Vietnam’s national establishment and
development can only come once Vietnam is capable of managing its relations with
both China and the US. Ang investigated hat both historical tradition and geopolitical
evolvement shaped the nature of tensions between Vietnam and China.
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Historically, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was managed through deference of
the tributary system for 10 centuries from 3 B.C. to A.D. 1000. Later on, the
combination of external forces and geopolitical interactions among major powers
such as China, the Soviet Union and the US has added to the dynamism of relations
between the two neighbours. The interplay of these factors can bring about
construction or destruction depending on Vietnam’s management of its relations.
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Le Hong Hiep 77 discovered that a strong China is a geopolitical threat to
Vietnam’s national security because of the geographical proximity and asymmetry of
size and power between Vietnam and China. Although Vietnam ranks as the 14th
most populous country in the world, its size of population is equivalent to one
medium province of China. Vietnam has no choice but to live, in Carlyle Thayer’s
words, in a “tyranny of geography” with a northern neighbour 29 times larger than
itself.
According to the author’s interview with Dr. Tuan, the dynamics of
Vietnam’s relations with its huge northern neighbour has long been a discussion
among Vietnamese scholars. The question of bandwagoning, hedging or balancing in
bilateral ties with China has remained since the end of the nineteenth century. Some
Vietnamese scholars came to recognise that China, a big power in Asia with great
influence on Vietnam traditionally, also experienced political and military pressures
from western countries during the 19th and 20th centuries; suggesting that following
China with blind consistency is not always beneficial. Meanwhile, Vietnam at that
time began to be influenced by western nations like France. Thus, the question of
following China, balancing with China, or hedging against China, is not a new line of
inquiry.78
This issue has now become more urgent. However, the choice Vietnam must
now consider should not be whether to follow the US, as they have recently returned
the region of Southeast Asia, or follow China, as they remain a geographically close,
regional neighbour. These two major powers both have great impacts on Vietnam in
economic, political and security affairs. Consequently, there should be no question of
choosing to leave China to follow America, or conversely, leave America to follow
China. Both China and America are important partners of Vietnam. Vietnam’s
productive relationship with China has created a favourable foundation to create and
maintain better bilateral ties with the US. Similarly, Vietnam’s advantageous
cooperation with the US in economic, political, defence and security affairs has
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created better relations with China. Thus, the relationships between Vietnam, China
and the US complement each other.79
Second, balancing the relations with both China and the US can help Vietnam
protect its national interests and balance major powers interactions. Vietnam should
establish the equally close or equally distanced relationship with both powers.
Consequently, Vietnam should not choose between the US or China because
Vietnam gains benefits from both relationships. Vietnam should advance its own
national interests to gain national benefits. From that point of view, to boost bilateral
ties with both China and the US should be its objective. Le Hong Hiep shares this
view by ascertaining that the best foreign policy for Vietnam is to maintain a balance
between China and the US. The improvement in Vietnam’s bilateral relations with
the US, even in its attempt to counter China’s aggression in territorial disputes,
should not come at the expense of China.80
Finally, Vietnam should do the utmost to prevent being drawn into the ChinaUS strategic rivalry. This means that Vietnam should try to mitigate the negative
impacts of the China-US competition while taking advantage of the positive
development of China-US cooperation. In short, this thesis is significant in its
contribution of analysis of the triangular relations of Vietnam between China and the
US since 1991 to the present. It is different from previous studies due to its inclusion
of a comprehensive perspective regarding the triangular relationship between a
global superpower, a regional developing power, and Vietnam. On the basis of
proving the position of Vietnam in the balancing strategy with both China and the
US, the thesis argues Vietnam is not moving closer to one power more than the other.
Indeed, Hanoi benefits from keeping equally close and equidistant with Beijing and
Washington. This balancing strategy is clearly stated in Vietnamese foreign policy of
multi-lateralisation and diversification, which continues to work effectively for
Vietnam to move forward in the dilemma of manoeuvring between China and the
US.
1.3.4 Key Concepts in International Relations Theory
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As a study of diplomacy, a number of key concepts in politics and international
relations theory such as national interest, realism, constructivism, balance of power
and hedging are employed in this research. Firstly, regarding the concept of “national
interest,” this phrase has become significant not only to contemporary global states
but also to Vietnam itself. It is common to find that a nation aims to advance its
interests to maximise benefits for itself, and realism believes states pursuing selfinterest is paramount in international relations. 81 In realism, pursuing national
interest is seen to be the obligation and responsibility of individual nations in the
global system: to do otherwise is seen as negligent and a betrayal of the basic
responsibility of the state to protect its people and territory. This point was made in
1848 by the British Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister), Lord Palmerston in
a speech to parliament, when he noted: “We have no eternal allies and we have no
perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our
duty to follow.”82
Realism is the main theoretical foundation for the thesis. With its emphasis on
history “as it is,” realism has been the dominant way of understanding international
relations since the beginning of academic studies on world politics. The realist
believes there is no authority above that of the state, and that alliances, while useful,
are not a guarantee of security. As realists view the world as having no supra-state
authority — anarchic, in the sense of no overall government— if a state’s security
cannot be taken for granted, states can and do seek to protect themselves. For
example, while China was a developing country, it was only a potential threat to the
rest of the world. However, when China began to develop, a rising China is seen as
an enormous threat to the existing world political system.83 In such circumstances,
states will find it reasonable to compete for power and security. 84 In the case of
Vietnam with its history of wars with both the US and China, realism is a helpful
approach to analyse Vietnamese foreign relations. Realism however has its
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limitations, and alternative approaches allow a more nuanced understanding of
motives behind state action.
Social constructivism can be useful in international relations theory as it helps
to identify the relationship between the historical evolution of the states, rules and
regimes that govern international politics, and the actual behaviour of states in
international relations in fashioning the international system. A constructivist can be
described as one who sees world politics as an evolving social reality, not as an
immovable series of interests based around the state. This is to say, what a nation
does in international relations, its interests and structures of operation, are defined by
social norms, and ideas, rather than by objective or material conditions.
Hence, for realists, constructivism is proved to be useful for research
methodology thanks to its corrective to the assumptions of individual rationalism and
materialism, which have been central to definitions of realism for the past few
decades.85 This can be illustrated by the understanding in constructivism that states
should avoid destructive disputes and respect the vital interests of others. Every
nation has its own national benefits, however, to live in harmony for development,
the constructivist perspective sees that one should respect the other as any national
interests without aspirations and values of others can result in ruin to the state and
surrounding neighbours. 86 Gain is not necessarily a zero sum game: because one
state’s benefit does not mean that another state loses. Using a constructivist
approach, the thesis will analyse the individual interests of China and the US in
Southeast Asia to find how the region can gain regional profit from the competitive
and cooperative relations of these two powers.
The concept of “balance of power” is defined as a system “in which the
power possessed and exercised by states…is checked and balanced by the power of
others.”87 Balance of power is thus a mechanism for states to prevent each other from
dominating. For example, although for the time being the US is a global hegemon, its
conduct in foreign policy, from a realist perspective, should still respect the global
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and regional balances of power in the international system, especially regionally.
This is becausein an interdependent world, when every nation has been “globalized”
more than ever before, the US is strong enough to discourage aggression in others,
but is not so strong that it can practise aggression itself.88
This can be illustrated by the US security approaches to Southeast Asia after
the Cold War, such as the revitalization of military alliance with the Philippines89
and Thailand90 as well as the rapprochement with other countries in the region. These
alliances can form a balance of relationships with the emergence of the regional
power China.
China’s security approaches towards Southeast Asia are to have new
adjustments in strategy, such as the enhancement of dialogue in relations with
Southeast Asian nations. In the context of territorial disputes with Southeast Asia,
this reaction of China is seen to be softer and more flexible, aiming at giving little
chances for the US and western countries to interfere in regional disputes. Thus, in
the argument of realists, the regional order of Southeast Asia is shaped by the
balance of big powers, mostly by the relations of the two biggest powers currently,
namely China and the US.
As small and vulnerable states, of significant interest to big powers, Southeast
Asia should study the lessons from history with respect to balance of power to
guarantee its stability and development. Southeast Asia should develop relations with
various powers in the global system to welcome the presence of other big powers in
the region for economic and commercial cooperation as well as to maintain equal
benefits among big powers for security and military guarantees. To this end, thanks
to its scholarly characteristics, the balance of power theory is used to carry out
research on this study of the triangular China, US and Vietnam relationship.
Hedging is another approach that is used in the thesis to analyse the
implications for Southeast Asian states in the dilemma of sitting among great powers.
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Chien-peng Chung explained that the inspiration for ASEAN states to facilitate the
practical strategy of hedging (limiting risk) against major powers is the necessity of
ensuring economic advantages while controlling security threats. This is a pragmatic
response of countries in the region amid the ascension of China’s growing economic
and military capability, resulting in a greater suspicion of its peaceful rise. Thus,
welcoming the US back to Southeast Asia to ensure the strategic balance of power is
also adopting a policy of hedging by regional states. The US military presence in
Southeast Asia is an essential guarantee for regional economic development.91
Le Hong Hiep shares the view that together balancing, bandwagoning
(alignment with a strong power) and hedging are three strategies adopted by nations
in international relations to protect their national interests. Accordingly, the hedging
strategy is examined as the rational choice for countries in Southeast Asia in dealing
with a more powerful China. However, he also admits that, on the basis of each
regional country, the degree of hedging may vary across the spectrum from
bandwagoning to balancing. For Vietnam, after long experiences in relations with its
northern neighbour, national strategists have come up with the belief that there is no
better way for Vietnam to move forward more than through hedging tactics.92
1.4

Methodology
The thesis will adopt a historic-analytical approach and comparison in its study

of Chinese and American foreign policy towards Vietnam. First, the historic
approach is used to break down the 24 years from 1991 to 2015 into two periods:
from 1991 to 2001, and from 2001 to 2015. The ten years frame after the Cold War
from 1991 to 2001 is considered the time of reconciliation and unity in the
cooperation of Southeast Asian states with one another; Vietnam joined ASEAN in
1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
This is also the time when the US is still the dominant global superpower,
whereas China has not yet become as influential as it has now. On the contrary, the
stage from 2001 to 2015 witnessed the completion of China’s “hidden dragon
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policy,”93 especially after the financial crisis of the US in 2008, when China’s overall
economic position rose substantially, with reserves of up to US$3,000 billion, while
the US had large economic problems that required government bailouts of industry
and federal agencies.94 The first period thus demonstrated US interest in Southeast
Asia when there is no potential threat from China, while the latter period shows
interactions and relationships of Southeast Asian states with a rising power, China,
and a power that is being challenged, the US.
Next, the author aims to use comparative politics to analyse the alterations of
American and Chinese foreign policy and interests towards the region. Regarding US
strategy with the region, analysis from American history showed that each President,
on assuming office, has exercised some actions in foreign policy, which becomes
known as a Presidential doctrine and which has characterised his period in office.
The first American post-Cold War President, Bill Clinton, shifted US foreign policy
focus from Europe to Asia, with the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and in this
Southeast Asia played an important part.95
This change was partly to support American national interests in the region,
but also to contain the rising expansion of China’s influence, which has been
challenging the dominance of the US. Until the first term of President George W.
Bush, there still existed the commitment of America administration to the region.96
Southeast Asia was a low priority during the Bush administration despite its
economic significance to the US as its fifth largest trading partner and the geostrategic importance of the region’s maritime lines of communication both for the
American navy and for the transit of much of Asia’s energy supplies. However, the
situation changed fast in the aftermath of 9/11 as Washington viewed the region as a
“second front” in its war on terror.97
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In addition to analysis, the originality of this research lies partly in the
twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with Southeast Asian diplomats and political
officials, who were at the time holding positions in the Parliament or Government of
Vietnam, or in ASEAN states. Acting as an expert in the Asia-Pacific Division,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of the National Assembly of the S.R Vietnam,
I was able to contact the regional experts to observe first-hand the discussions on
regional security. In my capacity as a researcher, I conducted interviews with highranking officials I met through my working relations, and these are a valuable source
of policy-oriented empirical examination.
Due to the position of these officials during the time of interview, the thesis
data collection follows the formal standard of UOW Ethics Approval to gather
information from ten ASEAN diplomats in Jakarta, where the ASEAN Secretariat is
situated and eighteen Vietnamese diplomatic officials in Hanoi for the research. A
number of such direct interviews can help to create a diversity of views for the
objective purpose of the research. The responses and comments of all participants are
voice-recorded on audio files (MP3), followed by transcription and translation at the
University of Wollongong (UOW). Anonymity is applied for seven interviewees that
requested the unidentified contents of answers to the subject matter (see attached in
the separated paper to this thesis to protect the identities of anonymous officials). All
thesis data collection, including MP3 files are stored in locked cabinets until the
conclusion of the project.
The data collected from these interviews provides primary evidence to be
integrated into my textual analyses. The flowchart of thesis data collection is as
follows:
Request with participants for interviews
(contacted by email)

Follow up email to establish location, date and time of interview (with participant
information sheet attached)
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Reconfirm involvement of participants (by email)

At arranged meeting explain proposed time taken for interview, conditions of storage
and use of data, any risks, inconveniences and discomfort, the capacity of
participants to withdraw from the research project.

Transcribe interviews from audio files to word files.

Seek feedback from participants on the sections that relate to their words and ideas.

Refine Thesis

Seek additional feedback if necessary.

The data collected from these interviews provides practical evidences of how
diplomats and political officers of regional ASEAN states are responding to the
China-US balancing act. There are a number of famous individuals in the study of
Vietnamese foreign relations, namely former foreign ministers Nguyen Manh Cam,
Nguyen Dy Nien, Pham Gia Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, former
Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung, Ambassador Luu Van Loi, Deputy
Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh that I really wish to interview. However, due to
their time constraints, I will use their insights and ideas through their written articles
and/or statements made around the time they held office.
These views are supplemented by secondary sources that explore American
and Chinese security policy and their interactions with Southeast Asian states.
Secondary sources such as articles of newspapers and journals are also used in the
thesis. By adopting a critical lens toward the primary source of interviews, party
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sources, government documents, texts of high-ranking government official speeches
and press interviews together with the secondary literature, this thesis hopes to make
a contribution to the study of foreign policy for Vietnam, and in a wider sense for
ASEAN.
1.5

Structure of the Study
The introduction, CHAPTER 1, is about the relevant literature, the thesis

research question and the methodology. Using international relations theories of
realism, constructivism, balance of power and hedging, the literature identifies gaps
of research that needs to be addressed. It focuses on three main points: Vietnamese
foreign policy, China-US relations and Vietnam’s relations with China and the US.
The methodology uses a historic-analytical approach and a comparison in a study of
Chinese and American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, followed by implications for
Vietnam.
CHAPTER 2 analyses the rise of China as an increasing influence in the
region, its growing strength in the global economy and impacts on economic
development in neighboring states regions. China’s military modernization is also
analyzed to understand China’s ambition to obtain greater influence in Southeast
Asia. Based on that context, the role of Southeast Asia in terms of economics,
strategy and security for China’s power in the region is investigated. China regards
this region as vital for its growth and prosperity. This chapter also assesses research
on the strategic policy of China towards Southeast Asia on the basis of its
significance. Particularly, among countries in the region, Vietnam is of significant
importance to China both traditionally and after the Cold War due to its unique
location in the neighbor areas of China and buffer geopolitical zone.
CHAPTER 3 analyses the transformation of the new world order into a multipolar system, in which the US cannot impose its dominant role unilaterally in
international relations in spite of its superpower. The new tendency in world politics
towards both cooperation and competition in relations among great powers has made
the US to adjust its foreign policy to protect its national interests. Amid this
alteration, this chapter also assesses research on the strategic policy of the US
towards Southeast Asia on the basis of its significance. The chapter focuses on
Vietnam’s central role in the US “pivot” or “rebalance” to Southeast Asia. This
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significant role has brought about both pros can cons for Vietnam in the bilateral ties
with its former adversary, the US.
CHAPTER 4 discusses the strategic interaction of the US and China in
Southeast Asia. In Washington’s perception, in the long term, China will be a
challenge for the US both economically and militarily. The emergence of China as a
serious threat to US dominance can jeopardize American interests and benefits in
Southeast Asia just as the US is making a return to the region. However, for the time
being, US-China competition and cooperation still coexists in various fields. The
thesis will look into this relationship in terms of security, socio-economic and
cultural development as well as the enlargement of influence and power. The South
China Sea dispute is also analyzed to examine different benefits and the interests of
various parties.
CHAPTER 5 explores the characteristics of the triangular Vietnam, China,
US relationship. Due to its geo-strategic location, Vietnam suffers from the effects of
sitting between a regional power and a global superpower. When the two powers
cooperate, then Vietnam can benefit from the positive impacts of win-win SinoAmerican relations. When the two powers compete, then Vietnam suffers a dilemma
of which side to align with. In the situation that both powers interact with each other
in cooperative and competitive relations, Vietnam becomes more vulnerable in the
security, socio-economic and human rights characteristics of the triangular
relationship between Vietnam, China and the US.
CHAPTER 6 investigates the development of the triangular Vietnam, China,
US relationship since 2001 up to present (2015). Vietnam and China entered a new
period of cooperation after the normalization of bilateral ties from 1991 to 2008, then
suffered a tougher time in the territorial disputes over the South China Sea from 2008
onwards. With the US, bilateral ties started slowly in the period after normalization
of diplomatic relations from 1995 to 2008, then witnessed a closer VietnameseAmerican military cooperation from 2008 onwards.
The purpose of Vietnam’s rapprochement with the US in defense ties is
examined to test the hypothesis that Vietnam benefits from increased military
capacity and professionalism in national defense. The chapter argues that Vietnam
can defend its national independence and sovereignty as well as play a greater role in
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contributing to regional security. It also questions the belief that Vietnam wants
closer ties with the US as leverage against China. Vietnam is pursuing a more
independent and imaginative foreign policy, and a closer Vietnam-US military
relationship is only a part of Hanoi’s broader strategy of defensive diplomacy with
other countries such as Russia, India, Australia and France. The final feature that the
chapter explores is the rapprochement between Vietnam and the US, and the chapter
argues that this is not a strategy to counter the rise of China in the region, nor is it a
response to China’s military building up or its assertive sovereignty claim in the
South China Sea.
CHAPTER 7 discusses the implications both for regional countries and for
Vietnam. It argues that the US aims to seek friendly relations with Vietnam to
prevent China’s influence in Southeast Asia while China has tried to put pressure on
Vietnam to replace the “power gap” after the Soviet Union’s collapse reduced the US
presence in Southeast Asia. In this context, Vietnam should follow a foreign policy
of balancing the strategic rivalry of great powers. However the chapter also asserts
that in its external relations, Vietnam should focus on a more imaginative approach
than simply great power balancing, and should seek enhancement of relations with
regional countries within ASEAN, and use other multilateral forums to gain
international support to deal with regional disputes with China. Vietnam’s foreign
policy makers should engage in a charm offensive, with the main task being
protecting national sovereignty, independence and freedom as well as seeking to
maintain national benefit.
The conclusion, CHAPTER 8, highlights the position of Southeast Asia in US
and China’s strategic policy. For the US, despite speculation about its position in the
world, retaining primacy at both regional and global level remains a policy goal.
Given the huge and enduring power disparities in the world, the increasingly
symbiotic nature of power relations in economic terms, and the networked
relationship among states, the thesis argues no power can take advantage of the
current situation to dramatically upset this status quo. Thus, the US-led balance of
power system in the region will endure, and the US-centred liberal order will
continue. In this scenario, China will continue to make a re-emergence in a multipolar system while seeking to avoid conflicts with the US. As long as cooperative
relations between Beijing and Washington remains constructive and stable, there will
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be no surge of military acquisition and no spike in defence spending that could cause
an arms race in the region overall. In this context, this chapter concludes the thesis by
recommending Vietnam’s foreign policy maintain friendly ties with major powers
and stay in harmony with other regional actors. This will be to Vietnam’s benefit,
and ASEAN states should also follow this policy as much as is possible for their own
benefit.
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CHAPTER 2. CHINA’S STRATEGIES TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA

This chapter studies Vietnam’s position in China’s post-Cold War foreign
policy, It will assess China’s ascension in the new world order and its foreign policy
amid global trends and the regional situation in the post-Cold War era. It will focus
on China’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia and China’s strategies towards the
region. The main argument of the chapter is that Chinese interests and foreign policy
towards Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular are to advance its power
and influence in Southeast Asia, leading to significant implications for Vietnam.
2.1
2.1.1

The New World Order after the Cold War
Global Trends and the Rise of China in the New World Order
The fall of the most famous symbol of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, on 10

November 1989 was followed by declarations of independence from many Soviet
Republics and the collapse of the Soviet Union on 8 December 1991 historically
marks the end of the Cold War. As the danger of superpower confrontation receded,
global peace maintained by non-violent means had become a popular trend of
international relations. Roberts argued that a major war during this period is now
highly unlikely. 1 Arguably, the threat of war has been reduced due to the
development of crosscutting cleavages caused by the disappearance of the SovietAmerican poles of power in the international system.2 However, the post-Cold War
peace has not been entirely tranquil, and it is forecasted as an unsteady peace
characterised by strategic uncertainty. Simultaneously, there appeared new
challenges to peace, namely: the revival of nationalism, religious fundamentalism,
and ethno-nationalist disputes in various parts of the world. At the same time, global
security was threatened by regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and uncertainties surrounding the reform process in the Commonwealth
of Independent States (made up of former Soviet Republics) and in other former
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socialist countries.3 As a result, the international trends in the post-Cold War are
notably recognized as the mix of both stability and uncertainty.
Politically, the most significant characteristic of global geopolitics in the
aftermath of the Cold War is the trend of cooperation and competition, contradiction
and harmonization in international relations. Great states tend to adjust their policies
towards maintaining long-term stable strategic partnerships. Although serious
competition still exists, states make an effort to avoid direct rivalry. They strive to
make stability and economic development priorities to advance their national
interests. This adjustment aims to strengthen national power to maximise national
interests in the international arena.
In terms of national hard power, military power continues to play its
traditionally important role. However, in a world of continuing diversity, economic
and technological power have become crucial strengths. Hard power used to be the
ideal tool in international relations, but influence can also be achieved by methods
other than the use of force. So-called “soft power” includes the attraction of national
values such as culture, ideology, education that is extended through internal or
external policies. In addition to these two normal powers, the post-Cold War era also
witnessed the appearance of “smart power,” which is comprised of the combination
of both hard and soft power. 4 As the concept of “national power” becomes less
relevant with “hard power,” “soft power” and “smart power” tend to play a more
significant role in identifying the relative influence of a nation.
Socio-economically, globalization and international integration is another
feature of political reality in the new millennium. In the years of worldinterdependence, states face a variety of global issues that cannot be resolved alone
such as poverty, environmental pressures, weapons of mass destruction, trans-border
diseases, trans-national crimes and terrorism. In this context, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995
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to advance the free trade agenda. WTO is more comprehensive than GATT and has
four key objectives: to enforce rules for international trade; to create a forum to
negotiate and monitor trade liberalization; to improve trade transparency; and to
reduce trade disputes.5 Advocates of globalization argue nations all over the world
should integrate globally, striving to become WTO members so as to facilitate the
development of their own national economies.
Technically, the advancement of digital technology has brought about a
significant revolution to every sector of modern society including international
relations. The scientific and technological evolution has made knowledge and
informatics play a crucial role in global economic affairs, laying the foundation for
the knowledge economy. The main lesson from the Cold War is that military rivalry
was expensive and it took a great toll on both the US and the Soviet Union, while
economic cooperation and competition seems to work effectively for the European
Union (EU), North America and East Asia. In this there is a continuing economic
trend towards tri-polarity with the EU, North America and East Asia as the major
poles since “each of them accounts for approximately one-fourth of the world’s gross
national product (GNP).”6 Economic power is now pursued at a regional, rather than
a national, level.
More importantly, the end of the East-West confrontation left the US with
dominant superpower status. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was
increasingly considered as a new giant both in Asia and the world. China’s rise in the
global trading system has been dramatic: “in thinking strategically about modern
international affairs, there is no more important challenge than to understand the
nature and implications for a rising China.” 7 From one of the least developed
countries in the 1970s, China has made tremendous economic progress to become
one of the largest economies in the world by the end of the 20th century. Considering
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the traditional elements of national power, China’s land area and population have
already made it a major power. Historically, it had been a regional power. China has
the largest population in the world with over 1.2 billion people in July 2000. 8 A
decade later, China maintained its status as the most populous nation on earth with
1.3 billion, a labour force of 780 million and some 389 million Internet users. 9
Accordingly, China’s largest population has steadily affirmed its strength as a global
power.
The rise of China as an economic power is a remarkable feat by any standard.
The annual growth rate of the Chinese economy, measured by the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), has been no less than 10% for over three decades. China’s GDP in
1978 was reportedly 7% of its GDP in 2007, and with economic output doubling on
average every eight years, the structure of the economy has witnessed significant
changes. The primary sector of the economy accounted for 70% of employment in
1978 but this was reduced to 40% by 2007. 10 Other statistics demonstrate that
China’s economic growth rate has been at least 12% per year since the 1990s, fuelled
by rising exports and a staggering $180 billion in foreign investment. According to
the Director-General of the Chinese government policy agency, the State
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, Mr Lu Yong Hua:
We believe we can keep our growth rate around 9% per year for the next 15 years.
China’s GNP (Gross National Product) will become the first in the world in the next
century. It will surpass America’s.11

This economic achievement started in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping, the
successor to Mao Zedong, introduced free-market reforms that led to three decades
of explosive growth rates in the economy under the political control of the Chinese
Communist Party.
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annual growth rate of 10%. In the OECD’s perception, “in just one decade and a half,
China has transformed itself from a dormant, introspective giant into a dynamic
powerhouse.” 13 China overtook Japan and became the world’s second-biggest
economy by the second quarter of 2010, with its GNP of US$1.337 trillion and GDP
of more than US$4.9 trillion.14 China has become the world’s largest exporter15 and
is projected to have the single largest economy in the world by 2016.16 Although this
growth has slowed down slightly due to the global financial crisis, the overall
achievements are still remarkable.17 More impressively, according to calculations by
some American scholars, China’s GDP could reach 25% of global GDP in the year
2030, and 40% in the year 2040, becoming the largest world economy.18
The increased importance of the Chinese economy in the global economic
system has resulted in a greater influence for China in the global political arena.
China is set to achieve more power on the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
governing board, both for the developing world and for itself. China’s voting share
within the IMF increased from 2.9% to 3.6% in 2006 and then to 3.8% in 2010.
Moreover, China has suggested replacing the current dominant currency (USD) with
a basket of currencies that represent the value of special drawing rights (SDRs) used
within the IMF.19

13

Scott, D., ‘China Stands Up: The PRC and The International System’, Routledge, New York 2007,
p. 84.

14

Bloomberg News, 16 August 2010, ‘China overtakes Japan as World’s Second Biggest Economy’

15

‘China becomes World’s number 1 Exporter, passing Germany’, The Associated Press, 10 January
2010 in Travis Nelson and Matthew Carlson, ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese
Influence in Asia’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 2012, p. 477.

16

Nelson, T. and Carlson, M., ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese Influence in
Asia’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 13(4), 2012, pp. 330-359 at 477.

17

Nelson, and Carlson, ‘Charmed by China? Popular Perceptions of Chinese Influence in Asia’, p.
477.

18

Nguyen Tat Giap, Chien luoc dai khai pha mien Tay cua Trung Quoc giai doan 2010-2020 [Trans:
“The Chinese Grand Strategy to exploit the Western Region 2010-2020], in Do Tien Sam and
Kurhara Hirohide (eds), Hợp tác Phát triển: “Hai Hành Lang, Một vành đai Kinh tế” Việt Nam Trung Quốc trong bối cảnh mới [Trans: “Cooperation Development: “Two Corridors, One Economic
Belt: Vietnam and China in the New Situation”], The Social Science Publisher, Hanoi, 2012, p. 227.
19

Dittmer, L., ‘China’s Global Rise’, Americas Quarterly, 2012,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/China-Global-Rise (Date of visit 6 January 2015).

56

China’s phenomenal economic expansion has made it an Asian giant with
greater ambition. For some countries, this ambition is a threat. Former US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice argued:
China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that
China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of
power in its own favour. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the “strategic
partner” the Clinton Administration once called it.20

China’s ambitious strategy to further its power in Asia is focused on
Southeast Asia. The geo-strategic reality is that China is surrounded by strong and
influential nations: Japan and Korea lie in the east and both are protected by the close
US alliance; Russia to the north has a formidable military capacity and possesses
nuclear arms; to the west lies India, a populous country with nuclear arms and
protected from land invasion by the Himalayan mountain range. The only outlet for
Chinese ambitions is Southeast Asia. Thus, it is China’s intention to become a
predominant force in the region by building up close relationships with countries
here, so as to place Beijing in the position of leadership and influence while isolating
the US from its traditional role in this area. For Southeast Asian states, China is
already recognized as the regional dominant superpower, largely due to its effective
translation of burgeoning economic clout into political influence.21
Finally, China’s rapid economic development and growing influence has led
it to seek an expansion of its military capability and force projection. While the US
continues to be the world’s biggest military spender with a defence budget of
US$711 billion in 2011, China has become the second largest spender with an
estimated US$143 billion that year. China has increased its military spending by
170% in real terms since 2002. 22 It has also increased defence spending at
approximately 12% per year. Although Chinese defence spending is only less than a
quarter of the size of the US today, China’s generals are ambitious. According to the
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annual report from the US Congress, China spent as much as US$139 billion on
modernizing its military forces in 2007, more than three times its announced defence
budget. That actual figure would overshadow the military budget of Russia, Japan
and South Korea combined.23 Chinese total military spending, including defense and
other military items, such as research and development, could be as much as US$160
billion. The defence expenditure of China is expected to exceed that of the US by
2035, as China is expected to be the world’s largest military spender that year.24
However, China’s modernization of its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
raised concerns about the future of peace and stability in East Asia. Although
Chinese leaders claim China’s emerging power is a peaceful rise and its military
expansion is only for defensive purposes, the global community is still concerned by
what they see as China’s unclear motivations. China’s military activities have
rekindled American interest in the Asia-Pacific region.25 There is no doubt that China
maintains the largest standing army in the world. The rise of China is undoubtedly
one of the most salient features of international relations in the 21st century.
However, whether China’s rise will be peaceful is uncertain.
2.1.2

The Regional Situation after the Cold War
In evaluating the regional situation in the Asia-Pacific, it is essential to

understand the geographical extent of the area. Southeast Asia is an important part of
the Asia-Pacific. The term “Asia-Pacific” emerged in the post-Cold War world and
denotes a vaguely defined region that covers around two-thirds of the world’s
population and more than half of global trade. The meaning of the term varies in
different contexts. In a geographic sense, the Asia-Pacific is the part of the world in
or near the Western Pacific Ocean, and it typically includes at least East Asia and
Southeast Asia, and even Russia in the north of the Pacific. From a Western geostrategic perspective, the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War is comprised of several
groups of nations. One group includes the former and rising great powers of China,
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Japan and Russia. Another group includes the regionally influential powers such as
Australia, India and Indonesia. The Asia-Pacific can also be divided into the five
sub-regions of East Asia, Heartland, Offshore Asia and Oceania, South Asia and
Southeast Asia.26
Another study considers the Asia-Pacific as a loosely comprised region
moving from Pakistan in the west to the Americas in the east, and from Russia in the
north to Australia and New Zealand to the south. 27 The Asia-Pacific can be
understood geo-politically through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
inaugurated in Australia in 1989. It comprises 21 members from Southeast Asia,
Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Philippines, Russia,
Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, The United States and Vietnam.28
The end of the Cold War has shifted the distribution of powers in the AsiaPacific towards regional multi-polarity and the movement towards alignment. In this
regional political landscape, the US plays the role of both global superpower and
active player that is still settling on its post-Cold War role. Meanwhile, China and
Japan are seeking more influential roles in regional and global politics. From the
early 1990s, the two Koreas and Southeast Asian states have started focusing on a
sub-regional order.29 Therefore, the Asia-Pacific is not only a region of economic
growth, but also a geopolitically strategic area.
Southeast Asia is a crucial part of the Asia-Pacific. Geopolitically, Southeast
Asia is often understood through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), a geopolitical and economic regional organization formed on 8 August
1967. Geographically, Southeast Asia consists of the area to the south of China, east
of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia. It has two geographic sub-
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regions. Mainland Southeast Asia comprises Cambodia, Laos, Burma (Myanmar),
Thailand, Vietnam and Peninsular Malaysia. Maritime Southeast Asia comprises
Brunei, East Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and East Timor.
ASEAN covers a land area of 4.46 million km2, but its sea area is three times larger.
With a population of approximately 600 million people, ASEAN accounts for 8.8%
of the world’s population. As a single entity, ASEAN’s combined nominal GDP had
grown to US$1.8 trillion by 2010.30 It makes the grouping the ninth largest economy
in the world and the third largest in Asia. With rapid growing economies, rising
purchasing power and affluent consumers, Southeast Asia’s combined GDP
exceeded US$2.2 trillion in 2011.31 The size and location of Southeast Asia has been
a factor in the struggle between great powers for influence. In the context of the
global political change following the fall of the Soviet Union, the US withdrew its
forces from Southeast Asia, Japan remilitarized, and China invested heavily in
defence. Therefore, Southeast Asia had to face a changing regional hierarchical
order. Despite withdrawing its forces, the US has maintained its alliance
relationships, strategic cooperation and economic involvement in Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, as a rising regional power, China seems content not to directly challenge
the dominant status of the US. At the same time, Japan and other leading Southeast
Asian states were successful in establishing cooperative mechanisms to create mutual
understanding and regional identity. The result has been cooperation of major powers
and the socialization of China within Southeast Asia, bringing about more
commitment from the US to the region.32
This temporary security in Southeast Asia was enhanced because of the
regional political system after the Cold War. Writing in 1993, Hari Singh argued that
the bipolar international system had a strong impact on Southeast Asia politics and
regional conflicts could be significantly reduced due to the absence of a single pole
in international politics. However, together with increased security, there would be
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increased uncertainties that will undermine regional stability. 33 Tensions such as
contending forces of economic liberalisation and protectionism, repression and
democratisation, nationalism and supranationalism, integration and fragmentation,
hegemony and resistance to great power influence are bound to affect the regional
politics of Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War world.34 Others domestic conflicts
within some Southeast Asian state members including the Philippines (Mindanao),
Indonesia (West Papua) and Thailand (Patani) are also the region’s most pressing
security issues.35
Singh has been largely proved right by history. However, the post-Cold War
world threw a new challenge to the region in the shape of the “global War on
Terror”. Until the Bush administration, and with the development of Southeast Asia
as the “second front” in the “global war on terror,” there is little doubt that
Washington had, to some extent, lost interest in ASEAN as a regional bloc,
preferring to deal directly with the Philippines and Thailand, in particular.36 The US
has also stepped up security relations with former adversary Vietnam by organising
“security dialogues” on political and military issues. 37 The US and Vietnam held
their first annual Political, Security and Defence Dialogue in Hanoi in October 2008.
Both countries have also held an annual Defence Policy Dialogue since 2010. These
dialogues have enhanced the Vietnamese-American defence relationship. However,
Vietnamese Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vịnh has stated the limitations of the
cooperation and reiterated the necessity of bilateral trust between top leaders of the
two nations:
A better defence relationship should be based on the efficiency of practical
cooperation, including overcoming the aftermath of war…Generally speaking, the US
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has offered Vietnam active cooperation in this issue, but it is not enough as the
consequences of war are terrible.38

Acharya and Tan have argued that American engagement in Southeast Asia
with limitations can be useful for the regional order. If Washington gets involved in
regional affairs with its unilateral interests and assertion of power, the US risks
coming into conflict with China. However, if the US adopts a measured presence and
respects China’s growing claims, the situation will be less hostile.39
Southeast Asia has long been considered by China as the “vital region for its
own growth and prosperity.” 40 Thus, US presence in the region can challenge
China’s regional strategy and create a fierce competition between the two major
powers. As Carlyle Thayer concluded, Southeast Asian security was affected by
Sino-American relations due to the US re-engagement with the region and Chinese
assertiveness in the South China Sea. Southeast Asia will continue to be affected by
Sino-American rivalry and military competition.41 The coming of a new world order
has brought about major changes in Southeast Asia’s political landscape. A bipolar
structure has given way to a dynamic multi-polar regional mechanism. SinoAmerican relations have had a great impact on regional security and development,
requiring further detailed analysis about the practical implications for Southeast
Asian states.
2.2
2.2.1

China’s Strategic Interests in Southeast Asia
Political Interests
China’s principal political interest in Southeast Asia is to advance its power

in the region, in recognition of its greater regional status. For centuries China has
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considered Southeast Asia as its most important gateway to the outside world. 42
Another perspective is to see Southeast Asia playing a vital role in China’s attempt to
expand its global influence. 43 According to Thayer, China has been developing
stronger relationships with Southeast Asian states. Between 1999 and 2000, China
signed long-term cooperative framework agreements with all ten ASEAN members.
Besides general cooperation, each agreement is different in details. While the six
documents mention defence cooperation with Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, three other agreements with Indonesia, the
Philippines and Laos refer to human rights. Three of these agreements with the
Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia specifically address the territorial disputes in the
South China Sea.44
With the agenda of reinforcing sub-regional cooperation, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai reached a consensus in
2004 on a new initiative of “two corridors and one ring.” The first corridor stretches
from Nanning (in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) via Lạng Son to Hanoi,
Hai Phong and Quang Ninh. The second corridor will be from Kunming (in Yunnan
province) via Lao Cai to Hanoi, Hai Phong and Quang Ninh.. The one ring is the
Beibu Gulf Rim.45
China has two economic strategies requiring cooperation with Southeast Asia
through ASEAN: the “Great Western Development Strategy,” and the “Gulf of
Tonkin Economic Belt” in Vietnamese or the “Beibu Gulf Economic Rim” in
Chinese. The former covers six southern Chinese provinces (Gansu, Guizhou,
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan) and five autonomous regions (Guangxi,
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang) and the municipality of Chongqing.
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This region contains 71.4% of Mainland China’s area but only 28.8% of its
population (as at the end of 2002) and 19.9% of its total economic output (as at
2009). 46 The second strategy highlights China-ASEAN cooperation as it links
Guandong, Hainan and Guangxi provinces with northern and central Vietnam. 47
These strategies represent a new era in China-Southeast Asian cooperation.
With a new Asian regionalism stimulated by the 2010 China-ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that binds China and six ASEAN countries, and
expanding to all ASEAN members by 2015, China is laying the firm foundation in its
relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours. While the CAFTA opens up a bilateral
framework for cooperation at the strategic level, the other sub-regional mechanisms
facilitate the progress of bilateral cooperation at the grassroots level. Through these
frameworks, China aims to convey its peaceful rise and to bring about economic
development for its southern provinces and make Kunming a regional operation
centre for trade and transport. China’s active role in these cooperation projects
reveals its strategic vision of strengthening bilateral relations with ASEAN.48
According to Thayer, China also views Southeast Asia (and especially the
South China Sea) as its traditional sphere of influence and has attempted to engage
the region in all spheres of bilateral relations. With its reliance on regional energy
sources, China has an interest in enhancing stability and security of regional states,
where these resources are exploited and sent through the sea lines of communications
(SLOCs).49
Between 70 and 80 per cent of the PRC’s vital energy imports pass through
the Straits of Malacca, the narrow and congested waterway in Southeast Asia.50 The
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region was where Chinese migrants have settled down for centuries and it can
provide China with the space to expand its power and influence. In the sub-continent,
India is always a key player, no matter how close the friendship between China and
Pakistan. After the Cold War, China’s rivalry with India in South Asia brought the
former to a strategic partnership with Pakistan. In Central Asia, China has to compete
with Russia and a growing American presence. Therefore, China finds it easier to
deal with Southeast Asia. 51 Stuart-Fox argues that Southeast Asia, in particular
mainland Southeast Asia, is where China can deploy its influence due to a strong US
military presence in Korea as long as the division of the peninsula remains, and with
a US-Japan alliance in place. Southeast Asia is the only choice for Beijing to
cultivate its “sphere of influence.”52
In addition, China needs to establish a safe zone in the south or if possible, a
“sphere of influence” as a “spring-board” to reach out to the outside world, aiming
both to achieve greater international influence and to limit US global hegemony.
Thus, ASEAN is always regarded as an “outer shield” with the role of protecting
China’s western and southern security. Major powers tend to use the surrounding
neighbours as the starting point for a national grand strategy. For example, the US
succeeded in using Canada and Mexico as strategic grounds, taking advantage of
Latin America for strengthening its strategic position.53 Eastern European countries
have distanced themselves from Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 54
Preserving a peaceful and stable atmosphere in Southeast Asia is a long-term
requirement for China with its agenda for the “Great Renewal of Chinese Nation.”55
China is well aware of the crucial significance of ASEAN in implementing major
power diplomacy with a “responsible image” to advance its influence in the world.
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The South China Sea in particular is regarded as one crucial gateway for an
emerging China to carry out its ambition of becoming a sea power and global power
to reach the “green ocean.” China considers the South China Sea as the “unique
path” that can provide either a major convenience or a great obstacle for China in its
expansion. According to Do Minh Cao, the South China Sea is located in an arterial
sea traffic route connecting the Pacific with Indian Ocean, Europe and Asia, the
Middle East and Asia. Five of the world’s ten biggest commercial sea routes are
connected to the South China Sea. The Sea is also regarded as the second busiest
international traffic route with 150 to 200 vessels per day passing through it. Half of
these vessels weigh more than 5,000 tons, and at least 10% of these vessels weigh
more than 30,000 tons. There are 536 seaports in the South China Sea, with two of
them, Singapore and Hong Kong, the world’s largest and most modern ports
respectively.56
Do regards the South China Sea not only as an area of great territorial
importance to China, but it is also vital for its plans to be a regional power.57 China is
blocked to the East by the solid American-Japanese-South Korean alliance, and to
the South West by the Indian Ocean, the traditional sphere of India. Without the
South China Sea, China’s geo-oceanic advantage will be non-existent, making it
solely a continental power. The South China Sea provides a region for China to
achieve its ambition of becoming a sea power and exert global influence.
China favours a multilateral approach to cooperate with Southeast Asia
through the ASEAN regional mechanism. Baviera claims that, since the 1990s,
China has started to evaluate Southeast Asia as a region of strategic value with a
unified ASEAN, which is likely to be an ally for China’s ambition of balancing
powers in Asia.58As a regional power, China finds that a useful method of countering
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US dominance is to accelerate and enhance a multi-polar structure. China expects
ASEAN to evolve into one “pole” in a multi-polar system since the organization
aims to create a peaceful and neutral region.59
ASEAN members are mostly small- to medium-sized countries. If each state
acts on its own, its political strength and international leverage are limited. However,
since the 1990s, ASEAN has developed into one of the most successful integrated
regional associations in the world. If ASEAN succeeds in establishing the ASEAN
Community with its three pillars – Political-Security, Economic and Social-Cultural
cooperation – by 2015, then it will be possible for ASEAN to form one important
geo-political pole in a multi-polar world. Consequently, China, with its rising
position as a regional power, will attempt to affirm its role as a major power in this
area and attempt to influence ASEAN. This is a reasonable assumption because once
China imposes itself on this region it can broaden this greater influence into the
international arena. 60 China values its relationship with ASEAN because the
association represents the whole region. China regards ASEAN as a driving engine
for other important and related multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Closer ties with ASEAN are also
valuable for China, in helping to limit Taiwan’s international quest for legitimacy
since ASEAN supports the One-China policy.61
It is also in China’s interest to constrain the US and reduce American
influence in Southeast Asia. China wants to develop good relations with Southeast
Asia through multilateral cooperation in order to project an image of a regional
power with no potential threat. This image can help constrain American influence.62
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Furthermore, a policy of good cooperation with ASEAN is beneficial for China as
the latter intends to ensure that Southeast Asia has a balanced relationship with other
major powers in the region, including the US, Japan and Russia. 63
Chinese interests in Southeast Asia are not uniform across each regional state.
Southeast Asia is not always docile due to the different national interests.
Specifically, China’s attempts to develop bilateral ties with ten Southeast Asian
countries must satisfy each of the ten countries’ national interests. This argument can
be explored by examining China’s relations with several key Southeast Asian
countries.
Among Southeast Asian maritime nations, Indonesia is acknowledged as
being of great interest to China due to its size, population, strategic location and its
traditional policy of non-alignment.64 Indonesia’s positive features can bring about
major advantages for China, especially after Jakarta and Beijing normalized
diplomatic relations in August 1990. Maintaining a strong relationship with
Indonesia, which is regarded as the de facto leader of ASEAN, can help create more
leverage for China in international issues. Indonesia’s policy of non-alignment is in
line with Chinese interest in a Southeast Asia free of the dominance of outside
powers. China can also benefit from good bilateral relations with Thailand with the
latter’s foreign policy of “go with the strength.”65 Thai diplomats claim that among
Southeast Asian nations, they are enjoying the best relations with China in spite of its
close security engagement with the US. China is aware that Thailand never takes part
in any coalition in opposition to China. Weaker and more vulnerable Southeast Asian
states like Laos and Cambodia consider China as more of a protector than a probable
threat.
Myanmar also regards China as a peaceful neighbour and Sino-Burmese
relations have allowed Chinese trade expansion through to the Bay of Bengal. Bert
argues that China has an interest in good bilateral relations with Myanmar because of
the latter’s geopolitical strategies, arms transfers and response to military logistics
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and other communications problems. Myanmar is now a firm political and military
ally of China. 66 Brunei has historic trade links with China and remains influenced by
China. Malaysia and Thailand have the friendliest relations with Beijing to date
because of closer economic ties with East Asia. 67
Southeast Asia, despite enjoying effective cooperation with China, is not
always docile in its relations with China, especially in the event of conflict between
the US and China. For example, Singapore is not willing to be closer to one or other
of these two powers. Stuart-Fox believes that Singapore, which has been providing
facilities for American warships, is very careful in extending any influence beyond
its borders. It is impossible for Singapore to act as China’s advance garrison or
America’s lone bastion. The Philippines is the ASEAN country most in line with
American interests. Since the Aquino Administration took office, it has given priority
to revitalizing its treaty alliance with the US and both countries signed an Enhanced
Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2014. Diplomatic ties between the PRC and the
Philippines also lack depth due to the Philippines’ closer ties with Taiwan and to the
strong influence of Roman Catholicism in the Philippines. Lastly, Vietnam has more
than a thousand years of Chinese influence. Arguably, the Vietnamese understand the
Chinese better than any other ASEAN state because they share much of the Chinese
worldview. The failure of the Soviet model demonstrated to Vietnam that China
should be dealt with on its own terms. Vietnam has learned from historical
experiences that to be tough and self-reliant can be the best course of action.68
2.2.2

Economic Interests
China has significant investments in Southeast Asia through bilateral

relations and multilateral cooperation, and its persistence in the South China Sea
disputes reveals the region’s economic attractiveness for China.
Much of China’s imported energy is transported through regional sea-lanes
and the region has important natural resources that can meet China’s future needs. A
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peaceful environment in Southeast Asia is regarded as an important precondition for
China’s continued economic growth. ASEAN states have enjoyed strong economic
growth and it is believed this will bind the area more closely to the Asia-Pacific
through ASEAN-led institutions. 69 Furthermore, China derives economic benefits
from cooperation with Southeast Asia at a multilateral level in order to check the
interests of its competitors, particularly the US. Khoo et al. argue that the planned
establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2010 was seen as a tool for
China to enhance its power over the region and reduce the influence of China’s
competitors such as Japan, Taiwan and the US. The ASEAN+3 forum (ASEAN,
China, Japan and South Korea) attempted to strengthen China-ASEAN relations by
excluding the US. In this sense, China’s active participation in multilateral
mechanisms such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in 2003, the
EAS, and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area from part of China’s intentional grand
strategy. This tactic is carried out on the basis of “non-threatening trade-focused”
approach using “formal and informal mechanisms of interdependence as a de facto
strategy to restrain the US.”70
Additionally, China’s main economic engagement with Southeast Asia is
related to the ethnic Chinese living in the region. According to Vaughn and
Morrison, there are about 30 to 40 million ethnic Chinese residing in Southeast Asia.
Most of them are descendants of migrants from the southern Chinese provinces of
Guangdong and Fujian. Among Southeast Asian states, Indonesia has the largest
Chinese ethnic community with eight million people (3.2% of the total population).
Chinese ancestry and the Chinese Lunar New Year were officially recognized in
Indonesia in 2003. There are also significant ethnic Chinese populations in other
Southeast Asian states – two million in Singapore (about 80% of its population); five
million in Malaysia (28% of population); five million in Thailand (10% of
population) and two million in Myanmar (3.5% of population).71 The majority of the
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Chinese community in these Southeast Asian states have played an important role in
China’s economic interests in the region due to their huge contribution to the
regional economy.
From a bilateral viewpoint, China has maintained its economic interests in
Southeast Asia through amicable relations with individual states. This is because
Southeast Asia, through ASEAN-10, is a diversified group in its relations with
China. Three nations of ASEAN-10 that enjoy a higher per capita GDP than China
are Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Two countries in this group, Indonesia and
the Philippines, have a lower per capita GDP than China, but have enjoyed strong
growth in domestic industrial and modern service sectors in the past four decades.
China has helped Indonesia to build bridges and roads in Surabaya, East Java and in
some islands. In the coming years, China is expected to assist Indonesia build a
bridge to connect Java and Sumatra. Indonesia also has cooperated with China in
military technology in order to reduce its dependence on the US and other Western
countries. 72 Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have made impressive efforts in GDP
growth, and Vietnam has achieved faster economic growth than any other economy
in the region.73 China aims to gain a bigger share over Cambodia’s natural resources.
In exchange for enhancing bilateral relations with Cambodia and boosting the
Cambodian economy, China can achieve favourable leverage in its mediation of
regional conflicts.74 China has built the closest bilateral relationship with Myanmar.75
Its economic interests in Myanmar can serve its purpose of economic and military
expansion. These policies are likely to help China secure a stronger access to the
Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean.76
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Bert concluded that China’s interests in the expansion of roads, railways and
other transportation infrastructure is focused not only in Myanmar, but also on parts
of its general strategy to improve access to and from Southeast Asia, including
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. A large land zone in the south of Yunnan province
called the Golden Peninsula has three routes through Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. It
is expected to create favourable conditions for Chinese commercial penetration into
Southeast Asia. Chinese investment in infrastructure in the region comes from not
only its intentional strategy, but also from the objective requirement of Chinese
economic expansion due to Yunnan province’s limited connection with China’s coast
and the outside world.77
Tran argues that China’s economic interests in the South China Sea are of
vital importance. Several East Asian nations such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore and China have national economies heavily dependent on the maritime
route through the South China Sea. The Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) are
the lifelines of navigation for the transfer of oil and other natural resources between
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. More than 90% of global commercial
transportation is carried out through navigation, of which 45% is done through the
South China Sea. Furthermore, the volume of oil and gas transferred through this
area is 15 times larger than that transferred through the Panama Canal.78 Do claims
that China controls 29 out of 39 maritime routes, and that 60% of its imports and
exports, and 70% of its oil, are transported through the South China Sea annually.
The sea routes in this region play a crucial role for China’s exportation of its own
products, worth US$31 billion in 2012.79
Given its recent assertiveness in the territorial disputes with Southeast Asian
neighbours, little further evidence is required to gauge China’s interest in the South
China Sea. Zhao clarified that Chinese assertiveness is the result of a Chinese energy
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security “emergency,” when the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East
placed China and its energy strategy at risk of probable constraint and cost increases.
As a result, China had to implement new energy diversification tactics, shifting oil
and gas development to the ocean, especially to the South China Sea.80 China is now
an energy superpower gobbling up coal, electricity, oil and other raw materials. In
2003, China consumed more than 40% of the world’s cement output, and was
responsible for one-third of the world’s growth in oil consumption and 90% in steel
demand.81 China’s oil importation is set to increase from 6.2 million barrels per day
(bpd) in 2004 to 12.7 million bpd in 2020. China’s current domestic problems of
pollution caused by coal burning are also adding urgent pressure to explore new
alternative energy resources to replace traditional sources. 82 Therefore, partly
because of its future energy needs, China has become the major player in Southeast
Asia, especially in the South China Sea.
2.2.3

Security Interests
China aims to increase its influence in Southeast Asia through maritime

expansion and counter the presence of the US in the region. The Malacca, Sunda,
Lombok, Makassar and Ombai-Wetar Straits have turned out to be important for
China in its security strategy. Lee 83 has argued that these straits were not only
significant in terms of economic values but also crucial with regards to security
perspectives. The Straits of Malacca is about 500 nautical miles long, 200 miles wide
to the north and about 11 miles across at its narrowest point. It provides the shortest
passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Due to its location, the
Straits of Malacca is often viewed as China’s most important waterway to expand
Chinese naval power into the Indian Ocean and beyond. People’s Liberation Army

80

Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Disputes and China-ASEAN Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1),
2013, pp. 27-43 at 32.
81

Kim, M.J. & Jones, R.E., ‘China’s Energy Security and the Climate Change Conundrum’, Natural
Resources &Environment, 19(3), 2005, pp. 3-8 at 3.
82

Vaughn, B. and Morrison, W.M., ‘China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues and Implications
for the United States”, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress, 2006, CRS 19-20.

83

Lee, J.H., ‘China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24(3), 2002, pp. 549-568 at 560.

73

(PLA) strategists have a clear objective of controlling this strait so that no other
power can impede its movements.84
The Sunda Straits, between Sumatra and Java, is the major sea link from the
Indian Ocean to the Java Sea, but it is less strategic than the Malacca Straits as it is
shallow and incapable of taking the largest shipping. The Lombok Straits, between
Bali and Lombok, is a crucial waterway for ships travelling from Malacca to the
Indian Ocean. The Makassar Straits, between Kalimantan and Sulawesi, contains a
large number of offshore and coastal oil fields. The Ombai Straits lies between the
islands of Alor and Timor, while the Wetar Straits divides the northern coast of
Timor and the southern coast of Wetar. After the Straits of Gibraltar, the US regards
both the Ombai and Wetar Straits as most important for its defence policy.85
Lanteigne argues that China’s security interest in Southeast Asia, especially
the Malacca Straits, is to serve the purpose of expanding the operational space for the
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Although China is an emerging Asian
giant, its naval forces are still underdeveloped compared to those of the other powers.
Moreover, the PLAN is deficient in large-scale operations far from Chinese waters.
Hence, the Chinese find it essential to shift naval capability from “green water,”
which covers the coastal areas, to “blue water,” which allows force projection into
deep ocean waters.86
China also harbours an ambition for greater security influence in Southeast
Asia. The region plays a vital role for China’s stability and development due to
traditional security concerns and reform-era economic concerns. From a historical
perspective, the previous collapse of Chinese dynasties has led to Chinese
encirclement or an invasion from the periphery. The PRC remains committed to
maintaining a good relationship with Southeast Asia with the view of creating a
stable periphery and a good security environment for Chinese economic
development.87
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Maintaining relations with Southeast Asia also helps China to reduce
American influence in the region. De Castro advanced this argument by showing
China’s strategy of creating “unstable power balancing” to undermine America’s
well-established alliance systems and force deployment in Asia. To carry out this
strategy, China introduced a “New Security Concept” (NSC) in 1998, which became
a prominent theme in China-Southeast Asia relations by 2008. The NSC presents a
model of diplomatic-defence relationships with countries that are neither Chinese
allies nor opponents. Since then, China has consistently promoted the usage of this
new concept in regional and international security forums such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), ARF or EAS as a push for regional community
building. These initiatives are believed to help China to unbalance the influence of
the US through multilateral consultation. 88 China seeks to maintain good relations
with each individual Southeast Asian state over energy security.89 It considers the
South China Sea as a strategic region.90 Lee claims that China has to make efforts to
enhance its maritime capability so as to exercise greater control over the Sea by
safeguarding the sea-lanes from the Middle East to Chinese ports.91
China’s interest in Cambodia is a security issue, as it may need Cambodia as a
strategic location to get access to the sea in a response to an escalation of the South
China Sea dispute. China has invested around US$1.2 billion for weapons and other
military equipment for Myanmar, in exchange for securing a beneficial future market
for its large defence industry. More importantly it will now be able to collect
intelligence data on movements through the busy shipping lanes from the Indian
Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.92
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2.3

China’s Strategies towards Southeast Asia
A historical analysis of Chinese political, economic and security strategies

towards Southeast Asia can help understand changes and continuities in Chinese
foreign policy. We can divide the post-Cold War era into three main periods: the
“new diplomacy” period from 1991 to 2000; the “good neighbour” period from 2001
to 2008; and the current period since 2009 after Hu Jintao came to power.
2.3.1

Political Strategies
In the early 1990s, China commenced a strategy of “new diplomacy” toward

its Southeast Asian neighbours. This policy emphasized international cooperation for
economic growth with China as a responsible regional power. The main
characteristics of the policy were the establishment of more active diplomatic
relations, having frequent leadership meetings, placing greater priority on people to
people exchanges with an emphasis on “peaceful development”, and on the use of
soft power to achieve international goals. This more flexible Chinese diplomatic
strategy aimed to assure Southeast Asia that China’s economic and political rise
would benefit the region.93
Since China’s new diplomacy was launched, it has carried out a successful
diplomatic campaign in Southeast Asia. In August 1990 China re-established
diplomatic relations with Indonesia. Two months later, Singapore extended formal
diplomatic recognition to China. In 1991, China normalised diplomatic relations with
Brunei and Vietnam, completing diplomatic ties with all Southeast Asian states. It
opened a new era of fruitful bilateral relations with frequent high-ranking exchange
visits. Between 1990 and 1992, there were 110 visits from China to ASEAN
countries and 109 from ASEAN states to China. In 1993, the Malaysian Prime
Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, brought an entourage of 290 political elites and
entrepreneurs in “the most successful foreign visit” to China for a series of business
deals worth US$3.2 billion. The year 1993 was heralded in the Chinese media as “the
year of China’s ASEAN diplomacy.”94
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Since 1991, China can be considered the primary supporter of Southeast Asia.
As part of its commitment to multilateral security cooperation, China has engaged
institutionally with Southeast Asia at the regional level through the ARF and
ASEAN+3. China joined ARF as an official member for the first time in July 1994
and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in July 1996. In December 1997,
Chinese President Jiang Zemin attended the unofficial ASEAN+3 Summit in Kuala
Lumpur and signed the Joint Declaration on “ASEAN-China Cooperation towards
the 21st Century.” On the basis of this meeting, the ASEAN-China Summit has been
held annually, creating a useful regional forum for cooperation in mutual concern
matters. China also announced its “new security concept” in 1998 with a focus on
multilateral security, a precondition for the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on
the South China Sea in 2002.
For long-term strategies, China has made efforts to boost its bilateral security
relations with regional states, undertaking high ranking exchanges, conducting joint
military exercises, and selling weapons to its neighbours. These active approaches
were effective in projecting a more positive image of China to Southeast Asia.95
From the early 1990s to the 2000s, Chinese strategy was to gradually reduce any
perception of a “China Threat” among Southeast Asian countries. Chinese VicePresident Hu Jintao remarked at the opening ceremony of the Annual Conference of
the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in 2004:
China is an Asian country. China’s development is closely related to Asia’s prosperity.
Persisting in building good-neighbourly relationships and partnerships with the
neighbouring countries, we pursue a policy of bringing harmony, security and
prosperity to neighbours and dedicate ourselves to strengthening mutual trust and
cooperation with the fellow Asian countries, easing up hot spot tensions, and striving to
maintain peace and tranquillity in Asia. China’s development cannot be achieved
development in isolation of Asia, and Asia’s prosperity also needs China. China will
follow a peaceful development path holding the banners of peace, development and
cooperation, join the other Asian countries in bringing about Asian rejuvenation, and
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making greater contribution to the lofty cause of peace and development in the
world”.96

With this win-win approach, some Southeast Asian states have shown less
hostility towards China. Hu also remarked at the same conference that:
It is China’s sincere wish to cultivate with the fellow Asian countries an overall and
close partnership geared to Asian rejuvenation, a partnership that features equality and
mutual trust politically, mutual benefit and win-win economically, exchange and
emulation culturally, and dialogue and cooperation on the security front.97

From 2001 to 2008, the Chinese “Good Neighbour Policy” aimed at “hòa
thuận với láng giềng, yên ổn cho láng giềng, giàu có với láng giềng” [Trans: the
policy of peace, stability and wealth with neighbours] with the view to achieve “cùng
phát triển, cùng an ninh, cùng phồn vinh” [Trans: mutual development, security and
wealth] thanks to “khối cộng đồng lợi ích xung quanh Trung Quốc” [Trans: the
beneficial community block around China]. China, in this strategy, must promote
“đoàn kết bên trong, hữu nghị bên ngoài, mưu cầu cùng thắng” [Trans: internal
solidarity, external friendship for win-win relationships with neighbours].98
According to Chen, China’s foreign policy is omni-directional; while it wants
to improve relations with every country, the priority is a good neighbour strategy
with surrounding countries, followed by a more active role in the international
community. Chen argues that this policy had its roots from the status of China as an
Asian country with limited national strength. In order to go further into the world,
China needed to have close cooperation with Western nations such as the US.
China’s post-Cold War foreign policies show its determination to create advantages
for domestic reform and economic development.99
Since 2001, China continued its strategies towards Southeast Asia actively
and responsibly by hosting summits and proposing new multilateral mechanisms.
Bilateral ties were sealed by a Joint Declaration in December 1997 of “partnership of
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good neighbourliness and mutual trust towards the 21st Century,” China and ASEAN
officially signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity in October 2003. Following these guidelines, China and ASEAN have
since established the dialogue mechanism and multi-level agreements such as
ASEAN+1 (ASEAN and China), ASEAN+3, economic and diplomatic consultations
at ministerial level, political consultations at high ranking levels, and joint
cooperative commissions, which aim at creating close cooperation over regional and
international issues. China is the first power to appoint a Resident Ambassador to
ASEAN.100
After Kuala Lumpur was announced as the host of the first EAS to be held in
December 2005, China expressed its desire to host the summit in 2006. China also
hosted other defence meetings and made positive proposals for regional defence
transparency. China arranged reciprocal high-ranking exchange visits to ASEAN
countries to show Chinese willingness to invest time, effort and resources to improve
bilateral relations with neighbouring countries. These active approaches towards
Southeast Asia have allowed ASEAN to gain trust in China and to move from a
position of suspicion to an acceptance that China is a responsible and constructive
regional power.101
Since 2009, China has become even more influential since the financial crisis
in 2008. The negative side of Chinese foreign policy after 2010 is its rising
aggressiveness. This is particularly evident in Southeast Asia where some analysts
have suggested that China is carving out a “sphere of influence” through a kinder,
more nuanced “new” diplomatic approach. China’s stridency is clear due to its
assertiveness in the South China Sea territorial disputes. It has conducted an
increasing number and range of military exercises. Chinese maritime patrols in the
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region and its enhanced military activities in the South China Sea disputes have led
to a number of clashes with Filipino and Vietnamese vessels.102
2.3.2

Economic Strategies
From the early post-Cold War period China has aimed to deepen its economic

relations with Southeast Asia as part of China’s strategy to develop dynamic
economic relations with Japan, South Korea, the US and ASEAN. This has been
done to ensure China’s continued economic development and to provide
comprehensive security. Yong Deng noted that, in the 1990s, China’s trade with six
Southeast Asian states (excluding Vietnam) had increased at an annual rate of over
20% from US$6.02 billion in 1990 to US$13 billion in 1994. It jumped to US$18.44
billion in 1995 as ASEAN surpassed Taiwan to become China’s fifth largest trading
partner.103
China focused itself on its economic relations with Southeast Asia in order to
create favourable conditions for its domestic development. Renato Cruz De Castro
notes Beijing’s principal goals are to strive for fast economic growth, continuing
economic liberation, globalization, social harmonization and political consolidation
as well as a modern military capability against Taiwan with a view to enhance
regional influence. It does not aim to challenge the US at the global level. 104
Following this strategy, China has played an important role as a driving force to
boost regional economic development, an important factor in helping Southeast
Asian states maintain high rates of economic development and financial stability,
especially after the complications of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis.
Glosny described China’s loans and aid through multilateral channels such as
the International Monetary Fund as more than meeting ASEAN countries’

102

‘Chapter 1: China’s Foreign Policy Aggressiveness’, The China Story, Australian Centre on China
in the World, http://www.thechinastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook-2012/chapter-1-chinas-foreignpolicy-aggressiveness/ (Date of visit 10 September 2014)
103

Deng, Y., ‘Managing China’s hegemonic ascension: Engagement from Southeast Asia’, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 21(1), 1998, pp. 21-43 at 5.

104

De Castro, R.C., ‘Clashing American Images of an Emergent China and the 21st Century ChinaASEAN Relations: 2001-2008’, International Journal of China Studies, 2(3), 2011, pp. 610-623 at
p.614

80

expectations.105 Similarly, ASEAN also appreciated the Chinese refusal to devalue
its currency (renminbi), which could have set off another round of competitive
devaluations that could do more harm to ASEAN. During this time, China behaved
as a “responsible and unselfish power,” and did not seek to take advantage of
Southeast Asia’s economic woes. ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino
commented, “China is really emerging from this smelling good.”106
In 2009 ASEAN was China’s largest trading partner with trade to the value of
US$178 billion. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), inaugurated on 1
January 2010, has now become the world’s third largest free trade area after the EU
and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), with the total GDP of member
states equivalent to US$6 billion. It has a total trade volume of US$4.5 billion and a
market of 1.9 billion people living in an area of 13 million square kilometres.107 For
the first eight months of 2010, bilateral trade increased by 47% and ASEAN exports
to China increased by 54%.108 Closer economic integration has clearly worked for
China, and has bought it a good deal of political goodwill, although tensions remain.
2.3.3

Security Affairs
The stronger the Chinese are, the more assertive they become in developing

security strategies towards Southeast Asia. Hoang Oanh notes that China has recently
developed a security of “opportunity” policy to replace that of “assertiveness.” In the
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past, China used to be very careful in choosing the opportunities for its security
strategies to avoid the risks of facing strong external reaction from overseas.109 In
most of the disputes with its ASEAN neighbours, China made efforts to resolve or
reduce tensions to show China’s responsible behaviour. In the land disputes with
Laos and Vietnam, China showed its willingness to compromise in bilateral
agreements with Laos (in 1991) and Vietnam (in 1999) to delineate their common
land border.110 In 2000, China and Vietnam agreed on the maritime boundaries and
fishery cooperation in the Beibu Gulf. Five years later, China ceased its assertiveness
in the South China Sea with the commitment to move towards a signing of the
multilateral code of conduct. After several multilateral efforts the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed by concerned parties in
November 2002 in Phnom Penh. As noted previously, China has made efforts
towards greater military cooperation with Southeast Asia to reduce ASEAN’s
mistrust, such as military exchanges with Thailand, a close military relationship with
Myanmar, and proposed joint military exercises with Vietnam and the Philippines.111
In the past few years China has acted differently in security affairs, causing
problems for political analysts. Unlike its previous cooperative manner in dealing
with Southeast Asia, China since 2009 has carried out a more aggressive security
policy towards the region. According to Le Thu Huong,112 the state-owned China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has deployed the HD-981, a deep-sea
oil-drilling rig, in the disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands along with another
80 vessels since 2 May 2014. Since the HD-981 was located within Vietnam’s
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the deployment of this oil rig led to strong antiChinese riots in Vietnam. A demonstration on 7 May 2014 was organised by 20 civil
society groups that opposed China’s invasion of Vietnamese territory and called on
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measures from the Vietnamese government to deal with the crisis appropriately.
More peaceful demonstrations occurred from 11 May to oppose China’s presence in
the Vietnamese EEZ. The demonstrations were followed by violence in Binh Duong,
Dong Nai and Ha Tinh provinces on 13 May 2014.113 China’s assertiveness in the
South China Sea territorial disputes has led to rising tension and a revival of old
suspicions in Southeast Asia of China’s potential threat to the region. Southeast
Asian states such as Vietnam and Indonesia remain wary of China’s position as an
emerging regional power and believe that one day it will impose its dominance on
the region.114
2.4
2.4.1

Implications for Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular
Implications for Southeast Asia
Trade between China and ASEAN is now greater than ASEAN trade with the

EU or the US. 115 Thus, from the perspective of the business sector, China’s
spectacular economic development can be a leading engine for ASEAN’s economic
expansion. China’s tariff-free market is a huge benefit for ASEAN exporters. Some
analysts have even argued that China’s increasing economic power can help
Southeast Asia to reduce western influence. 116 More advantageously, Southeast
Asian is beneficial from China’s efforts to have win-win cooperation with Southeast
Asian nations as Chinese President Xi Jinping stated:
China cannot achieve development in isolation from the world, and the world also
needs China for development. China is fully committed to the path of peaceful
development, the independent foreign policy of peace and the opening-up strategy for
win-win results. A stronger China will add to the force for world peace and the positive
energy for friendship, and will present development opportunities to Asia and the
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world, rather than posing a threat. China will continue to share opportunities for
economic and social development with ASEAN, Asia and the world.117

Consequently, Southeast Asia through ASEAN can gain great benefits from
the four-point program developed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is a
favourable condition for the region to boost its economic development and bilateral
relations with its giant neighbour. Xi’s plan is to increase bilateral trade from
US$326 billion in 2011 to US$500 billion in 2015, encourage Chinese companies to
step up investment in ASEAN, promote transportation on land and sea between
China and ASEAN as well as enhancing people to people two-way exchange of
100,000 youth and students over a ten-year period.118
Southeast Asia can also gain great benefits from bilateral relations with China
to attract Chinese tourists to the region, the number of which increased sharply to 4.5
million in the year 2008. Even after the Global Financial Crisis led to a regional
financial crisis in Southeast Asia, in 2010 Thailand reportedly received 45% more
Chinese tourists than in 2009.119
In general, Southeast Asia through ASEAN can seek advantageous benefits
from China’s interests in the region. However, China’s rise is likely to bring about a
variety of risks for Southeast Asia. Chinese military modernization and
aggressiveness over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea may be seen as
threats for the ASEAN region.
China’s expanding budget for naval modernization has created concerns for
regional stability. Chinese defence transformation can be seen as part of the normal
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process of military modernization, and quite reasonable given Chinese economic
expansion. However, the United States, Japan and Australia as well as other regional
states have raised concerns that China’s military build-up is more than defensive. To
some extent, China’s development of blue water navy may be viewed as an effort to
ensure the security of SLOCS and to protect China’s growing global interests.120
Most notably, China’s growing assertiveness of sovereignty over the South
China Sea has become the biggest threat for Southeast Asia in the context of bilateral
relations. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea represent the greatest
challenge to ASEAN unity and cohesion in its road map towards an ASEAN
Community in the year 2015. This unresolved matter not only pits Southeast Asian
claimant states against China, but also pits ASEAN as a collective against China.121
The disputes have divided Southeast Asian states into mainland (Myanmar, Thailand,
Laos and Cambodia), littoral (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysian and Brunei) and
maritime (Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) camps on the South China Sea issue.
This “security complex” of individual attitudes towards the problem exists while the
mainland states have adopted a position of greatest deference towards China, at the
same time as the littoral countries carried out a policy of both deference and defiance
with a noticeable military component, and the maritime neighbours supported the
approaches of deference as well as defiance with a notable focus on diplomatic
efforts.122
Historical lessons demonstrate that all superpowers are potential threats to
stability because superpowers aim to use power to achieve strategic ends. China is an
emerging superpower, so it is reasonable to test whether China will be a threat to
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regional security and stability. 123 In the realist’s view, China poses a clear and
obvious threat to US power and to the region as it aims to expand its influence in the
world. The question is, how exactly should ASEAN react or respond to the situation
of living next door to an emerging regional power?
In the past, Southeast Asia has traditionally views its northern neighbour at a
threat. China’s great size and proximity, the longevity of Chinese civilization, the
traditional tributary relations with Southeast Asian kingdoms and the presence of
wealthy Chinese ethnic communities in Southeast Asia have all contributed to fuel
anxieties about the “China Threat.” China’s recent economic and military
development has raised the spectre that China will soon attempt to impose its agenda
on the region, and will try to dominate Southeast Asia.124 However, in spite of all
these potential challenges, China appears to have recently persuaded most of its
Southeast Asian neighbours that China does not pose an immediate security threat to
the region.125 Beijing has dispelled most of the suspicions that the PRC will in the
future act as a great superpower and try to dominate the region. ASEAN should
however be well-prepared for the possibility that a powerful China may request
special privileges that could threaten the autonomy and independence of smaller
states.
In the long term, hedging or balancing in harmonization is the most practical
strategy for Southeast Asia to deal with Chinese possible domination. This hedging
approach aims to establish relations with other large outside powers to counterbalance the Chinese influence. For example, Southeast Asia through ASEAN has
built up close linkage with not only the US, but also with Japan, Russia and India,
while the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which is an agreement
covering Malaysia and Singapore, connects the region with the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand (through Malaysia and Singapore). This is an appropriate
way for Malaysia and Singapore to invite multiple powers, both “great” and
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“middle”, to check each other while continuing to play an important role in the
region.126
Additionally, the policy of engagement should also be used as another
effective tool for Southeast Asia to avoid Chinese domination. This strategy involves
encouraging China to participate in multilateral organizations, dialogues/forums and
agreements to exercise its responsibility as regional power. Consequently,
engagement can help to reduce tensions and bring about political convergence in
terms of a favourable position towards a China that is connected to the region in
partnership relations and which will act in a cooperative “ASEAN way”. 127 As a
result, the most effective response can be to create a win-win solution, not a zerosum game for ASEAN’s partners in the region, including China, as engagement also
appears to be its policy for reducing tensions and building confidence. ASEAN’s
policy of engaging all players can help development of the region through having
outside powers complement and not compete with each other. This policy is analysed
by Evelyn Goh in the concept of “omni-enmeshment”.128
Accordingly, Southeast Asian nations find themselves in a disadvantageous
situation if they face an unstable multi-polar regional system with major powers
competing against each other. In order to hedge against that possibility, ASEAN
chooses to neither pick sides nor to exclude any major powers, but to make efforts to
include all different powers in the regional affairs. Indeed, according to a seasoned
ASEAN political official, it is not ASEAN’s desire to see outside powers compete, as
this would be unlikely to produce a general benefit: rather, it is ASEAN’s duty to
make efforts to have all powers engaged in Southeast Asia to cooperate with each
other to bring benefits to the region.129
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2.4.2 Implications for Vietnam
Vietnam has a unique position in Chinese foreign policy. In the mindset of
the Chinese ruling class, Vietnam used to be considered as the “shield” to protect the
Chinese southern border region against foreign invaders that China wanted to
subdue. After more than 1,000 years of Chinese rule, Vietnam gained its
independence from China in AD 939. During the Ming dynasty, Vietnam was
dominated by China again, though briefly, from 1407 to 1428. 130 According to
Thayer, ideology could sometimes bring Vietnamese and Chinese bilateral relations
to be as “close as lips and teeth.” The relationship was once praised by Ho Chi Minh
as “comrade plus brother,” but on other occasions China considered Vietnam a “little
hegemonist” and the “Cuba of the East.”131
In the author’s interview with a Vietnamese official, he considers Vietnam a
unique country in the region, having experienced both positive and negative
historical relations with China. After it joined ASEAN in 1995, its role is improving
positively. Vietnam has the third largest population in Southeast Asia after Indonesia
and the Philippines. Vietnam is taking part in regional matters actively, contributing
to ASEAN and in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, if China wants to have good relations with
an ASEAN state, it should build up a good relationship with Vietnam. As a result,
Vietnam plays an important role in China’s foreign policy.132 Its long sea border of
3,444 km has also given Vietnam a strong connection to maritime Southeast Asia.133
Furthermore, Vietnam plays the role of “a buffer zone” in China’s foreign
policy. Major powers often feel more secure with neighboring regions as buffers
against rival powers. The buffer state’s position is important as it can help one
power, encircle or wedge into the territory of another power. Trying to manage
neighboring states by cooperating, forcing into obedience or preventing outside
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powers from interfering into regional affairs are options for the regional power.134
With its S-line geographical location, Vietnam situates as a bridge for China to go
further into Southeast Asia. According to Le, China always considers Vietnam as the
gateway to Southeast Asia. Thus, maintaining a good relationship with Vietnam is an
assurance of the “good neighborhood” policy that China aims to show its regional
partners, and the world, about China’s peaceful rise. Womack described the meaning
of Vietnam in China’s foreign policy:
For China, Vietnam has been the southern boundary stone of its grand notions of itself.
Vietnam viewed China as the inscrutable northern giant. Even at peace the giant is
feared because the fateful decision of war or peace is largely in the giant’s hand.135

Among Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam is the one that understands most
about Chinese strategic thinking and interests in the region. Vietnam is also the
unique country that had wars with the two great powers - China and the US - and the
only one that defeated both of them.136 Thus, Vietnam in the strategic calculation of
both China and the US can be used as the buffer zone to manage the other power. As
a close neighbour, Vietnam is affected by the rise of China and its strategic interests
in Southeast Asia. Examining the growth of China stems from a pragmatic need to
understand this Asian giant, and by doing so to recommend appropriate policy
strategies for Vietnam.
If China refrains from the more expansionist aspect of the Đại Hán (Great
China) ideology, bilateral relations between Vietnam and China can be positive, as in
the motto of “friendly neighbours, both comrades and brothers.” Vietnam can gain
positive political and economic benefits from a benign regional power. Vietnam
could speak publicly of both countries as “mountains to mountains, rivers to rivers”
that share a number of identical features in history and culture, with a long tradition
of bilateral relations. Sino-Vietnamese relations should be strengthened under the
guideline of sixteen (Vietnamese) “golden words”: “Láng giềng thân thiện, Hợp tác
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toàn diện, Ổn định lâu dài, Hướng tới tương lai [Trans: Friendly Neighbourhood,
Comprehensive Cooperation, Long-term Stability, Future Orientations]. This
relationship can take place within four “goods”: good neighbours, good friends, good
comrades and good partners.137 The bilateral relations and a comprehensive strategic
partnership could also be deepened further on the basis of the two states operating
under similar Marxist ideological and economic principles.138
China’s peaceful rise could bring about a more influential stance for Vietnam
as its closest neighbour because of Vietnam’s geographical location and strategic
importance in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. With its long coastline and a
shared mainland frontier with China, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam could gain from
the active involvement of major powers in the region, as well as by playing the role
of a connecting bridge between Northeast and Southeast Asia. In addition to its
stability and attractive investment environment, the dynamic economic development
of Vietnam has created a favourable impression of Vietnam in the calculation of
major powers.139 Consequently, in the fluid and dynamic developing Southeast Asian
region, Vietnam has become a factor to be noted in how any shift in power will affect
the region and the interests of all states within it.
China’s spectacular economic rise has created export opportunities for
Vietnam. China and Vietnam were initially strategic partners, but this was later
upgraded to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in 2008. Both nations
have some remarkable achievements in economic cooperation. According to
Vietnam’s General Department of Customs, China is still Vietnam’s largest trading
partner in 2013, with a total import and export value of US$50.21 billion, up 22%
from the previous year.140 Vietnam imports machinery, refined oil and steel from
China while exporting to China unrefined oil, coal and rubber. Statistics show that
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the most crucial problem in the bilateral trade relationship is the imbalance in
China’s favour. Vietnam has a trade deficit with China. From US$9.1 billion in 2007,
it increased to US$12.6 billion in 2010.141
China’s expansion gives Vietnam the opportunity to bring its bilateral trade
with China to a more balanced level. Vietnam should take advantage of this. China
has now become the world’s largest importing market. While a lot of developed
economies are still suffering from the global financial crisis, China continues to
import goods. The value of China’s imports is 10% of the global GDP, a figure
equivalent to that of the entire EU. Moreover, the speed of China’s economic
development over the past three decades has created a growing middle class, which
stimulated higher demand. Vietnam is likely to increase its exports to China due to
its geographic proximity.142
Furthermore, Vietnam can attract substantial FDI from China’s interests in
the region due to its central position in Southeast Asia. The FDI from China to
Vietnam in the first decade of the 21st century increased markedly following the
normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1991. There were sharp increases in projects
numbers, investment volume and capital registered. By April 2011, there were a total
of 790 projects, with investment capital totalling US$3.7 billion, placing China 14th
out of the 92 countries and states that invest in Vietnam.143
Nguyen Dinh Liem 144 predicted that in the coming years, Vietnam could
enjoy favourable investments from China because of the Chinese government’s
development strategy towards exports. More investment from China is a reasonable
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proposition, as Vietnam has benefits over other markets in the region. According to
the World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPs) from 2009 to 2011 conducted by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Vietnam was
assessed to be one of fifteen most attractive economic markets for investment
because of its stable political system, good economic growth and rising international
stance. Vietnam will figure in the thinking of Chinese investors in Southeast Asia.
On the less positive side, if China develops in the direction of Đại Hán, and if
it adopts an expansionist ideology in the territorial sense as a major power, then the
scenario can be risky, creating many challenges for Vietnam. The negative impacts
will worsen the traditional friendship and cooperation between the two communist
parties. Domestically, China can cause difficulties for Vietnam by disrupting national
unity, dividing the Vietnamese leaders and people. Internationally, China can isolate
Vietnam in the regional and international arena. In the past, China has shown that it
could do this, especially when Vietnam deployed troops into Cambodia in late
December 1978 to remove the Pol Pot regime.145
According to Do Tien Sam, the rapid rise of China’s economy has created
more favourable conditions for the “Great China” ideology to exist and develop.
While shaping a new order in Southeast Asia, China will point to its economic
expansion and military enhancement as proof of its leadership credentials. China is
actively expanding into the surrounding region, aiming to use the whole of Southeast
Asia, especially countries in the sub-Mekong delta, as the springboard to achieve
global influence. Nguyen Manh Hung claimed that the Chinese strategy to increase
exploitation of resources could negatively affect the environment of Southeast Asian
nations including Vietnam. To carry out this policy, China is likely to move energyintensive industries that use raw materials, low skilled manual labour and
environmental pollution to neighbouring countries in ASEAN and sub-Mekong Delta
region.146
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China’s aggressive manner against Vietnam in the South China Sea can be
seen clearly through evidence found in several incidents caused by Chinese fishing
boats in 2011 (Bình Minh 02 cable cutting incident on 26 May and Viking 02 cable
damaging incident on 9 June) and the HD 981 affair which lasted from 2 May, when
China placed an oil rig in an area claimed by Vietnam, to 16 July 2014, when China
withdrew it. These activities are explained as accidents from the Chinese but then
again, most of the vessels are well equipped with modern technology designed to
exercise sea control. The Chinese explanation of accidents is no longer persuasive.
These incidents show that China’s assertive attitude in the South China Sea is
demonstrated through Chinese vessels disregarding the claims to sovereignty of
Vietnam and the Philippines.147
The bilateral relationship between Vietnam and China is a strategic
partnership, steeped in history, and the Vietnamese have always respected the
traditional solidarity with the Chinese Communist Party, the state and the people of
the PRC. Through historical experience, Vietnam has suffered from seventeen wars
in total, fourteen of which were with the giant northern neighbour China.148 Of these
fourteen wars, thirteen wars happened in the feudal period and only one occurred in
modern times. The Vietnamese people have not forgotten the great assistance of the
Chinese people in the cause of building and defending the nation during wars against
the French and the Americans. Similarly, the Vietnamese have not forgotten that they
conquered the powerful army from the north after more than one thousand years
under Chinese feudal dynasties. The South China Sea territorial dispute is intricate
and complicated, and Vietnam considers this a matter that requires patience,
calmness, sober judgements and avoidance of hasty decisions. Vietnamese policy in
the South China Sea disputes is to refrain from conflict, build trust and cooperation
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in less sensitive areas, and to establish communication channels, conduct joint
military activities and increase the influence of, and adherence to, maritime law.
Although Vietnam wishes to be friend to all neighbouring countries, this should not
come at the expense of its national interests.149
Vietnam strongly condemns all acts of aggression, especially the armed
solution to resolve tensions in the South China Sea.150 It is reasonable for Vietnam to
defend its claims to sovereignty, and not allow any force for any reason to enter the
sea and air space of Vietnam. There are historical grounds to assert Vietnam’s claims
over disputed islands and Vietnam should maintain its attempts to settle the disputes
peacefully in the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and the basic principles of the United Nations chapters. Arguably, the
Vietnamese understand the cost of a war better than its Southeast Asian neighbours,
so Vietnam should be patient and firm in its diplomatic initiatives and in the legal
attempt to resolve disputes through peaceful negotiation and not resort to war.
Vietnam has expressed its willingness to settle the problem calmly and according to
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and in
moving forward to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), proposed by
ASEAN countries.151
The next chapter will explore the position of Vietnam in US foreign policy. It
will examine the basis of American interests and strategies towards Southeast Asia,
and the geopolitical importance of Vietnam for the US.
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CHAPTER 3. US STRATEGY TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA

This chapter will assess the role of the US in international relations. The
dominance of the US is declining, as it cannot impose its influence on every part of
the globe. With a trend towards cooperation and competition among great powers,
the US has had to adjust its security and foreign policy in order to protect its national
interests. The Obama Administration announced a strategy of a “pivot” to Asia and
stronger re-engagement with Southeast Asia through military co-operation. The main
argument of this chapter is that US interests and foreign policy towards Southeast
Asia are to engage the rise of China. This will have significant implications for
Southeast Asia and especially Vietnam.
3.1
3.1.1

Transformation of the New World Order
Overview of US Hegemony after the Cold War
In the immediate post-Cold War era, the US was the world’s sole

superpower. Today, while China has grown in importance, the value of the US
economy is still more than double the Chinese economy. The US economy grew by
27% between 1990 and 1998, which was almost double the growth rate in the
European Union and three times that of Japan.1 According to the Sydney Morning
Herald in January 2000, seven of the world’s top 20 companies are American. On
the basis of its economic power, the US continues to dominate the globe’s most
influential institutions, including the United Nations (UN), International Monetary
Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO). 2 This influence
over the global economy and its international mechanisms has created political and
economic leverage for the US. Even China or Russia needs its support to join these
institutions. Moreover, with the American economy central to the world economy,
US dollars have long been the basic means of global payments in the world market.
1
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This reinforced the centrality of American political and financial strength to the
system as a whole. Just as Britain once demonstrated with the pound sterling, the US
has achieved sufficient global power to have its currency as the central unit of trade
due to its superpower position of protecting trade routes, controlling the sources of
oil, and storing financial property at the global level.3
The US has the world’s largest defence budget with modern well-equipped
digital forces. Despite a reduction in the defence budget, however, the US still
accounted for 37% of total global military expenditure in 2013. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI, the US spent US$618
billion on its defence in 2013, more than three times the US$171 billion budget of
the second-placed China. 4 The US remains the only country with the capacity to
project its military power to the most remote corners on the planet.5
A hallmark of American defence policy in the 21st century is to maintain a
decisive advantage over possible rivals. During the Bush Administration, neoconservatives argued that the US should have the power was to reshape the world,
and that the country should take the opportunity to do so in order to prevent the
emergence of rivals.6 American military power allows it to pursue interventionist and
unilateral policies around the world, usually with a degree of support from its allies.
However, the US now faces a number of internal and external problems. It is
confronted by a growing China, a state that has increased the size of its economy
fourfold since 1978. China’s economy is likely to equal and then surpass that of the
U.S. 7 According to the combination of assumptions from The Economist, China
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would overtake America as early as 2019. 8 According to Rachman, China is the
world’s leading exporter and biggest manufacturer, and now controls over US$2.5
trillion in foreign reserves.9
The US faces mounting challenges to its defence capabilities. Russia can
compete with America in strategic nuclear arms. The United Kingdom, France,
China, Pakistan, India and North Korea also have the ability to produce nuclear
weapons. In terms of homeland security, the attacks in New York and Washington on
11 September 2001 demonstrated America’s vulnerability to non-traditional forms of
warfare. The engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq were costly and have not resulted
in stability in those regions. Layne has argued the ascension of China and India into
“great power” status will return them to positions held two centuries ago when China
and India produced 30% and 15% respectively of global wealth. By 2025, China is
expected to be a first-rank military power, while India, as a member of the BrazilIndia-Russia-China-South Africa (BRICS) group, has attempted to bring about a
multi-polar international system in which New Delhi will be one pole. Russia,
despite its domestic instability, has opposed US domination in the UN Security
Council to ensure its own sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.10
In 2008, Fukuyama claimed that while the US remains the dominant power in
the world, the story is not so much about American decline but how the rest of the
world has been catching up with the superpower. 11 The indebtedness of the US
contrasts with large reserves in other countries and economic centres, exposing
American economic vulnerability. As mentioned earlier, China held $2.5 trillion in
reserves by 2011. In 2008, Russia had $550 billion, South Korea $260 billion and
Thailand $110 billion. Presently, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
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collectively have around $300 billion in reserves. Saudi Arabia alone is saving
money at the rate of approximately $15 billion per month from its energy exports.12
The American economy is also declining. Its proportion of the global
economy is likely to reduce from 28% in 2004 to 27% in 2025 and 26% in 2050.
Moreover, the US is facing escalating competition from emerging economies and
regional trade associations such as the EU, Japan, China, Russia, India and Brazil.13
In Fortunes’ latest rank of the world’s largest companies, only two American firms
are in the top ten, namely Walmart and Exxon Mobile, while there are already three
Chinese firms on the list – Sinopec, State Grid and China National Petroleum.
According to Gideon, American military power has largely been maintained through
deficit spending and ‘the war in Afghanistan is effectively being paid for with a
Chinese credit card.’ 14 The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen
told business executives on 22 September 2011 that ‘I’ve said many times that I
believe the single, biggest threat to our national security is our debt.’15
American financial power has been unchallenged since the end of World War
II, due to the strength of the US dollar. The financial and economic crisis of 2008
plunged the US and the world to the worst downturn since the Great Depression. It
also opened up speculation about the waning of American hegemony. Whispers
about the end of the “American Empire” had led to concerns about the long-term
prospects of the US dollar as the international system’s reserve currency. Khanna
argues that while globalization was once equated with Americanization, the reality
was that global integration could come at the expense of a Pax Americana.16 Should
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the value of the US dollar decline, the US will face a major challenge in getting
domestic support for any ambitious foreign policy goals.17
Fukuyama also explores signs of the decline in spreading American values to
the rest of the world. Chinese and Indian movies, Korean pop stars and Japanese
anime/manga are popular all over Asia. There are also worrying trends in the
education sector, especially in the growing reluctance of foreign students to attend
American universities due to the obstacles the US has placed on them to study in the
country. New magnets for high quality education are competing in the field. Among
five destinations in 2012 that hosted nearly one-half of total global students, the
United States had 18%, the United Kingdom 11%, France 7%, Australia 6% and
Germany 5%.18
On balance, American military and economic strength is likely to decline.
Some emerging states are likely to catch up with the US. A multi-polar structure is
likely in the coming decades.19 At the end of the Cold War, the US enjoyed a brief
uni-polar moment, but it should now prepare for a multi-polar system.20
3.1.2

Overview of US Involvement in Southeast Asia after the Cold War
Post-Cold War American involvement in Southeast Asia is generally seen as

positive. Most of the ASEAN nations welcome all major powers to the region. In
2011, the former US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton argued that Asia is more eager
to welcome US leadership and business now than at any time in history. She
observed that the US is the only power with a strong network of close alliances in the
region, as it has no territorial ambitions. US cooperation with its allies has helped to
preserve regional security for decades, patrol the security of sea lanes, enhance
stability and create an environment for development. She went on to say that the US
is also the region’s major trade and investment partner and a source of innovation
17
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that benefits the region. Despite other options being available in the education
market, the US still hosts 350,000 Asian students every year. It remains an outspoken
advocate of open markets and universal human rights.21
Most of these issues resonate with Southeast Asian states. Muzaffar argues
that the Philippines and Indonesia have not been the only pro-Washington states in
Southeast Asia from 1975 to 1997. From the early 1970s, Singapore began to seek a
closer relationship with the US through economic and security cooperation. Brunei is
a US informal strategic partner, while Thailand has been a US ally since the mid1950s. Malaysia is also a friend of the US with a vibrant trade relationship, and in
security matters Malaysia has conducted joint military exercises and provided port
facilities for US warships.22
States such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar joined ASEAN from
1995 and they have adopted a more careful view of US engagement in the region due
to historical factors, such as American military actions from the 1960s and the
political orientation of their own governments at the time. Through the 1980s and the
early 1990s, Vietnam maintained a lukewarm attitude to the US in spite of its market
reforms and initial integration into the global economy. Laos made no attempt to
interact with Washington and Cambodia had little interaction with the US. Myanmar
also chose not to be a close ally of the US. In a divided region six out of ten ASEAN
states appeared to be close to Washington during the early 1990s, while the other
four stayed outside the US sphere of influence. 23 Vietnam and the US opted for
bilateral diplomatic normalization from 11 July 1995. Vietnam joined ASEAN in
1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. It ushered in a
new period of ASEAN reconciliation and unity. ASEAN has a policy of engaging
any power that supports the development of the region.24
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Accordingly, ASEAN states look to the US to play a role in the Mekong
Basin and in the South China Sea. A shared concern about China’s rise has
contributed to a growing strategic convergence between Vietnam and the US. The
high-profile remarks by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the South China
Sea were made at the 2010 ARF, when Vietnam held the ASEAN chairmanship:
The Obama Administration is prepared to take the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to the
next level on these issues and in new areas of cooperation. We see this relationship not
only as important on its own merits, but as part of a strategy aimed at enhancing
American engagement in the Asia Pacific and in particular Southeast Asia. We spoke
about a range of challenges affecting regional security, including Burma, North Korea,
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and we welcome Vietnam’s constructive
leadership and its excellent contributions to ASEAN, including its very important role
as ASEAN chair.25

This rapprochement has made Hanoi a valuable partner in the US engagement
strategy in the region. Not only Vietnam, the three other lower riparian countries of
the Mekong River Basin (Cambodia, Laos and Thailand) also saw enhanced US
involvement in the Lower Mekong Initiative as a positive development. Myanmar, in
spite of its long close relationship with China, now considers the US reengagement
as a window of opportunity for this nation to adjust its overall alignment posture.26
Singapore considers the US as “indispensable” for Asia-Pacific security and
in 2010 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong commented that the US must be a part of
the “stable architecture” of the region. The Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Albert del
Rosario remarked that he welcomed the assurance from Hillary Clinton concerning
the US commitment to the region to ensure freedom of navigation, open access to
Asia’s sea-lanes and respect for international law in the South China Sea. In a
meeting with Clinton, before the APEC meeting in Hawaii in November 2011,
Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang also declared the US as “a leading strategic
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partner” and welcomed stronger US cooperation with the Asia-Pacific for peace,
stability and development in the region.27
Although the US rebalancing strategy towards Southeast Asia is largely seen
as a positive development by regional states, the US no longer has dominance in the
region. Tao argues that Southeast Asians experienced mixed feelings towards
American presence in the region.28 On the one hand, people fear that the complete
withdrawal of the US troops from the region will alter the balance of power, causing
instability and insecurity to the region. On the other hand, nationalists in Asian
countries desire US troop withdrawal. This explains why the Philippines Senate did
not ratify the extension of the US-Philippine military base agreement, causing US
troops to withdraw in 1992. A US approach to the Thai government to establish a US
logistics base in the Gulf of Thailand was also rejected. Thus, it is doubtful the US
can maintain a troop presence in Southeast Asia for long.
US influence over Southeast Asia is also in decline as a result of the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997. Southeast Asian states were dismayed over the slow and
inadequate response of the US to the region’s economic problems. Mauzy and Job
argued that Washington failed to offer any bilateral bailouts to the hardest-hit states
and instead wielded the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to impose a “one size fits
all” solution to the region. Asian values were held up as the cause of the crisis, due to
their tendency toward non-democratic governance and a lack of transparency. 29
Resentment towards the IMF after the crisis resulted in a widespread anti-US
sentiment in Southeast Asia.30
The US perceived lack of concern for Southeast Asian states during the crisis
was in contrast to that of China. Southeast Asian states are still grateful to China for
not devaluing its currency and offering the region bilateral aid and loans with no
27
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strings attached. 31 Mauzy and Job note that bilateral relations between Southeast
Asia and the US were at their nadir when US President Bill Clinton dismissed the
Thai and Malaysian currency crisis as “a few small glitches in the road” at the APEC
Summit in November 1997. Through the IMF, the US resisted any effort to seek an
“Asian solution” to the general crisis. This inaction of the US caused Southeast Asia
to appreciate the more attentive and sympathetic approach to the region’s difficulties
by China.
3.2
3.2.1

US Interests in Southeast Asia
Economic Interests
From a geo-strategic perspective, Southeast Asia is situated in an integral part

of the Asia-Pacific. It is in an area favourable to the economic interests of the US as
an Asia-Pacific power. The previous chapter explained how Southeast Asia’s key
strategic value comes from its geographic position as well as its economic
development. Apart from the sea-lanes, energy reserves in and around the South
China Sea, Indonesia, and Burma give the region added strategic importance.32 This
important feature of Southeast Asia has made the US pay attention to the region out
of economic interest. In 2011, Hillary Clinton stated that one of the most important
tasks of the US over the next decade is to lock in a substantially increased investment
including diplomatic, economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Harnessing the growth and dynamism of Asia is a central priority in American
economic and strategic interests. Open markets in Asia can supply the US with
burgeoning opportunities for investment, trade and gaining access to cutting-edge
technology. America’s economic recovery will largely depend on exports, and the
operations of the American firms that invest in the vast and growing consumer bases
in Asia.33
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Southeast Asia is also the region where there appears to be key emerging
powers and important partners with whom the US will need to work closely to derive
economic benefits. The US is seeking a new and deeper relationship with Indonesia,
the world’s third largest democracy, the world’s most populous Muslim nation and a
member of the G-20. Being one of the key drivers of the global economy, it is an
important partner of the US and increasingly a central contributor to regional peace
and stability. Indonesia’s importance is set to increase in the coming years.34 The US
and its former adversary, Vietnam, also adopted an Agreement on Comprehensive
Partnership in July 2013 to advance ties. According to Auslin, the US found in
Vietnam a major shared wariness over China and other strategic interests in
Vietnam’s long coastline, which may be a future key logistics centre in Vietnam’s
dynamic and growing economy.35
The US considers Southeast Asia as a region for trading and commercial
relations, which will be beneficial to the US economy. Southeast Asia, through the
primary multilateral organization ASEAN, has grown into a burgeoning economy.
With a population of approximately 620 million and a combined GDP of over
US$2.2 trillion, ASEAN is collectively America’s fourth largest export market and
fifth largest trading partner.36 Southeast Asia and ASEAN have become a focal point
in American reengagement strategy in Asia.37 Few regions of the world can offer US
companies as much opportunity as Southeast Asia. With its abundant natural
resources, including oil, gas, timber, gold and rubber, and arable land for agriculture,
Southeast Asia has emerged as a principal market in the trade and investment
strategies of American enterprises. The US is second only to Japan in direct
investment in ASEAN. In the near future, Southeast Asia represents a vast potential
for US economic growth, competitiveness, jobs opportunities and security
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enhancement. Trade with Southeast Asia has already created approximately 800,000
US jobs.38
The US is pursuing its economic interests in the region through the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) which brings together economies from across the Pacific
(both developed and developing) into a single trading community with a view to
create not just more growth, but “better growth”. The US hopes that the TPP can
serve as a benchmark for future agreements, a potential platform for larger regional
economic integration and finally a free trade area for the Asia-Pacific. 39 The US
initiative to create the TPP serves both its economic and its strategic calculations as
US President Barack Obama stated:
The TPP will boost our economies, lowering barriers to trade and investments, increasing
exports, and creating more jobs for our people…the TPP has the potential to be a model
not only for the Asia Pacific but for future trade agreements.40

From an economic perspective, the US aims to use the TTP as a new
economic mechanism with more commitment and higher binding legal requirements
than APEC in commerce, environment, and labour. According to Hoang Anh Tuan,
if any country, including China, wanted to have an economic role in the Pacific
through the TPP, it will have to acknowledge the influence of the US. Thus, the TPP
works effectively as an effective bargaining tool for the US against China.41 This
US-orchestrated scheme has so far involved 12 nations in the Asia-Pacific region, but
it will be open to China only when China becomes a market economy. Washington
aims to undermine Beijing’s commercial clout in the region because, over the past
decades, China has become the largest trading partner of most Asian countries.42 Vu
argues that the TPP has both economic and strategic meaning for the US and that the
38
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TPP is in fact a new type of Free Trade Area (FTA) but with a “higher standard.”
American ambition is to cover all APEC member economies and contribute to global
trade liberalization as championed by the US.43
The TPP can also be a calculated US move in the region. Hsieh argues that
the US is pursuing twofold goals in its motives to promote the TPP. First, the TPP
provides a substitute pathway towards Asian regionalism other than the Beijingpreferred East Asia Economic Community (EAEC) based on the ‘ASEAN +3’
framework, which is likely to exclude the US. Thus, the TPP not only helps the US
avoid marginalization from Asian FTA networks, but it also reinforces its leadership
in the region. Secondly, the TPP’s comprehensive contents can be set as a benchmark
for prospective partners. This paves the way for the US to have any future FTA
negotiations based on the TPP process. It elevates TPP standards to meet US trade
interests.44
Finally, US economic interests in Southeast Asia emerge largely from the
significance of the South China Sea. Any conflicts or disputes in the South China Sea
would have a direct impact on the US and Japan, two of the world’s largest trading
powers.45 Therefore, in the pursuit of the freedom of international navigation, the US
became involved in the territorial disputes to protect its own economic interests.
Wang provides two reasons. First, the Northeast Asian allies of the US (Japan and
South Korea) obtain 90 percent of their oil through the South China Sea and the
Strait of Malacca. Second, by the end of the 20th century, trans-Pacific trade was
twice the value of the Atlantic trade, making the Pacific a region of strategic and
economic importance for America.46As a result, the South China Sea is more than
just an area of strategic importance to US trading interests. It also creates the
43
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opportunity for the US to become involved in the territorial disputes. The disputes
give a reason for the US to engage China due to the latter’s rising aggressiveness in
the South China Sea.
3.2.2

Political Interests
After a decade when Southeast Asia was of a low priority in US foreign policy,

the region is now central to Washington’s plans to define and defend US power in
the Asia-Pacific. Perwita noted that the United States’ formal accession to the
ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) marks a new milestone in USASEAN relations. 47 The US-led global war on terror in the aftermath of 11
September 2001 has caused the US relationship with several ASEAN member states
to expand significantly. More common causes were found between Washington and
Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila in initiatives to strengthen antiterrorism measures, such as intelligence sharing, joint surveillance and police
training. On the other hand, the renaissance of US-ASEAN relations was enhanced
due to a new appreciation in Washington of China’s rise in the region.
According to a Vietnamese party official, the US is engaging China with a
view to limit Chinese economic and military expansion in Southeast Asia, as this can
be a potential threat to American supremacy. While China regards Southeast Asia as
the natural theatre of expansion of its political ambitions, and a traditional sphere of
influence in the past,48 the US views Southeast Asia as a springboard for its East
Asia strategy. 49 It plans to engage China, but will maintain political and security
arrangements with its traditional allies in the region.50 Washington has enhanced its
military-security cooperation with Singapore and Thailand in a “network of security
and military relationships” both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.51 This can
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help the US to reassure its commitment with Southeast Asian allies and to engage a
rising China without containing it, thus avoiding making China feel threatened.52
ASEAN has also been able to play the role of a convenor and driver of
regional cooperative institutions and processes. It has fostered peace and stability in
East Asia. Through the ASEAN Dialogue partnerships, the ARF, ASEAN + 3 and
the EAS, it has provided a neutral platform for the major powers to meet and
promote their economic and security interests in the region. China’s growing position
in the regional institutions created by ASEAN can affect US economic, political and
strategic interests as well as its influence in East Asia, which is why the US moved to
join the EAS.53 In October 2011, Hillary Clinton stated the political interests of the
US in Southeast Asia:
So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral institutions,
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful that our work with regional institutions
supplements and does not supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region
that America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions -- and it is in
our interests as well that they be effective and responsive. That is why President
Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time in November. To
pave the way, the United States has opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta
and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN.54

To maintain its position as the dominant superpower among its traditional
allies and closer partners in the Asia-Pacific, and especially East Asia, the US has a
strategic interest in maintaining confidence among all East Asian states that it
remains a reliable guarantor for universal freedom of navigation. 55 While the
proportion of US trade travelling through these waterways is small, American allies
such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Singapore depend on
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Southeast Asian sea-lanes.56 Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu have argued that by helping
to ensure the freedom of navigation, the US can provide comfort to regional states
and discourage other actors from making efforts to exert influence in ways that are
detrimental to regional security.57
Furthermore, US bilateral relations with individual Southeast Asian states
enhance its influence in the region. The US aims to pursue bilateral initiatives with
individual Southeast Asian states to promote democracy, human rights and political
stability, foster market-oriented economic reforms, and reduce the effects of
organized crime.58 The US seeks to play the key role by using human rights and
democracy as a leverage against regional governments.59 Limaye argues that human
rights, democracy and governance are among the contentious issues between
Washington and ASEAN member states. Although there are disagreements between
the US and individual Southeast Asian countries, US interest in and attention to these
matters will not fade. One issue that has near-total consensus among ASEAN
members is for the military government of Myanmar to move towards democracy
and improved human rights, and the Myanmar government has started introducing
political change in response.60
Wang argues that if the US can maintain its hegemonic status in the South
China Sea, the US is able to cover the South Pacific Region and strengthen the
region’s alliance with Australia. To the west, the US can extend beyond the Straits of
Malacca to enhance its interests in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. To the
north, the US could directly contain China’s southward expansion efforts. To the
northeast, the US can go beyond the Taiwan Strait to the Japan Sea to strengthen the
coastal defence of the Japan Sea. The South China Sea is regarded as the third most
important potential hot spot in the Asia Pacific Region after the Korean Peninsula

56

Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu, The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S Strategy towards China, pp.11-12.

57

Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu, The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S Strategy towards China, p.14.

58

‘A National Security Strategy For a New Century’, http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nsspret-1299.html
(Date of visit 1 May 2013)
59

Singh U.B., ‘Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia’, Strategic Analysis, 24(2), 2000, pp.
315-342 at pp. 318-319.
60

Satu, L.P. ‘United States-ASEAN Relations on ASEAN’s Fortieth Anniversary: A Glass Half Full’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29(3), 2007, pp. 447-464 at 456.

109

and the Taiwan Strait.61 The flow of oil from the Middle East across the South China
Sea to Japan and South Korea, and most recently the naval aspirations of the PRC,
have made the constant American naval presence in Southeast Asia a symbol of
Washington’s security-oriented view of the region.62
3.2.3

Security Interests
In terms of its geo-strategic significance, Southeast Asia has a crucial role in

US comprehensive security. Keeping maritime routes near Southeast Asia open is
important in order to ensure the US deployment of defence forces in the case of
events such as natural disasters.63 Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu share this viewpoint,
showing that, Southeast Asia’s strategic location at the intersection of two of the
world’s most heavily travelled sea-lanes straddles that the east-west route connecting
the Indian and Pacific oceans, and the north-south route that links Australia and New
Zealand to Northeast Asia. Thus, from a military perspective, these sea-lanes are
critical to the movement of US forces from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean
and the Persian Gulf.64
Simon argues that although Southeast Asia has not been defined as an area of
vital American concern since the Second Indochina War (1963-1975), its importance
is inherent in its location astride the sea lanes between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and
the US’s Northeast Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. Unlike US deployments in
Japan and South Korea, which provide direct deterrence against potential invaders,
such as the USSR or North Korea, Southeast Asian military facilities in the
Philippines were not primarily intended to defend the host country. Instead, they
constituted storage and repair capacities in case of conflicts, and were essential for
the US Navy or Air Force to provide the capability to move west to the Indian Ocean
or Persian Gulf or north to the sea of Japan. The US could deploy forces from Guam
and Okinawa to the Korean peninsula in the event of a conflict. This capability was
61
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shown in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, when supplies from the Philippines were
transferred to the US forces located around Saudi Arabia.65
The US has revealed its security interests in its bilateral relations with
Southeast Asian nations. Former Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld emphasized the
significance of a continuing US role in Asian security in his visits to Singapore,
Indonesia and Vietnam in June 2006. US military activities were enhanced in the
region, such as naval port visits to Vietnam since 2003, joint exercises with the
Philippines, normalization of military ties with Indonesia, cooperation with Thailand
in delivering humanitarian aid, and the annual US-Thailand Cobra Gold Exercises.66
Unlike the military unilateralism of the Bush Administration’s first tenure, Secretary
Rumsfeld asserted at the Shangri-La Conference of Asia-Pacific Defence Ministers
in Singapore:
That in the past five years in terms of defence and security cooperation, the United
States has done more things, with more nations, in more constructive ways, than at any
time in our history.67

Geo-strategic considerations in other Southeast Asian states also affect the
security environment. Opium production in Laos, which by 1990 had grown to be the
third largest source in the world, made countering narcotics the second highest US
priority with Lao PDR, after the matter of Prisoners of War and those Missing in
Action from the Second Indochinese War. In 1990, the US allocated US$8.7 million
for a crop substitution program involving hill tribes and capacity building around law
enforcement officers. From 1993, opium production decreased remarkably and the
US began to shift resources towards drug rehabilitation. The area under opium
cultivation fell from 42,000 hectares in 1989 to 1,700 hectares in 2006, a decline of
96%. 68 Pholsena notes that countering narcotics operations is now the main US
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priority in Laos, although the country is considered less a site of a production than
the area between Myanmar, Thailand and China.69
Strategically, Southeast Asia is considered as the “second front” in the US war
on terror, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The arrest in Singapore of
Jemmah Islamiyah operatives revealed the existence of an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist
network in Southeast Asia, which was thought to be targeting Western interests. US
discoveries from several Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Indonesia and the
Philippines) led to the conclusion of international and regional links between groups
advocating political violence. Washington considered Southeast Asia as a “fertile
breeding ground for terrorists operations” due to its majority Muslim population,
separatist movements, easy trans-national communication, varying levels of regional
development and occasionally compromised intelligence, police and military
services.70
In late January 2002, the Bush Administration deployed 660 US troops to
southern Philippines to assist in hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations.
This move was widely seen as the opening of a second front in Washington’s war on
terrorism. 71 Stronger bilateral defence ties between the US and Southeast Asian
states such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have paved the way for
improved security relations between the US and ASEAN. It has enhanced the
stabilizing role of the US in the region and strengthened the basis for engagement in
multilateral forums, such as the US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to
Combat International Terrorism in August 2002.
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The multilateral security

cooperation through the forums has strengthened American defence interests in
Southeast Asia.
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Looking from a long-term perspective, the US engagement with Southeast Asia
is also a strategy to enhance American presence and counter China’s rising influence.
Sutter argued that China’s rising position as a regional power has created more
influence, and a central role in Asian regional multilateral institutions. He argues that
China’s rise has worked against US national interests.73 In a realist perspective, the
US seeks strategic interests to defend its influence in Southeast Asia, and engage
China as a method to defend the superior position it currently holds. The US needs to
have close relations with the region to protect US strategic interests in Southeast
Asia, to ensure Southeast Asia is a relatively peaceful and stable region, and to not
allow any emerging power to dominate the region or make a threat to US interests.74
Again, US security interests in Southeast Asia are related to the South China
Sea. Yang notes that the South China Sea is not only important to claimant states, but
also non-claimant nations including Japan and the US. The US uses the South China
Sea as a transit point and operating area for the American Navy and Air Force
between military bases in East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. It also
has strategically critical interests in the safety of navigation and the freedom of
SLOCs.75 Hillary Clinton stated officially after the 17th ARF Ministerial Meeting in
July 2010, when several ASEAN members encouraged the US to make a statement
on the South China Sea:
The United States, like every other nation, has national interests in freedom of
navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law
in the South China Sea. We share these interests with not only ASEAN members and
ASEAN Regional Forum participants but with other maritime nations and the broader
international community.76
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China’s recent assertiveness in the territorial disputes of the South China Sea
has provided opportunities for the US to “come back” to Asia. At the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Hanoi in 2010, the US helped to shape a region-wide effort to
protect access and passage to the South China Sea, and to uphold international law in
defining territorial claims. Considering it has security, economic and strategic
interests in the South China Sea, the US has taken important steps to protect its vital
interests in stability and freedom of navigation, and unrestricted commerce, by
paving the way for multilateral diplomacy among the claimants of the islands in the
South China Sea. The US seeks to ensure that the dispute can be addressed
peacefully in accordance with the established rules and international law.77
3.3
3.3.1

US Strategies towards Southeast Asia
From 1991 to 2000
In the initial aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the US seemed to ignore Southeast Asia and paid more attention to
solving its domestic problems. In 1991, Simon felt there was little doubt that the
demise of the Cold War and domestic effects of a deficit had prompted the US to
reduce its deployed air and naval forces in Southeast Asia. The number of US aircraft
carriers declined from 14 to 11 by the mid-1990s.78 Writing in 2000, Singh argued
that US would prefer to reduce its overseas commitments because of internal
budgetary issues. Economic constraints have made the US develop an alternative
security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific, and to readjust its East Asia strategy to
maintain a strategic troop presence of 100,000 personnel in the region.79 They were
located in bases in Japan and South Korea and naval forces were withdrawn from
Clarke Air Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines in November 1992. In the mid1990s, US interests were not perceived to be under threat. However, in 1998, the US
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revived its security engagement with the Philippines after the lease on the bases
expired, and it then secured additional facilities at Singapore’s Changi naval base.80
The US strategy to build up “a new Asia Pacific Community” was created
under the Bill Clinton administration from 1993. He said:
Our economic relations depend vitally on our ties with the Asia Pacific region, which is
the world’s fastest-growing economic region. In November 1993, President Clinton
convened the first-ever summit of the leaders of the economies that constitute the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
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Tao notes that President Clinton stated in his Engagement and Enlargement:
Report on U.S National Security Strategy, submitted to the Congress on 21 July
1994, that with respect to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific:
East Asia is a region of growing importance for the US security and prosperity;
nowhere are the strands of our three pronged strategy more intertwined, nor is the need
for continued US engagement more evident. Now more than ever, security, open
markets and democracy go hand by hand in our approach to this dynamic region”.82

Between 1990 and 1992, the Bush Administration drew up plans to reduce
American troop numbers in the region. During the first term of the Clinton
Administration, the Pentagon devised a new security strategy towards the region to
reaffirm US commitment, based on a stable level of 100,000 troops (80,000 in Japan
and South Korea and another 20,000-30,000 in the West Pacific).83 In the late 1990s,
Nathan observed that the Clinton Doctrine for Asia claimed the US would be an
active player in Asia-Pacific growth, stability and prosperity towards the 21st century
as it would “remain fully engaged economically, militarily and diplomatically.” Such
a strategy of engagement was seen as an important way in helping to preserve
American access and influence over the region.84
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In Clinton’s second term, US strategy towards Southeast Asia was enhanced.
He continued to affirm American strategic interests in Southeast Asia, as exemplified
by the 1999 national security strategy Towards the 21st Century that the US was
keen to “develop regional and bilateral security and economic relationship that
assists in conflict prevention and resolution and expand US participation in the
region’s economies.” The US continued to maintain its alliance with Thailand and
the Philippines, reached security access agreements with Singapore and other
ASEAN countries, and encouraged the emergence of a strong and cohesive ASEAN
capable of enhancing regional security and prosperity.85 The US aimed to maintain
the increasingly productive relationship with ASEAN and to enhance the security
dialogue under ARF.
Since the Clinton Administration, the US has normalised diplomatic relations
with the new ASEAN members of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, in
addition to maintaining close relations with its old allies in the region. The
relationship between Vietnam and the US has gradually improved. In April 1991, the
US provided Vietnam with a roadmap for normalization, and then from 1991 to 1993
Vietnam cooperated in implementing the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. In 1994 President Clinton lifted the trade
embargo on Vietnam and finally on 11 July 1995, the normalization of relations was
announced officially.86
3.3.2

From 2001 to 2008
In the first decade of the 21st century, the US enhanced bilateral ties as it

expanded the war on terror into Southeast Asia. The US arranged close cooperation
in dealing with terrorists in the Philippines and gave it the status of a Major NonNATO Ally. Several cooperative operations were carried out, including a remarkable
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increase in military supplies to the Philippines. There were joint and prolonged
exercises which allowed hundreds of US military personnel to train their Philippine
counterparts in dealing with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the south-western islands of
the country. Another US ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand, also received increased US
military aid under the Bush Administration, while Singapore developed a new
security framework agreement with the US for cooperation on counter-terrorism.87
During this period, the US supported strengthening ASEAN as a regional
institution mostly for countering terrorism. A number of activities were carried out
by the US Government to assist Southeast Asia on the second front on terror. In
August 2002, the State Department announced the ASEAN Cooperation Plan to
strengthen the Secretariat, help with the integration of ASEAN’s new members, and
combat trans-national challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and the spread of
HIV/AIDS. Terrorism has also been a key issue at APEC meetings since 2001.88
Since the Bali bombings in October 2002, more than 130 people have been arrested
in Indonesia on terrorism charges. The US now has a common interest with a leading
Southeast Asia regional player in addressing the threats of terrorism. Through
countering terrorism, the US seized the opportunity to deepen relations with
Indonesia.89
3.3.3

From 2009 onwards
The “back to Southeast Asia” approach was stated by US Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton at the 16th ARF on 22 July 2009 in Phuket, when the US signed the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with representatives of ASEAN. Clinton
affirmed that “the United States is back in Southeast Asia” and acknowledged the US
was fully engaged with ASEAN partners on a wide range of challenges. International
observers saw the move as a chance for the US to “reoccupy” a sphere of influence
that had been neglected during the Bush Presidency.90 While Southeast Asia was
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never totally ignored in US strategic thinking, the US strategy of returning to Asia to
reengage Southeast Asia should be understood in a symbolic sense. The Obama
Administration’s foreign strategy aims to draw attraction to a “new” foreign policy
direction.91
According to Vu Le Thai Hoang, the diplomatic charm offensive by the
Obama Administration at the end of 2011 was mostly analysed as the “decisive
blow” in his relentless efforts over the past three years and can be encapsulated in
two main ideas: Smart Power and the Pacific Century (also known as the US “Pivot”
to the Asia-Pacific). The US strategic objective is to enhance its global position
through three pillars: economics, strategic security, and American values of
democracy and human rights. In this strategy, the US considers the network of
bilateral relations as the foundation for its strategic pivot, divided into three groups:
treaty allies, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand; the
emerging upcoming powers like China, India and Indonesia; and the newly
prioritized countries, including Vietnam. Thus, Southeast Asia is valued as a sound
testing ground for the US to try on its “Smart Power” and “Pivot to Asia-Pacific.”92
The US has been committed to enhance its relations with Southeast Asian
states since the Obama Administration took office. In spite of proposing some
initiatives and improving some particular relations with the region, the Bush
Administration approached Asia-Pacific in a relatively restrained manner. With
Obama’s tenure, especially during the second half of his first term, US relations with
the Asia-Pacific have improved.93 Limaye notes that the US declared its commitment
to improve relations with ASEAN as an organization and search for opportunities for
broader and deeper bilateral ties with specific ASEAN members. The new US
strategy also includes “rapprochement,” “re-engagement” or “revitalization” with the
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newest members of ASEAN, namely Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.
These close relationships mark the progress of US ties with Southeast Asia because
of problematic relations with these nations in the past.94
Arguably, recent US involvement in Southeast Asia has created more positive
than negative effects for the balance of power in the region. American engagement in
the region can now draw more attention to Southeast Asia from other major powers,
adding strengthened values to the regional institutions and helping to maintain
regional stability to resolve issues.95 American improvement of bilateral ties with
Vietnam has added a fresh dynamic to the political situation in Southeast Asia. The
improved features in this relationship can be seen from the signing of the Bilateral
Trade Agreement (BTA) in December 2001 and Vietnam’s entry into the WTO in
January 2007. According to Brown, the US is a leading trading partner of Vietnam,
with two-way trade increasing from US$220 million in 1994 to US$15.7 billion in
2008.96
Improvement in the US-Lao PDR relations also occurred following 9/11 with
bilateral counter terrorism cooperation. Thayer argues that when the US declared
Southeast Asia to be the second front on terror, Lao PDR became one of the bases
that the US needed to cover in its regional counter-terrorism efforts. 97 With
Cambodia, the US reopened its diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh in November
1991, following the political settlement of the Cambodia conflict and the entry of the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Since then, the
rapprochement in terms of economic, political, military and aid dimensions varied
until early 2007, when the US resumed direct foreign assistance. In September 2009,
Cambodia and the US amended a bilateral trade agreement to include the provision
for the US to support Cambodian economic priorities.98
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As the main regional organisation, engagement with ASEAN has become a
US priority during the Obama Administration. Swielande notes that the US Assistant
Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, Kurt Campbell, had stated that the US has been
diversifying its strategic and military approach. While keeping its strong
commitment with Northeast Asia, the US is going to focus more attention on
Southeast Asia. In the past, the US had developed bilateral relations with Southeast
Asian countries. However, the Obama Administration considers ASEAN a unified
organisation. Since 2009, annual summits have been organized between ASEAN and
the US. 99 The US was the first non-ASEAN country to name a non-resident
Ambassador to ASEAN with the appointment of Scot Marciel in 2008, followed by
the establishment of a permanent US Mission to ASEAN in 2009 and a dedicated
Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in June 2010.100
The US is now engaged in Southeast Asia through regional cooperation and
active participation in political institutions. Bower examined these trends from a
strategic perspective, with both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton starting to recognise that strong relations with ASEAN are vital to America’s
interests in Asia. In 2010, Clinton outlined the core US principles for Asian regional
architecture in Honolulu, and Obama signed the protocol of accession to the ASEAN
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which declared that US interests in Southeast Asia
are significant enough for an annual presidential focus. 101 Thayer regards these
moves as signalling close engagement with ASEAN.102 The US pledged to attend the
annual ARF Ministerial Meetings in Southeast Asia, a departure from the Bush
Administration, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attended only two of the
four annual meetings.103

99

De Swielande, T.S., ‘The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Parameters,
42(1), 2012, pp. 75-89 at 80.
100

‘US Engagement with ASEAN’, http://asean.usmission.gov/mission/participation.html (Date of
visit 29 September 2014).
101

Bower, E.Z., ‘In Asia, the US should look beyond China and India’, The Christian Science
Monitor, 3 May 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0503/In-Asia-the-USshould-look-beyond-China-and-India (Date of visit 5 January 2014).
102

Thayer, ‘US Rapprochement with Laos and Cambodia’, p. 456.

103

Sutter, ‘The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia’, p. 205.

120

With Southeast Asia moving towards regional integration to become an
ASEAN community in 2015, the US has expressed its active involvement in this
road map since 2009. The US is likely to support Southeast Asia through the ASEAN
Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration
(ADVANCE) Program, and it has committed around US$7 million for activities
towards an ASEAN economic community.104 While not a large amount of money,
this is symbolic of the commitment shown towards ASEAN.
Regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes, the Obama Administration
has shown more commitment towards addressing the problem. China’s assertiveness
after 2007 had put pressure on foreign energy companies, including US companies,
not to undertake exploration off the Vietnamese coast. At the ASEAN Regional
Forum Summit in July 2010, US Secretary of State Clinton indicated Washington’s
willingness to facilitate tasks on implementing the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea:
The US supports the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the conduct of parties in the
South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of
conduct. The US is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures
consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all claimants and the
broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful
conditions.105

3.4
3.4.1

Implications for Southeast Asia
For Southeast Asia in General
Historically, Southeast Asia is a region for a rivalry among major powers. It

still needs US engagement to keep all major powers engaged in the region. This is a
strategy of ASEAN’s diplomacy. Once the US demonstrates its presence in
Southeast Asia, then the ambitions of powers like China and Japan can be kept in
check. ASEAN has accepted the US as a dialogue partner and an important
participant in the annual ministerial meeting with the Foreign Ministers and the ARF.
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Despite ASEAN’s rejection of US claims that the values of democracy and human
rights are universal, the US is seen as a crucial stabiliser in the region.106 However,
US involvement in Southeast Asia can cause both positive and negative impacts that
lead to specific implications for the region.
Positively, the US “back to Southeast Asia strategy” can benefit the region.
While the US is still the dominant superpower, its engagement in Southeast Asia can
draw the attention of regional powers such as China, Japan, India and Russia. Once
there are a number of powers involved in the region, then regional problems can be
resolved through balancing as major powers and nations have to work together to
discuss solutions. Subsequently, the role of regional multilateral institutions is
strengthened in a positive manner.107
Nehru shares this viewpoint by arguing that the US presence in regional
forums, such as APEC and EAS, is potentially to transform them into decision
making bodies rather than just “talking shops”. 108 Moreover, US engagement in
Southeast Asia brings security balance for the region amid the recent aggressiveness
of China in the territorial disputes over the South China Sea. From ASEAN’s
viewpoint, US reengagement in the region is welcomed, as the continued American
military presence in Southeast Asia can offer some measure of comfort against
China’s growing regional clout.109
In addition, in terms of economic benefits, Southeast Asia can also obtain an
advantage from US rapprochement with the region. Nehru claims that even when the
US was suffering the effects of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression
in 2011, it was still the world’s largest market. The US is still an important final
destination for much of the region’s exports and a key source of foreign direct
investment. The recent ratification of the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement is likely
to open the door for a similar free trade agreement with ASEAN, or a broader APEC106
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wide free trade area for the Asia-Pacific, or a concluded TPP agreement.110 The US
is still among dominant investors in Southeast Asia and this can be a beneficial factor
for the region. According to the figures from the US Department of Commerce in
2008, America had US$153 billion invested in ASEAN, US$53 billion in China and
US$14 billion in India.111
On the negative side, the US presence in Southeast Asia may pose a difficult
dilemma for regional states. When major powers get involved in the region, there
will be suspicion among them. The result can be strategic rivalry, arm races or a
“rally for allies”, causing concerns both for major powers and other nations when
participating in new initiatives or regional mechanisms. Moreover, the US approach
to Southeast Asia can trigger action and reaction, escalate tensions or create distrust
in the region. By trying to re-engage in the region, the US emphasizes its efforts to
prevent the rise of China, and US efforts to embrace Southeast Asian nations can
create a perception that the US is encircling China with its allies. This perception will
make it harder to reach any settlement of problems faced among countries in the
region with China. Conflicts may occur over minor incidents involving Southeast
Asian countries, for example, when they try and modernise their military forces.112
From an economic viewpoint, Southeast Asia is between “a rock and a hard
place” due to American involvement in the region, and with the close commercial
relationship it holds with China. Nehru investigated the passage of the US Senate’s
Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 designed to punish China for
alleged currency manipulation. He found it would hurt Southeast Asian economies
more because Southeast Asia’s economy is inextricably linked to China.
Furthermore, ASEAN’s ambition to build a free trade area by 2015 and an
infrastructure network to facilitate intra-regional trade is supportive of a broader East
Asian regionalism, which China plays an integral part.113
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From a multilateral perspective, it is essential for Southeast Asia to maintain
and enhance the relationship with the US amid competition and cooperation between
major powers in the region. Nguyen Hoang Giap argues that ASEAN countries still
regard the US as an important actor in the region and wish to preserve a good
relationship with the global superpower. From ASEAN’s perspective, America is not
only the dominant world power, but it has particular interests in the region.114 It is
practical for ASEAN to engage the US and other major powers in multilateral
mechanisms to carry out ASEAN’s foreign policy of balancing powers. This strategy
helps ASEAN to invite all major powers to the region, taking advantage of the
regional interests of great powers while at the same time creating a forum for powers
to exchange viewpoints. Giap argues that, together with its balance of powers
attitude towards the major powers, ASEAN needs to acknowledge that strengthening
multilateral cooperation with all outside partners, especially major powers, requires
maximising opportunities for regional economic development and a security
guarantee. This was the reason for the creation of regional multilateral forums, such
as the ARF from 1994.115
In the chapters that follow, interviews with regional diplomats demonstrate
that a method for ASEAN to mitigate negative impacts of US re-engagement in the
region is to regularly involve all major powers in a security dialogue in Southeast
Asia. This is the way to build up trust and confidence among powers themselves so
as to reduce suspicion between each other for more security. For Southeast Asian
states, bringing all major powers into regional forums to come and share differing
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viewpoints is also the smart way to gather information from major powers to
contribute to regional stability, security and development.116
3.4.2

For Vietnam in Particular
US engagement in Southeast Asia has pros and cons for Vietnam. The

bilateral ties between Vietnam and the US have been seen as a “rapprochement.”
Vietnam can benefit from US re-engagement in Southeast Asia in the political,
economic and security sectors. Politically, Vietnam’s geographic location makes it
central to US strategy, adding more leverage for Vietnam in the regional and
international arena. Huong argues Vietnam’s strategic role is enhanced as it can be
used as the “buffer zone or springboard” for both China and America in their
strategies towards Southeast Asia.117 For the US, Vietnam was once regarded as the
buffer against the spread of communism. It now plays an important role in balancing
the ascension of China. Moreover, Vietnam’s stable political system, economic
improvement, and rising regional and international prestige have led to Vietnam
receiving more attention from the US and China. The US has become the largest
export market for Vietnam, while China is the biggest source of its imports. Vietnam
has opportunities to further participate in regional multilateral mechanisms, raising
its voice and enhancing its role in these forums. With its impressive economic
development, larger powers now recognise Vietnam as an important partner.118
At the same time, Hoang claims that for Vietnam, the US has now become
one of its most important foreign partners. Vietnam is a strategic partner of the US.
With improved bilateral relations between Washington and Hanoi, Vietnam is one of
the top priorities for the US in Southeast Asia. New developments in Vietnam-US
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in Southeast Asia in the first two decades of the XXI Century and its implications for Vietnam],
p.168.
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relations provide support for American broader strategies towards Southeast Asia.119
US re-engagement in Southeast Asia and rapprochement with Vietnam can help
bring economic benefits to Vietnam. The statement of Secretary of State Clinton
during a short visit to Hanoi that the US wished to see a strong and prosperous
Vietnam was highly appreciated by the Vietnamese people.
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From the

normalisation of ties in July 1995 to the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement
(BTA) in December 2001, and with Vietnam’s entrance to the WTO in January 2007,
bilateral trade and investment between Vietnam and the US has become the mainstay
of the two countries’ relationship.121 Nguyen also points out that the US continues to
support Vietnam in its market reforms. Its open door policy and new legislation has
created better conditions for American enterprises to operate businesses in
Vietnam.122 Vietnam’s economy benefits from US interests in the region.
In terms of security, American involvement in Southeast Asia is beneficial to
Vietnam’s regional security to some extent, especially in the current territorial
disputes over the South China Sea. With China’s assertiveness in claiming its
maritime territory, American foreign policy of prevention and deterrence over the
South China Sea has, at least, helped to address the dispute through a more balanced
approach. US policy in the South China Sea is strongly opposed to the use of force to
resolve competing claims as it urges claimants to exercise restraint and avoid
destabilizing actions. The US desire is for the maintenance of peace and stability in
the South China Sea. The US also considers that maintaining freedom of navigation
and all maritime activities is consistent with international law and is in the
fundamental interests of the US. 123 Although the US pursues its own national
interests in its strategies towards the South China Sea, aiming to protect its
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economic, political and security privileges, Vietnam as one claimant in this territorial
dispute can benefit from the US approaches by addressing the problem multilaterally
under international law.
Negatively, US policy of spreading human rights and democracy can affect
Vietnam’s domestic political system and social stability. Vatthana argues that
Vietnam has made remarkable progress since the early 1990s, emerging from the US
embargo and international isolation to establish diplomatic and economic relations
with many partners, including international institutions. However, the Vietnamese
leaders, in particular those within the conservative elements of the Communist Party
of Vietnam (CPV), remain suspicious of US diplomatic and strategic intentions in the
region such as “the plot of peaceful evolution.”
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Vietnam’s foreign policy

strategies were largely decided by the interplay of the balance of power between
conservatives and reformers, along with the leadership style of the General Secretary
of the CPV. The reformers prefer a friendlier relationship with Washington as it can
help Hanoi have a greater leverage against Beijing.
However, the conservatives consider “peaceful evolution” as a dangerous
development.125 The phrase “peaceful evolution” was previously used to describe an
imperialist strategy of sabotaging socialism by destroying the party from within.
Party conservatives today emphasise that a “peaceful evolution” can be understood
as a “victory without war” over an existing regime. They argue that the objective of
hostile forces (such as the US) in a “peaceful evolution” is to interfere in Vietnam’s
domestic affairs and eventually remove the leadership of the CPV and end
socialism.126
The negative impact of US rapprochement with Vietnam raises the likelihood
of affecting bilateral relations with Vietnam’s neighbour China. Geography and
history have jointly made Vietnam into one of the countries that is most sensitive to
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developments in China. Vietnam lies on a China’s main route of expansion into
Southeast Asia.127 China is more of a long-term threat for Vietnam due to both its
geographical location and its political orientation. The threat from Beijing is greater
for Vietnam than that from Washington because for the US, the sources of tensions
are Vietnam’s political system, democracy and human rights issues. For China, the
matters that Vietnam needs to deal with are more complicated, and concern national
territory, land and sovereignty.128
In the short term, Vietnam should maximise its positive bilateral relationship
with the US in both economic and political issues as the US is Vietnam’s largest
export market and Vietnam has a huge trade surplus with the US. In tourism,
Vietnam receives its largest number of foreign tourists from the US. However, this
temporary advantage should not mean that Vietnam neglects China. Vietnam should
not choose either the US or China as Vietnam derives benefits from both countries.
The relationships Vietnam enjoys with both China and the US complement each
other.129
In the South China Sea territorial dispute, the different interests of various
states, not only China and the US, have made the issue complicated. What Vietnam
should do in the long term is a question of national policy. However, Vietnam should
do its best to prevent the bilateral relationship between China and America from
becoming a rivalry in strategic competition in Southeast Asia, especially in the South
China Sea.
Vietnam will not participate in any power competitions between/among major powers.
We will not stand on one side to confront another, rather, we only implement our duty,
contributing to peace, stability in the region and world on the basis of international law
and the UN Charter. We try our utmost to maintain our national self-reliance and
independence. This concept is clearly defined in Vietnam’s foreign policy. This truth
comes from the valuable lessons from our one thousand-year history of building and
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defending the country. Maintaining the self-reliance and independence foreign policy
ensures sustainable and long-time peace for our nation.130

An ASEAN community is beneficial to Vietnam’s national interests. ASEAN
can assist in dealing with larger issues of security and development, such as the
South China Sea territorial dispute. However, progress on such matters is
complex. 131 Brown argues ASEAN is crucial for Vietnam as multilateralism
approaches, so membership of ASEAN is a powerful weapon.132
In the long term, Vietnam’s foreign policy is to make friends with all major
powers. It is crucial for Vietnam to stand on its own national interest in its foreign
policy. At the same time it is practical for Vietnam to enhance external cooperation
to strengthen Vietnam’s security, development and prestige in the regional and
international arena. Vietnam does need to better address the interests of major
powers through international integration. Vietnam also tries to meet the interests of
foreign powers to pursue investment overseas. In its relations with China, Vietnam
has a large trade deficit and so it must improve its terms of trade. On the other hand,
Vietnam has a trade surplus with the US, with an export value of US$18.64 billion in
2013. Vietnam’s imports from the US were valued at US$5.23 billion, while exports
to the US reached US$23.87 billion. 133 To address the balance of trade, Vietnam
should enhance financial and credit cooperation with the US.134
The next chapter examines the relationship of cooperation and competition
between the US and China in Southeast Asia, followed by their implications on
Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER 4. SINO-AMERICAN INTERACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

This chapter will examine the basis of Sino-American interactions in
Southeast Asia after 1991. Sino-American interactions reflect a rising regional power
challenging the global superpower, and the leading creditor against the largest debtor
in the world. Understanding the dynamic that exists for these two powers is critical in
order to analyse how Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) should engage with them
in the region. This chapter will describe the bilateral relations in terms of cooperation
and competition. The main argument of the chapter is that the approach of Southeast
Asia to China and the US should not be seen as favouring one side while neglecting
the other. It is how ASEAN works to balance the interest of rival powers.
4.1
4.1.1

The Basis of Sino-American Interactions
Global and Regional Factors in Sino-American Interactions
In the post-Cold War era, the US has remained dominant in the international

arena despite its relative decline. China, meanwhile, has been regarded as the main
challenger to US hegemony with its spectacular economic growth over the past two
decades. Peng argues that the rise of China’s national power has been impressive and
it led to the proliferation of ‘China studies’ among American think tanks, along with
a wave of Chinese language study in America, showing that the US is well aware of
a real challenge from China’s rise. 1 In 2010, Sharma claimed that if the Obama
Administration carried out an uncompromisingly aggressive policy towards Beijing,
it would be at a painful economic cost. Owing to fundamental shifts in the global
landscape, the US is no longer in a unilateral position to call the shots. A new
economic picture has emerged – China has become the US government’s largest

1
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International Affairs, 61(1), 2007, pp. 98-113 at 105.
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foreign creditor while the US has the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest
debtor.2
China’s growth is one of the reasons that led to inter-dependence among
powers and other countries in the world in general, and to more dynamic bilateral ties
between China and the US. Peng recognised that the US has, over time, altered its
strategies and methods towards China, although its tactical goal of changing China
stays the same.3 From a strategic view, the US expects to see China as a responsible
stakeholder and has shifted its rhetoric accordingly – from an emotional language of
“China threat,” it now uses the phrase “China’s responsibility,” from “engagement”
with China, the US now uses “conditional acceptance.” These alternations
demonstrate international integration as the US seeks peaceful coexistence with
China.4
However, there are other aspects of the relationship that are less peaceful,
such as arms races, local conflicts and territorial disputes. These serve to complicate
the post-Cold War environment. One Vietnamese official thought that in the coming
decades there would be fewer possibilities of a world war, because peace and
cooperation remains the mainstay of international relations.5 While the world is not
engaged in major wars between great powers, invasions of smaller nations continue.
There are also likely to be boundary disputes. 6 As a result, the Sino-American
relationship has witnessed competition in addition to cooperation. Peng argued that
the increasing significance of Sino-American ties means not only American strategic
reliance on China, but also an increase in its strategic suspicions regarding China.7
Hung and Liu discovered in the 2001 US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that

2

Sharma, S.D., ‘China as the World’s Creditor and the United States as the World’s Debtor:
Implications for Sino-American Relations’, China Perspectives, 84, 2010, pp. 100-115 at 103.
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the United States will face a major military challenge from Asia, most notably from
China.8 The 2001 QDR of the United States clearly claimed:
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the
potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten
stability in regions critical to US interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging
as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition.9

Global politics has brought about major changes to Sino-American relations, shaping
it with specific features of cooperation and competition.
Southeast Asia has a dynamism that has shaped the Sino-American
relationship. Nguyen argues that China is the leading engine of economic growth in
Asia, and Asian countries have stronger trade relations with China than with the
US.10 China has much to offer to Southeast Asian states, including more convenient
conditions than the US due to geographical distance, its network of overseas Chinese
who are deeply engaged with business elites of Southeast Asia, and similarities in
culture, traditions and customs. Over the past few years, the US had increased
diplomatic efforts with other regions, such as the Middle East or South Asia, and this
had given China the opportunity to use ‘soft power’ to broaden and strengthen its
influence in Southeast Asia.11 Looking at their current position and strength in the
region, Chinese influence is more prominent than American influence. Nguyen
argues this trend is likely to continue in the coming years.12
4.1.2

Background to Sino-American Relations:
The relationship between China and the US has never been straightforward or

transparent. From the beginning there was intense rivalry between both countries.
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Since the end of the Cold War, US-China relations have become increasingly
unstable, which means greater variations in conflictual and cooperative behaviour
within short periods of time due to cycles of engagement and friction. This instability
reflects a fundamental disjuncture between limited cooperative interests and more
common conflictual ones.13 Sharing this viewpoint, Nguyen Thai Yen Huong noted
that although the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US
opened a new page in the bilateral relationship between the two powers, it did not
mean the end of strain and conflicts. The most important feature in post-Cold War
Sino-American relations is that China finds it essential to cooperate with the US at a
time when the US is experiencing a relative decline in power and has to adjust its
strategies towards China accordingly. The objective cause is rooted in the global
political trends of peace and a decrease in arm races.14
The intense rivalry between China and the US can be seen through a range of
strategies they have towards each other including vigilance, antagonism and conflict.
The tight cooperation is over security issues, politics, economics, diplomacy and
military affairs. In this perspective, Glaser discovered that between 2001 and 2003,
relations between Washington and Beijing underwent a spectacular transition in
ways that few could think of during the Bush Administration. Global terrorism, the
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, simmering tensions in South Asia, the Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the North Korea nuclear issue have added
a compelling strategic dimension to Sino-American relations. Not since the Cold
War have such security issues occupied a central position in the two powers’
interactions.15
US Deputy Assistant Secretary, Thomas J. Christensen, from the US Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, gave evidence to the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment, Committee of
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Foreign Affairs, on 23 July 2007 that the US-China relationship is candid,
constructive and cooperative with a solid foundation and that there has been an
improvement in recent years with some key areas of cooperation.16 Even the most
powerful country in the world can face a global problem that it is unable to resolve
alone. The US is aware of the fact that, sooner or later, China is going to become a
major power and exercise more influence in the international arena. This perception
has made Washington feel the risk of restraining Beijing with military confrontation.
Consequently, it would be reasonable for the US to attempt comprehensive strategic
contacts with China and work together for common solutions.
However, Sino-American relations also suffer from suspicion and differences
over several issues, which adds tension to this relationship. Glaser notes that in spite
of Jiang Zemin’s assurances to US President Bush that China has no ambition to
challenge American military presence in the Asia-Pacific and it considers the US as
having a stabilizing role in the region, most Americans are still worried about
Beijing’s long-term ambitions. Meanwhile, the Chinese were suspicious of Bush
Administration officials’ assertion that China should not be seen as an adversary. The
most sensitive issue between the two powers that has not yet been settled is the
potentially explosive problem of Taiwan. Beijing continues to object to American
interference in the Taiwan issue, such as US arms sales, closer military ties and
commitment to Taiwan.17 The suspicion and differences of opinion between the US
and China obstruct cooperation and increases rivalry between the two countries, as
evidenced by the enduring scepticism of each other’s long-term intentions and
persistent differences on sensitive issues.18
4.1.3 Theoretical Basis of Sino-American Relations
In realist thought, a nation aims to advance its interests so as to maximise its
benefits. The US national interest rests on preserving power, while for China, its
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national interest is linked to expanding its influence. However, a US under pressure
also understands that it is not in its national interests to pursue rivalry with China.
Policies can be adjusted to maximise benefits. Clinton argued that “nations as well as
individuals, act for their own benefit, and not for others, unless both interests happen
to be assimilated.” 19 While China wishes to advance its emerging power, it is
beneficial to cooperate with the US. China’s interest needs to be supported by a
peaceful region to focus on its economic development. Nguyen argues that China
views the relative decline of the US and Japan as an opportunity for its own rise,
replacing Japan as the leading East Asian economy and grasping a leadership role in
the region. At the same time, American economic woes have created a perception of
waning global strength and have narrowed the capability gap between major powers.
As a result, both China and the US find it difficult to maintain a policy of direct
rivalry towards each other and, in the near future, China is still likely to accept the
existing imbalance of power.20 China and the US have to cooperate with each other,
as it benefits each power’s national interests. Realism and balance of power are
reasonable tools to explain the theoretical basis for Sino-American interactions.
Different strategic objectives and national ideologies are the main reasons for
competition between China and the US. The US-China relationship is a competition
between major powers over differences in economics, politics, culture and social
values. Yan shows that after Barack Obama became US President, Beijing and
Washington officials formulated the concept that the China-US bilateral relationship
is the world’s most important relationship because of the level of conflicting interests
rather than shared ones. 21 Shambaugh explained that China and the US have
competing worldviews, divergent strategic interests, antithetical political systems, no
intelligence sharing and attenuated military relations. 22
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Owing to these differences, the concept of “strategic competitors” describes
Sino-American ties. Both sides can cooperate in some sectors while having
competitive, and sometimes contentious, relations at the core. In East Asia, China
and the US are vying for strategic pre-eminence and leadership. While China claims
never to seek hegemony or domination over the Asia-Pacific region, it is not
comfortable with current US regional security domination or multilateral security.
The Chinese military is not inclined to tolerate either an indefinite US military
presence or strategic American pre-eminence in the region. Moreover, the
contradiction in national ideology also adds to the competitive feature in SinoAmerican relations. Samuel Huntington sees the “clash of civilizations” as taking
place between the advanced industrialized nations of the West and other models of
development, including Confucian thought and culture in China. The major
differences between the Western and Confucian models can be traced to historical
experiences, cultural orientation, and political and social institutions. How US policy
addresses these issues will either separate two powerful nations or bring them closer
together.23
These differences in national ideology have led to the pursuance of different
objectives between China and the US. On the one hand, the American strategy is to
promote American views of human rights and democracy worldwide as universal
values. This use of soft power preserves American cultural influence in the world.
On the other hand, due to its traditional influence in Asia as the largest and most
populous power in the region, China has a stake in preserving Chinese culture and
integrity.24 China is the largest socialist country in the world today and, in opposition
with American views, looks at human rights as linked to stages of development. This
situation causes mutual suspicion.25 China and the US face strategic competition in
the regional and global race for national influence and power.
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4.1.4 Practical Basis of Sino-American Relations:
Sino-American relations are also affected by globalization and regional
integration. Nations all over the world today face common global issues, such as
cyber security, trans-national crime, terrorism, pandemic diseases and climate
change. Both China and the US are unlikely to resolve these problems unilaterally.
All countries need to coordinate with one another to deal with these global issues.26
Garrett argues that globalization has created a new “strategic independence” among
globalizing states because they are becoming more dependent on maintaining,
deepening and broadening economic ties with other states in an international system
of peace and stability, so that economic relationships can develop. While states that
have globalized successfully may become economic and political competitors in the
future, it is unlikely they will enter a zero-sum game of strategic competition, as was
the case of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Each state will find
that the growth, prosperity and security of other states are crucial to its own security
and economic well-being.27
Therefore, China and the US need to cooperate with each other because it is
in their national interest and benefit to do so. If China and the US cannot cooperate,
then both powers will suffer. When the most powerful nation in the world can
cooperate with the world’s most populous country, the result will be greater
prosperity and stability throughout the world. 28 Since the 1980s, China has been
aware of the growing influence of economic interdependence and globalization in
world politics. Not until the 1990s did the Chinese accept economic globalization as
an irreversible trend, and that China should be adaptive. In a long-term strategy for
increased wealth and power, China has integrated further into the world economy. Its
bilateral relations with the US play an important role in this process.29
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The Sino-American relationship faces strategic competition because of their
rivalry for influence over regional or international areas of concern, where Taiwan,
East China Sea (Senkaku Islands) and South China Sea territorial disputes are among
the most complicated problems. Tao argues that the Taiwan issue could undermine
the whole bilateral relationship between China and the US. It could even lead to war
between the two major powers.30 Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the
US Defence Department is obligated to sell weapons of a defensive nature to
Taiwan. The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is expected to participate
in any conflict with China. The Taiwan issue is always a sensitive matter in SinoAmerican relations. China views the return of Taiwan as a natural process following
the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999. China does not hide its
intention to use armed force if Taiwan declares independence. Meanwhile, Taiwan
has exploited the situation to develop and broaden its international space to counter
Chinese interests. In spite of objections from China, the Obama Administration
approved US$6.4 billion in arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010.31
Apart from Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea territorial
disputes are another area of strategic competition. Wang argued that the South China
Sea disputes are likely to be among one of the most serious challenges or troubles
between China and the US in the future. In 2002, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister
Li Zhaoxing described Taiwan as “a burden on the back of the U.S for more than half
a century.” Conversely, Wang predicted that it is hard to imagine the South China
Sea issue will be a burden on the back of the US for the next half century.32 Yee
argues that the latest escalation of tensions in the East and South China Seas has
drawn renewed attention to the possibility of conflict over the surrounding areas, and
both China and the US have made public their intentions. The US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton stated at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hanoi on 20 July
2010 that:
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The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation,
open access to Asian’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the
South China Sea. The United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by
33

all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion.

For its part, China has asserted that the South China Sea is its core interest.34
Thus, Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia is inevitable.
4.2

Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era
In order to address their national interests, China and the US have

implemented various strategies in Southeast Asia. In an interview with the author, a
leading Vietnamese scholar of Chinese studies likened the Sino-American
relationship in Southeast Asia as a boat that goes against the current. The relationship
is difficult to move quickly, but if it does not move forward, it is likely to move
backward. The reason for this conundrum is the lack of mutual strategic trust
between China and the US. 35 As a result, the China-US relationship in Southeast
Asia can benefit both powers and the region when it is in good standing, a win-win
solution for all parties. Others employ a different maritime analogy, comparing the
China-US long-term stable and cooperative relationship to a steamer sailing through
rough seas, where the four elements of mutual trust/respect, institutionalization,
transparency and mutual restraints in military build-up are viewed as the ballast that
ensures the ship will not capsize when faced with huge storms and monstrous waves.
The two sides need to make sure the relationship results in strategic benefits for both
nations.36
If, however, the Sino-American relationship develops into rivalry, then it is
likely to turn into a zero-sum game for each side. Southeast Asia will be split into
supporters of the US and supporters of China. An influential Indonesian
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commentator noted that if this happens, ASEAN would be polarized, resulting in the
marginalization of its roles as one of the pillars of architecture of East Asian
security.37 Positive relations between China and America can stabilise and improve
bilateral relations in Southeast Asia. During an economic downturn, it is essential to
create a favourable environment for social stability and economic development. A
more cooperative and stable strategic relationship between an established power and
a rising power will make it easier to deal with today’s global economic, political,
security, social and environmental challenges. On the one hand, this positive
relationship will in turn benefit both powers in politics, economics and domestic
priorities. By contrast, more confrontational and troubled strategic relations are likely
to undermine the security and well-being of both powers. Thus, the significance of
building a more stable and cooperative Sino-American relationship is wellrecognized as important, but a challenge for both China and the US today. 38 A
Chinese saying sums this up nicely: “Heze liangli, douze jushang” (合则两利斗则俱
伤) [Trans: “Cooperation brings benefits to both sides, Rivalry results in harm to
both sides”]. According to Professor Do Tien Sam, a Vietnamese leading scholar on
China, the Sino-American relationship in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era is
described “Đấu nhi bất phá” [“Competition without a break in relations”], meaning
competition exists, but has not come to rivalry as it did between the superpowers in
the Cold War. Cooperation exists but has not yet resulted in a ‘G2’ (the US and
China), although the Americans have proposed this.39
The relationship between China and the US in Southeast Asia also suffers
from instability and imbalance. This is because China is still far from being at the
same level as the US in terms of its comprehensive strength. Being a global
superpower, US foreign policy is framed by the idea that it is a power like none
before – an American ‘exceptionalism.’ China watches US behaviour closely and
carefully, calculating the impact on its own security and then responds accordingly.
This imbalance between the two powers has contributed to instability and
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unpredictability, to fluctuations and sometimes low points in China-US relations.40
Yan argues that instability is an important feature of the China-US relationship and it
embodies the superficial nature of that relationship. 41 The fluctuations in SinoAmerican relations have indeed brought about significant implications for Southeast
Asia, which will be addressed in chapter 7.
For Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia, cooperation and competition
as both “strategic partner” and “strategic competitor” are in co-existence for purposes
of mutual development. There are certain spaces for competition between a rising
power and a declining superpower. Simultaneously, when the emerging state has not
yet achieved enough conditions to challenge the current hegemon, then cooperation
between the two is another bilateral approach. Both sides will find opportunities for
cooperation in addition to competition.
From the Chinese perspectives, So and Kim argue that since the end of the
Cold War, the nature of the US-China relationship is unclear. 42 It could be
considered an unstable phase of bilateral relations. The reason mostly comes from an
uncertain American strategic perception of China. Evidence of this uncertainty can
be found in the meetings, dialogues, mediations, and cooperation of the American
and Chinese governments on a range of regional and international issues, such as
commerce, counter terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons. There is
disagreement between the two powers regarding political systems, ideology, human
rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, North Korea, the South China Sea and Tibet. As the
weaker partner in the relationship, China has no choice but to manage affairs in two
ways: on the one hand, China supports and attends meetings, dialogues, and
mediations to develop cooperative relations with the US, and, on the other hand, it is
on high alert for American actions, including further westernization, secession of
territories from the Chinese state and containment of Chinese power.
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4.2.1

The Sino-American’s Competition in Southeast Asian Affairs

4.2.1.1 In Security and Military affairs
China and the US both consider Southeast Asia as an area of regional
competition due to its strategic location in the Asia-Pacific. At the beginning of the
post-Cold War era, when the US was forced to withdraw its troops and vacate its
bases in the Philippines after the Philippine Congress refused to renew the leases on
these bases, China moved to fill the gap in Southeast Asia to influence its southern
neighbours. In the 1997 Asian financial crisis, while the US was late in assisting the
region, China played a role as the key helper to its southern neighbours to spread its
influence. Hung and Liu argued that the rise of China has made the Obama
Administration see the need, in 2008, for the US to return to Southeast Asia.43
While the US is making efforts to re-engage Southeast Asia by developing
new partnerships with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, China is losing
trust and confidence in the region because of the aggressive pursuits of its own
claims in territorial disputes with the Southeast Asian states of Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The more aggressive China is in dealing with its
southern neighbours, the more opportunity it brings for America in the region.
Cabras argues that the first significant signal of US interests in Asian geopolitical
space was the announcement by US President Obama in November 2011 to renew
American presence in the Asia-Pacific. The US Marines’ presence was rotational and
not permanent. It began with small numbers and will build up to 2,500 marines in
future years to Darwin in northern Australia, just 500 miles from Indonesia. The US
goal is to strengthen its alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines to
protect American core interests across Asia. The number of US troops in the AsiaPacific will be over 80,000 with 2,500 in Australia, 50,000 in Japan and 28,000 in
South Korea.44
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The issue of the South China Sea effectively demonstrates the competition in
security and military affairs between China and the US in Southeast Asia. While
China considers the South China Sea as part of its core interests, the US has an
interest in freedom of navigation with open access to Asia’s maritime routes. While
China claims its indisputable sovereignty over islands, reefs and rocks above the sea
surface, it also wants the sea area in which they are located, for access to potential
natural resources. The US urges all concerned parties to respect international law in
the South China Sea. While China is interested in dealing only with other claimant
states to resolve the territorial disputes in the sea area, the US looks to ASEAN
members, ARF participants and other maritime nations.45 Sovereignty over the South
China Sea has become a point of competition between the two powers in the region.
Wang explored the traditional balance of power theory and argued that the
struggles among great powers are defined by every previous struggle over
sovereignty. Regional disputes in modern times to some extent continue the past
struggle between colonial powers, and the South China Sea is no exception.
Southeast Asia used to be divided by powers such as Britain, France, Portugal, the
Netherlands and Spain. Japan today has vital interests in the region with 70% of its
oil carried on the sea-lanes through the South China Sea, but the US is currently
viewed by ASEAN nations to be the principal deterrent to any outbreak of military
hostilities. The US has made it clear to China that it will resist any attempt to
interfere with international sea and air navigation rights through the South China
Sea.46 Meanwhile, China views the South China Sea as an exclusively Chinese sea
and claims nearly its entire territory. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi claimed:
On the South China Sea, the position of the Chinese Government has been consistent
and clear-cut. China has sovereignty over the islands on the South China Sea and their
adjacent waters. There is plentiful historical and jurisprudential evidence for that.47
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Emmers notes that among the islands in the territorial disputes between China
and its ASEAN neighbours lies the Paracel and Spratly Islands at the centre of
competing territorial, economic and strategic interests. If China were to realise its
territorial claims, it will be able to extend its jurisdiction to the heart of Southeast
Asia. Furthermore, if China can control the maritime communication routes, it could
endanger the security interests of the US, Japan and other maritime powers that cross
these waters.48
Sutter argued that China’s harder line in military, diplomacy and other
manoeuvres in the South China Sea territorial disputes has tarnished its image in
Southeast Asia and raises the spectre of Sino-American military confrontation. 49
China can, however, give reason to the US to pay more attention to Southeast Asia,
to protect its security interests. The US has stepped up its security presence in the
region, including port-access arrangements in Southeast Asia and joint military
exercises with the Philippines. While China has conducted ever larger naval
exercises in the South China Sea in recent years without interference from the US,
the American naval presence is designed to reassure regional states. Wang argued
that American activities are aimed at setting up a “United Front” against China.50
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi made remarks about the US goal to
contain China by rebalancing its strategy with the region:
Judging from some recent U.S. moves in the region, including the strengthening of
military alliance with countries in the region, many people have come to the conclusion
that the fundamental role of the strategy is to contain China and to thwart China’s
development.51
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4.2.1.2 Political and Influential Power
In the 1990s, as the US downgraded the strategic importance of Southeast
Asia, a new strategic reality has been evolving in Southeast Asia. China’s economic
rise has taken place against a background of US foreign policy adventurism and its
relative economic decline.52 China has adopted a ‘good neighbour’ policy towards its
surrounding neighbours through the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” (heping
gongcun wu yuanze 和平共存五原则) in its policy foundation for shaping a peaceful
international environment. China has introduced its “five guidelines of regional
cooperation” (quyuhezuo wuxiangzhidao 区域合作五项指导) and consensus to set
aside problems. China has worked to resolve problems with Southeast Asian states
through dialogues and negotiations. There has been an improvement in relations
between China and Southeast Asian states. China entered as a consulting partner of
the ARF in 1994 and became a dialogue partner the following year.53
China has an economic influence over its southern neighbours. According to
Petty, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, ASEAN’s poorest states, have remained in
China’s orbit as a result of no-strings loans, desperately needed infrastructure
development, military support and investment opportunities from Chinese
companies. 54 Moreover, Beijing has strong economic ties with Singapore and
Malaysia, and has been aggressively wooing Thailand, a traditional ally of America.
The Director of Chulalongkorn University’s Institute of Security and International
Studies, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, claims that Southeast Asia has been of geo-strategic
value to China for centuries, as China has always had a major influence on the
region.55 An article in The Economist in 2011, the mysteriously named R.G. argued
that the government in Beijing has launched a charm offensive in Southeast Asia in
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the last decade. By supporting Southeast Asian development through improved
infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and hospital buildings, China became the
largest trading partner of many countries in the region while the US “only whistled a
lonesome single security-obsessed tune.”56
Since 2008, the competition between China and the US for political influence
in Southeast Asia has become increasingly tense due to conflicts of interest between
the two powers. Both powers issued a joint statement at the conclusion of President
Obama’s visit to Beijing for the Sino-American summit in November 2009. Both
leaders agreed to consider each other’s core interests as extremely important to
ensure a steady progress in US-China relations:
The United States and China committed to work together to build a cooperative
partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit in order to promote the
common interests of both countries and to address the 21st century’s opportunities and
challenges.57

However, early the following year, the US sold arms to Taiwan and
President Obama officially received the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, in the
White House, causing anger in Beijing. Moreover, while the US has made efforts to
urge all concerned parties in the South China Sea to respect international navigation,
China responded that it would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea.
For US analysts, this was the first time China identified the South China Sea as its
core interest, along with Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang.58
Petty explored Washington’s 2012 flurry of engagements with the
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam as a potential source of friction with
China, especially as tempers flared over the territorial disputes and the rapid Chinese

56

R.G., ‘China and America in Southeast Asia: Dance of the Giants’, The Economist, 21 November
2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2011/11/china-and-america-south-east-asia (Date of
visit 20 August 2013)

57

U.S.-China Joint Statement, The White House, 19 January 2011. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement (Date of visit 26
July 2015)

58

Thayer, C.A. ‘The United States, China and Southeast Asia’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2011, pp. 1625 at 16-17

146

military build-up in the South China Sea.59 The more tensions that China created in
the territorial disputes, the more Southeast Asian states aimed to improve relations
with the US, as a natural strategy of balancing powers. However, Southeast Asia is
not edging closer to the US as a response to the rise of China. ASEAN’s policy is to
engage all major powers for regional benefit. Rather, it is a matter of fact that
China’s aggression has brought about the tendency for Southeast Asian states to
improve their relations with the US.
Carr asserts that China’s aggressive stance has backfired as it resulted in a
series of recent maritime stand-offs with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. These
escalations have made some Southeast Asian states nervous about China’s intentions
and they are keen to improve relations with the US. Myanmar and Vietnam have
complex bilateral relations with China and they have worked hard to rebuild their
relationship with the US.60 Since 2010, occasional Chinese pronouncements on the
South China Sea territorial disputes have sent Southeast Asian governments “rushing
for the shelter of the American umbrella.” 61 Thayer has also claimed that the
downturn of US relations with China contrasted with an upturn in American ties with
Southeast Asia, as the Obama Administration continued to re-engage ASEAN states
and developed new partnerships with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.62
China’s military modernization and its increased assertiveness in the South
China Sea have prompted Vietnam and other concerned ASEAN members to lobby
the US to become more involved. The US responded by raising issues concerning the
South China Sea at the 17th ARF meeting in Hanoi in 2010. The US intervention has
provoked a hostile response from China and Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign
Minister, left the forum angrily. In the 2011 East Asia Summit in Bali, Chinese
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Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated that “outside forces should not, under any pretext” be
involved in a regional dispute over the South China Sea. According to China, US
interference in regional affairs, such as the South China Sea territorial disputes,
worsen the issues. In March 2009, the US and China had clashed in the South China
Sea as Chinese vessels warned the surveillance ship USNS Impeccable of conducting
illegal operations and forced it out of the area. This clash proved the geo-strategic
significance of the South China Sea to both China and the US.63 China has deployed
nuclear attack submarines on Hainan Island, and they are likely to deploy nuclear
ballistic submarines to its naval base on that island as well.
4.2.1.3 Commercial and Economic Sectors
Competition between China and the US in the commercial and economic
sectors has been an unavoidable feature of Sino-American relations in Southeast
Asia. Commerce represents a level of material power that can have a direct impact on
the development of the relationship between the two powers. Southeast Asia has
recently been of interest to major powers due to its expanding middle class and their
growing purchasing power. China has attempted to develop with Southeast Asia a
relationship for mutual benefit by funding various infrastructure projects, such as the
Singapore-Kunming railway, the Kunming-Bangkok highway and the dredging of
the Mekong River for navigation and trade. The growth rate of China-Southeast Asia
commerce has been rapid, although in real terms, the size has been moderate relative
to overall trade. Bilateral trade between China and ASEAN grew from US$42 billion
in 2001 to US$231 billion in 2008.64 This growth rate is more rapid than Southeast
Asia’s trade with the US. China is reportedly going to overtake the US as the largest
market for most Southeast Asian countries.
Southeast Asian trade with the US almost doubled between 1992 and 2001,
from over US$66 billion to US$ 118 billion, generally to the advantage of Southeast
Asia. Most of this trade, approximately 80%, takes place with maritime Southeast
Asia. Chinese and American trade with Southeast Asia has resulted in their
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intensified maritime coexistence in the region.65 Bilateral trade between China and
ASEAN blossomed after the Asian financial crisis, and Chinese imports from
ASEAN increased from US$12.4 billion in 1997 to US$154.6 billion in 2010.
Chinese exports to ASEAN also increased from US$12.7 billion in 1997 to
US$138.2 billion in 2010. Although ASEAN is only China’s fifth largest trading
partner, fifth largest export market and third largest source of imports in 2005,
China’s trade with ASEAN (US$202.5 billion) has surpassed trade between the US
and ASEAN (US$171.7 billion) in 2007, making China the largest trading partner of
ASEAN.66 Accordingly, the Southeast Asian market is very important to the Chinese
economy, especially when in competition with the US to exploit the region’s
potential.
In contrast, the US is ASEAN’s fourth largest trading partner behind China,
the EU and Japan. The US barely accounts for 10% of ASEAN’s total trade. In 2009,
ASEAN imports from China contributed to 17% of total trade compared to the US at
12%.67 Clearly, China enjoys an advantage in economic competition with the US in
Southeast Asia. These advantages have built on China’s traditional influence over the
Southeast Asia region. China is well on the way to ease regional concerns about any
perceived “China Threat,” despite its recent aggressive claims in the South China
Sea. While the US has not yet been afraid of China’s rise, China has been concerned
with President Obama’s announcement of the achievement of the broad outlines of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, an Asia-Pacific regional trade
agreement negotiated among the US and eight other partners, including Australia,
Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. A viable TPP
might exclude China and Russia from a proposed free trade regional area in AsiaPacific, with a related market of 500 million consumers.68
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In general, Sino-American competition in Southeast Asian affairs shows the
nature of interactions between the most two powerful nations on earth. As a dynamic
region in the Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asia has been, and will continue to be, the
testing ground for Sino-American relations in the new century because of the impact
of China’s rise. Competition between Beijing and Washington is inevitable. The
American rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific can be regarded as the very
first step toward a clear set of US foreign policies in Southeast Asia that position
China as the central concern.69
4.2.2

Sino-American Cooperation in Southeast Asian Affairs
The new dynamic feature of the regional situation in the post-Cold War era

has led to greater Chinese and American cooperation to pursue each power’s national
interests. In 2011, US President Barack Obama addressed the Australian Parliament
and he said:
The United States remains the world’s largest and most dynamic economy. But in an
interconnected world, we all rise and fall together…. Meanwhile, the United States will
continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with China.70

Consequently, as the globe’s leading powers, the US and China also found
room for bilateral cooperation in addition to a level of competition. 71 From the
Chinese perspectives, So and Kim argue that since the 1990s, China has carried out a
strategy to establish and develop a “healthy and stable” relationship with the US to
stabilize and nurture Sino-American relations.72 This is the target that China’s third
leadership generation adopted from 1989 to 2001. Prior to the official visit of
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to the US, the two states disagreed over Most
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Favoured Nations trading status (MFN), human rights, Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan
and even the issue of Chinese participation in the WTO. However, the two countries
have made efforts to control bilateral relations so as not to become comprehensively
hostile and antagonistic. Despite the difficulties in Sino-American relations, China
has made many efforts to develop a “healthy and stable” relationship with the US.
Cooperation without rivalry has become the long-term strategy of China towards the
US. This tactic has both specific and general characteristics, demonstrating a basic
difference between post-Cold War era Sino-American relations and those of the Cold
War.
From the American perspective, Sino-American relations have been positive
since 2001, but both powers are now building up a more constructive bilateral
relationship.73 There have been a number of initiatives by the Obama Administration
for US-China cooperation, such as the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,
and the Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE). As Chinese Vice Premier
Liu claimed:
The CPE together with political mutual trust and business ties are intertwined and
reinforcing each other. Since 2010 when the CPE mechanisms was established, China
and the United States have held five rounds of consultations and achieved nearly 300
concrete deliverables. I’m happy to see that that people-to-people exchange between
our two countries today has expanded to cover more areas, as Vice President Biden
said-that the CPE from four major areas add to the first round of the consultation now
covers seven areas.74
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4.2.2.1 Security and Military affairs
Both powers have shown clearer co-ordination in security and military affairs
in the aftermath of 9/11. While the relationship between China and the US was
turbulent between 1991 and 2001, it improved after 2001 during the Bush
Administration through economic cooperation and anti-terrorism efforts. 75 On the
basis of interdependence, China and the US have found it necessary to cooperate
with each other in security and military affairs in Southeast Asia. Chinese and
American military cooperation is focused on three areas – strategic dialogue,
reciprocal exchanges in functional areas and arms sales. As of today, there has been
more than sixty annual official dialogues between the US and China to discuss
strategic and military issues.76
The US aims for further engagement in military cooperation with China
through confidence building. The US also participates in military exchanges and
joint exercises in a bid to engage China as a partner in global defence issues.
Through cooperation on humanitarian activities and regional security, the US seeks
to have China integrated as a dependable member of the Asia-Pacific community and
a more involved member of the world community, following the same principles and
norms that the US and its allies follow.77 This is the fundamental basis for a close
cooperation between China and the US, although it is easier to understand in theory
than in practice. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with the US
Secretary of State John Kerry before their bilateral meeting at the State Department
in Washington on 19 September 2013, his statement mentioned a new model of SinoAmerican relations with no conflict or confrontation, only mutual respect to achieve
a win-win outcome. The historical basis for this proposal came from the
identification of 15 cases of rising emerging powers, and in 11 of those instances,
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confrontation and war had broken out between the emerging and the established
power.78
This is also the new proposal of Chinese foreign policy in Sino-American
relations, where “cooperation and a win-win approach” is an important result of
China’s diplomatic approach and a core result of China’s peaceful development path
and new international relations. The phrase “win-win solution” has been mentioned
in both the White Paper, China’s Peaceful Development, released in 2011 and in
Chinese leaders’ statements at international fora about the principle and spirit of
“sailing the same boat, cooperation and win-win approach.” 79
Although China and the US differ greatly in foreign policy, objectives and
concepts, the two countries still have broad common interests. Therefore, exploring
the avenues for promoting win-win cooperation between the two countries has a
practical significance for combining China’s new diplomatic theory with its
practice.80As President Obama stated about US-China relations:
Inevitably, there are areas of tension between our two countries, but what I’ve learned
over the last four years is both the Chinese people and the American people want a
strong, cooperative relationship, and that I think there’s a strong recognition on the
path of both President Xi and myself that it is very much of our interest to work
together to meet the global challenges that we face.81

The cooperation of China and the US when approaching Southeast Asian
affairs is shown clearly in the strategies of both powers over the South China Sea
territorial disputes. Since 2009, China has become more assertive in this sea area
through moves like an expansion of its annual unilateral fishing ban in 2009, the
continuance of regular maritime security patrols by the Chinese Fisheries
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Administration and State Oceanographic Administration, and through an expansion
of scientific activities as well as other naval exercises in the South China Sea.
Moreover, China’s submission of its “nine-dashed line” claim in the South China Sea
to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS)
that same year provoked further concerns. Those two incidents in 2009, together with
Chinese harassment of US surveillance ships in the South China Sea have heightened
American fears about a probable accidental escalation due to Chinese challenges to
freedom of navigation. China has not only placed the South China Sea within its core
interests, the US also claims to have vital interests in maintaining stability, freedom
of navigation and the right to lawful commercial activities in this sea.82
In this situation, when both powers have strategic interests in the South China
Sea, it is reasonable that they will experience tensions or competition in achieving
their differing national interests. However, together with strategic competition over
the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, both China and the US also made
efforts to cooperate with each other, as much as possible, for regional stability. Both
powers fully understand how costly and devastating a war can be, as well as how
harmful a rivalry could be. As a result, there exists room for cooperation between
these two powers in resolving this dispute. Since 2010, there is evidence that greater
US involvement in the South China Sea issue has successfully persuaded Beijing to
reconsider its policy and return to a more accommodating stance.83
After the ARF, Chinese officials ceased referring to the South China Sea as a
core interest in meetings with American counterparts. Beijing dispatched Chinese
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun to key ASEAN capitals to listen to their
concerns, and reassured them about China’s peaceful intentions. Consequently, by
September 2010, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines stated that China had
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initiated discussions at the working level with other parties concerned to draw up a
code of conduct and it is open to different formulas and initiatives in preserving
peace, prosperity and stability in the region.84
Furthermore, at the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in
Hanoi in October 2010, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie responded calmly
to US counterpart Robert Gate’s reiteration of Hilary Clinton’s ARF comments on
the South China Sea, opting to use the opportunity to reassure the region that China’s
military is not challenging or threatening anyone, but is defensive in nature. During
his trip to Singapore in November 2010, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping stated
that a “prosperous and stable China does not pose a threat to any country, and it only
means more development opportunities for other countries.”85
4.2.2.2 Politics and influential power
In the modern era of interdependence and integration, both China and the US
find cooperation with each other more beneficial than mutual rivalry. The declining
power status of the US does not allow it to pursue a hard line policy of rivalry against
the Asian giant. Meanwhile, China’s rising regional power is not strong enough to
challenge US hegemony. As So and Kim explained, while most of the American high
ranking political officials, including President George W. Bush and Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice, often stressed that the Sino-American relationship is
“complicated and immense,” with Chinese leaders recognizing a number of existing
disagreements in their bilateral ties, both sides have many mutual concerns. SinoAmerican relations should be viewed and resolved at a high strategic and
comprehensive level.86
Other evidence of the relationship can be found in the 8th official meeting of
Chinese President Hu Jintao and American President Barack Obama in January
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2011. A second US-China Joint Statement expressed the wish for both countries to
establish “cooperative economic partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefits to
both countries and to the global economy.”87 It reduced the tensions between the two
powers and strengthened relations.
Compared to the 2009 Sino-American Joint Declaration, when the two
powers wished to develop a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive US-China
relationship,”88 it is clear that China and the US have achieved remarkable progress
in their current commitment.89 Consequently, in addition to its strategic competition
in the Asia-Pacific, the Sino-American relationship is also characterised by
cooperation to benefit each other. In his speech to the Australian Parliament, US
President Obama reiterated the importance of Sino-American cooperation with
reference to Washington’s recognition of Beijing’s balancing role in the AsiaPacific:
We’ve seen that China can be a partner, from reducing tensions on the Korean
Peninsula preventing proliferation. We’ll seek more opportunities for cooperation with
Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries to promote
understanding and avoid miscalculation.90

Both powers have played down talk of a geostrategic rivalry in Southeast Asia.
Instead, they have welcomed each other’s presence and seek to allay fears in ASEAN
about the negative effect of their influence in the region.91 The author argues that due
to ASEAN’s balance of power strategy, the two powers can gain more beneficial
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advantages if they cooperate in a win-win solution, rather than compete for a zerosum game result. For China, its crucial motivation is to actively participate in
regional and international mechanisms organised by ASEAN so as to reduce
Southeast Asian neighbours’ suspicion of “the China Threat.” Clearly, these
multilateral fora, especially the cooperation in “10+1,” has created room for China
and ASEAN to resolve the current impasse over the South China Sea territorial
disputes, and to provide a means to engage on potential or newly emerging problems,
such as bilateral economic competition. As a result, there is progress in the
discussion over the South China Sea and the trust building measures that China
applied in ASEAN have increased gradually along with ASEAN’s trust of the
regional power.92 Moreover, China is making efforts to take advantage of ASEAN’s
belief in many engagements on a number of fronts to ease Southeast Asian states’
concerns over Chinese “hegemony.”
As Japan was busy with domestic economic recovery and the US with wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, China had seized its chance in Southeast Asia. However, as
China has found it impossible to replace the dominant position of the US in the
region, its foreign policy has been to avoid rivalry with the US and enhance bilateral
cooperation. One tendency in the current Chinese peaceful development strategy is to
encourage Southeast Asia and economic partners to participate in economic and
political cooperation at the continental level for peace, order and security.93
4.2.2.3 Socio-economic sectors
The Sino-American relationship is particularly complex due to economic
interdependence: both sides need each other for the health of their own economies. In
Southeast Asia this manifests itself as peaceful economic development and stability
enhancement for both the region and the two powers. Sharma argues that China
needs the US even more than the US needs China. The US is the world’s largest
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debtor and China is the world’s leading creditor, when the debts become too massive,
there are always more risks for the creditor.94
There is a popular saying that “if you owe the bank a thousand dollars you
worry, but if you owe the bank a million dollars, the bank worries.”95 This economic
interdependence might define the Sino-American relationship in Southeast Asia in
two ways. On the one hand, if Sino-American rivalry escalates, and ASEAN
members split into China-deferring and China-defying camps, this could ruin the
group’s ability to lead. On the other hand, a peaceful balance of power between
Beijing and Washington could give ASEAN room to operate independently between
the two.96
Cooperation between China and the US in Southeast Asia also brings socioeconomic benefits for the two powers and the region. Both the US and ASEAN states
face a similar dilemma with respect to China: while they have tight economic
linkages with Beijing, they still worry about Chinese future intentions as its material
power grows together with the increased display of Chinese assertiveness. Both
ASEAN and the US believe extreme approaches are not the answer to the problem.
Adopting a purely offensive posture prematurely creates a self-fulfilling prophecy
that could precipitate another Cold War-like confrontation. In contrast, appeasing
China could risk undermining the territorial integrity of ASEAN states and the global
standing of American values. Thus, a more nuanced approach involves the
“Goldilocks Zone” – neither “too hot” nor “too cold” but “just right.”97 Cooperation
with Beijing is possible, but confrontation with Beijing is likely on issues that the US
takes a firm stand. This is the way to preserve US interests and ideals, while taking
into account the needs of American allies.98 The current approach of Southeast Asia
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to the US should not be seen as an answer to cope with a rising China. It is ASEAN’s
way to balance power, although this policy is flexible enough to adjust to different
circumstances.
In addition, Sarith argues that if the situation arises when China and the US
need each other to achieve a strategic balance of power in Southeast Asia, ASEAN
can benefit from the mechanisms of regional cooperation. If the US extends its
security umbrella and leads the region economically through multilateral forums,
ASEAN nations would likely sign up to US-led multilateral agreements, such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Expanded Economic Engagement (E3)
initiatives, with a view to diversify their export markets and increase US FDI flow
into the region. Currently, four members of ASEAN, namely Singapore, Brunei,
Malaysia and Vietnam are participating in TPP negotiations. Since the US needs a
strategic balance with China, ASEAN can benefit from these initiatives. ASEAN
member states, too, need closer strategic relations with the US in order to counter
China’s influence, especially on the South China Sea territorial disputes.99
4.3
4.3.1

The Development of Post-Cold War Sino-American Relations in Southeast
Asia
Sino-American Relations in Southeast Asia from 1989-2000
In the first period after the Cold War during the Bush Administration, the

Sino-American relationship experienced a level of sensitivity in which both powers
carried out a preventive policy towards each other. Saunders has argued that in the
aftermath of the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the US quickly turned to
economic sanctions to punish the Chinese government for killing protesters and
applying pressure on the Chinese government to remove martial law and improve
human rights conditions. 100 Yan Xuetong notes that right after the June 1989
demonstration, the US imposed sanctions on China in an act that the Chinese and
American Governments understood marked the end of their friendship. However,
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with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, neither side was ready for such a
sudden change. Improving bilateral relations has since been the principal policy.
While pretending to be friends, China and the US were “neither-friend-nor-enemy” (
非敌非友: fei di fei you). The nature of Sino-American relations at this time has been
described as same bed, different dreams.101
During the Clinton Administration, US constructive engagement policy added
tensions to the bilateral relationship. Hương argues that the US made propaganda
about the “China Threat” and launched various strategies to dominate China in
various sectors, from religion, to human rights and commerce. For the first time in
more than forty years since the Korean War, the US brought two carrier Task Forces
to the Taiwan Strait to warn China, and to support the presidential election in Taiwan
in March 1996. The US had responded to China’s firing of ballistic missiles into the
Taiwan Strait to intimate Taiwanese voters.
Back then, the US considered China, with its economic ascension and
military expansion, as the main challenger to the US in the coming decades.102 These
tensions between China and the US are a natural feature of the relationship and are
the result of regional bi-polarity. Tow has claimed that China is the dominant land
power while the US is the primary maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region. These
two nations are the only regional key players that own sufficient materials as well as
the non-material means to competitively project power into the Asia-Pacific. Thus,
the relationship between China and the US will inevitably be a competitive one and
this is reflected in the Sino-American rivalry in Southeast Asia. With a view
countering a US-dominated security regime in Southeast Asia, China has actively
promoted new security concepts at both bilateral and multilateral levels with its
southern neighbours.103
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In the early 1990s, the US neglected Southeast Asia and paid more attention
to other areas in the world, giving China the opportunity to get closer to its Southeast
Asian neighbours. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the eventual closure of
US military bases in the Philippines gave ASEAN countries some concerns about
American future commitment. It gave China an opportunity to seek long-term
interests in regional politics. Accordingly, China established and developed its
relationship with ASEAN in the 1990s and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN
in 1996. Although suffering from regional disputes over the islands, reefs and rocks
in the South China Sea, the nature of China-ASEAN relations evolved from one
based largely on bilateral relations to a multilateral relationship built on expanded
areas of cooperation.104
From 1997 to 2000, the Sino-American relationship underwent some policy
adjustments as the Clinton Administration came to regard China as a strategic
partner. After 1989, China and the US did not hold a summit until October 1997,
when President Jiang and President Clinton issued a joint statement committing both
nations to establish a constructive strategic partnership in the 21st century.105 The
China-US Joint Statement clearly states:
The two Presidents agree that a sound and stable relationship between China an the
United States serves the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and the American
peoples and is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to work for peace
and prosperity in the 21st century.106

This move marked a crucial landmark in Sino-American relations in the
second half of the Clinton Administration. From a Chinese perspective, the Clinton
visit was a symbolic achievement as he was the first US President to visit China in
the nine years since the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, indicating a full diplomatic “renormalization” between the two countries.107 Until then, the US was considered a
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political and security threat to China’s stability and development because of the crisis
in the Taiwan Straits. However, there was a positive result from the second summit
as the US reiterated the “three noes” policy to China: no support to Taiwanese
independence, no support for “two Chinas” and no support for Taiwan’s membership
in an international organization requiring that states only are members.108
The Sino-American relationship went through a period of relative friction
during the 2000 US election, when the US considered China a competitor more than
partner. Presidential candidate George W. Bush initially defined China as a “strategic
partner” during his campaign, but still insisted on protecting American firms’
interests over disagreements with China. The discord between the two powers
remained during Bush’s presidency, due mainly to his support for a pro-separatist
Taiwan, religious freedom and the provocative national missile defence system.109
Phạm Cao Cường argues that unlike the previous US administrations, George W.
Bush took a hard line in foreign policy and adopted unilateral approaches in dealing
with international relations. As a result, the US under the Bush Administration
regarded China a “potential competitor” rather than a “potential partner.”110
The Sino-American relationship from 1989 to 2000 went through periods of
cooperation and discord. This characteristic has significant impacts for Southeast
Asian nations. Despite the initial neglect, the US is still the dominant superpower in
the region. China has not become the most influential regional power and Southeast
Asia has enjoyed stability and peace. Goh has claimed that East Asia has remained
stable since 1990 largely due to the US being able to maintain its alliances by
maintain a deep economic and strategic involvement in the region. Major conflicts
were avoided partly because China chose not to aggressively challenge the status
quo.111
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4.3.2

Sino-American Interactions in Southeast Asia (2001-2008)
Despite tough competition at the beginning of the Bush Administration when

the US considered China a strategic competitor, Sino-American ties went through a
dramatic transition when both powers chose to cooperate from 2001 to 2008. Both
powers had to deal with global issues that became prominent after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in the US. Hribernik argues that the 9/11 attacks influenced and improved the
relationship between China and the US. Criticism of China within the US subsided
and Beijing began to support Washington more strongly in the war on terror. Both
China and the US recognized the benefits of cooperation in security as each side
ensured non-interference or even outright cooperation.112 Although China was the
fourth largest trading partner of the US, the new Bush Administration took a hard
line against China in early 2001 over the collision between a Chinese F-8 fighter and
an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft. The Chinese had demanded an official
apology for the death of the Chinese pilot but the American refusal to do so led to
more tensions in Sino-American ties. 113 American policy towards China, however,
changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and resulted in a more stable Sino-American
relationship between 2001 and 2008.
The reason for this relative cooperation between China and America in the
aftermath of 9/11 attacks comes from the changing situation. Lu concluded that the
September 11 incidents provided another point of cooperation for the two nations. In
the aftermath of September 11, President Bush’s visit to Shanghai for the APEC
Summit Meeting in October 2011 marked a milestone in bilateral relations for the
two powers. The US had committed its willingness to develop constructive and
cooperative relations with China, a positive response to China’s support for the
American anti-terrorism campaign.114
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When cooperation can bring about benefits, China and the US will cooperate.
In this regard, China’s cooperation is crucial due to China’s position as a major
power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The US also needs
China’s cooperation in dealing with global issues, such as proliferation of weapons,
transnational crime, and human and drug trafficking. 115 However, the temporary
cooperation between China and the US from 2001 to 2008 did not mean the end of
uncertainty and instability in the relationship.
Hribernik recognized that the age of uncertainty in bilateral relations between
China and the US continues presently. The US had expressed its concern over the
actual extent of China’s commitment to the struggle against terrorism given the
appearance of Chinese weapons in Afghanistan. 116 There have also emerged a
number of other problems, such as US trade sanctions, criticism of China’s internet
restrictions and its continued human rights abuses, controversy over US arms sale to
Taiwan or President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, as well as America’s
pivot to Asia-Pacific with the rotational presence of US troops in Australia.117
The Sino-American relationship, like any other international relationship, is
carried out on the basis of national interest. In Southeast Asia, the improvement in
Sino-American relations stemming from 9/11 was not strong enough to overcome
differences between the two powers. For much of East and Southeast Asia, the US
focus on terrorism and related international security issues contrasted sharply and
unfavourably with Beijing’s emphasis on economic matters. While the US focussed
on issues that regional governments considered as secondary to growth and
development, China engaged them directly on economic interests. When Washington
pressed cooperation in the war on terror, and sometimes criticised its counterparts for
lacking skills or techniques, Beijing pursued a free trade area with ASEAN states, or
it made efforts to ensure that China’s economic ascension was more of an
opportunity than a threat. As a result, Chinese success in economic development and
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social stability was talked about as the “China Model.” US anti-terrorism strategies
have been perceived as anti-Islamic, which furthered tarnished US soft power.118
Jia Qingguo has argued that cooperation between China and the US does not
mean their differences will disappear. They will continue to differ, as there are
unresolved issues, such as human rights, the pace of modernization, the meaning of
free and fair trade, the role of international organizations and the Taiwan issue.
However, sharing the same global problems, such as terrorism, increasing the level
of bilateral cooperation and assuming a greater role in world affairs will make both
powers find more constructive methods to deal with these problems.119
4.3.3

The Sino-American Relations in Southeast Asia since 2008 upwards
By 2008 the Sino-American relationship had reached a pivotal point. China’s

ascension has been recognised globally after the global financial crisis, and this
coincided with China’s ambition to use Southeast Asia as the buffer zone for its
global strategy of international engagement. The US also launched a strategy of
rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. Conflicting interests have drawn China and the
US into strategic competition in Southeast Asia in spite of the level of cooperation
outside the region. China’s rise could be seen as a challenge to the status quo of the
US as a superpower. Sino-American competition could be a threat to Southeast Asia
in territorial disputes and an opportunity for regional economic development.120
Southeast Asia has been squeezed between a rock and a hard place. While
China’s economic rise is the main reason to shift US power to Asia, it was the Asian
financial crisis that served as a turning point for China’s rise, as Southeast Asian
states began to develop a more favourable perception of Beijing. China’s growing
relationship with the region directly affects American interests there because China’s
rise means the US is no longer the sole protector or lender.
Utilising realism’s power transition theory, the international system is most
unstable when the distribution of power changes. Thus, future Chinese growth
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remains a concern for regional stability. Southeast Asia, therefore, serves as a testing
ground for China’s increasing influence and an early warning on how US foreign
policy will respond.121 Southeast Asia has grown in importance for both China and
the US, especially after 9/11. The two powers have attempted to cooperate actively
with the region in their competition for influence in Southeast Asia. After 2009, the
US adopted a regional approach and institutionalised its cooperation with ASEAN
once again. The 2009 ASEAN-US Summit laid the foundation for a renewed
relationship. The US also strengthened its relationship with ASEAN and East Asian
countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.
Recently, Vietnam and Indonesia have also developed stronger defence ties
with the US but the depth of these defence ties varies greatly between Indonesia
(which is a major step up in relations following the end of the Suharto era) and
Vietnam (where the defence ties are nascent).122 The adjusted US strategy to bring
Southeast Asia back onto its radar is aimed at controlling the rise of China. With
China’s growing influence, the US has begun to pay more attention to Southeast
Asia, and China’s ascension has caused Washington to initiate a set of strategies
focused on Beijing’s potential challenge to its strategic interests in Asia.123 The reengagement of the US with ASEAN is regarded as a response to a rising China,
whose influence is increasingly felt beyond its borders, particularly in Southeast
Asia.124
In general, Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia include both
cooperation and competition. Jian and Rouben note a report in China’s influential
Liaowang Weekly that China expects that Chinese and American interests will
become increasingly intertwined and that the cooperation between the two countries
will continue to develop. At the same time, it is imperative for the two sides to face
their disagreements and conflicts. Occasional frictions and tensions do occur in the
development of bilateral relations but war would be detrimental to both parties.
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Consequently, cooperation and friction will continue to characterise the most
important bilateral relationship in the globe today.125
4.4
4.4.1

Implications for Southeast Asia
Impacts
There are pros and cons in the post-Cold War Sino-American relations for

Southeast Asia. The positive effects can be achieved only when China and America
cooperate well with each other in Southeast Asian affairs. On the contrary, if the
Beijing-Washington relationship suffers from a strategic rivalry, then there will be
negative impacts. In terms of advantageous impacts, this relationship has created
economic dynamism for the regional situation. This dynamic development is an
essential essence for a regional mechanism like ASEAN to grow and mature. This
will be a considerable achievement given the turbulence that was once present at the
birth of the ASEAN community.
After more than forty years, ASEAN has become a successful example of
regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Jetschke argues that since its establishment
in 1967, “ASEAN is the most successful regional organisation among development
countries.” 126 Through a number of multilateral security forums and regional
cooperation mechanisms, ASEAN has succeeded in enlarging and consolidating the
relationship between itself and outside dialogue partners, including major powers.
The ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) was established in the 1990s for
ASEAN to conduct dialogues with outside partners. ASEAN’s dialogue partners
have been expanded to include China, South Korea, India and Russia, in addition to
its partners in the early post-Cold War period, such as the US, the EU, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand.
The next step was the foundation of ARF in 1994, which quickly became an
effective consultative forum in the Asia-Pacific to enlarge dialogues on regional
political and security issues. Another regional achievement followed with the
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establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. In 1997, ASEAN
proposed to hold the ASEAN +3, which included all ASEAN state members, plus
Japan, South Korea and China. Since its institutionalisation at Singapore in 2000,
ASEAN+3 has started to develop East Asia integration, and it paved the way to
officially start an East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005. Later, in response to the U.S.
strategy of rebalancing to Southeast Asia, and amid a rising and assertive China with
efforts to resolve the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN successfully
held the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in Hanoi in 2010.
The meeting was a remarkable example of ASEAN’s balance of power strategy, with
the attendance of Ministers of Defence from ASEAN states, the US, Russia, China,
Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, to discuss Southeast Asian
security issues.127
The other positive impact from Chinese and American interactions in
Southeast Asia is to bring about a higher international profile for ASEAN as a
regional cooperation mechanism, and to position Southeast Asia as an important subregion of the Asia-Pacific. When ASEAN becomes the focus of the world’s leading
powers, there will emerge conditions conducive for ASEAN to enhance bilateral
relations with China and the US. In this way, ASEAN has created its own regional
reputation in the globalised world as a positive destination for investment, tourism,
education and other socio-economic developments. Finally, the Sino-American
interactions in Southeast Asia are likely to bring about stability and security to the
region. China’s amazing economic development can lead to greater political
influence and military enhancement. This trend has, however, concerned ASEAN
states and as a result, ASEAN had to enhance its bilateral relations with the US to
counter the influence of China. As a result, China’s greater influence in the region
creates greater influence for the US in Southeast Asia. This development is in line
with ASEAN’s long-term strategy and policy to invite all great powers to play roles
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in the region. In ASEAN’s perception, the more powers appear in the region, the less
possibility exists for one dominant power to overwhelm other regional powers.128
In terms of disadvantages, there are a number of worries for regional
instability and insecurity if China and the US confront each other in the regional
arena of Southeast Asia. Firstly, ASEAN’s centrality will be affected, as member
states are likely to be polarized because of different national interests. Some
countries are very close to China because of their economic dependence. Others are
already very clearly in the camp of American allies: the Philippines, Thailand and
Singapore. Then there are countries that choose to adopt a neutral stand, such as
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. In that situation, ASEAN will be less effective. If
ASEAN can no longer maintain its strategic centrality then ASEAN will become less
relevant as the different alignments could split the organisation. Southeast Asia risks
becoming polarised and this will undermine ASEAN unity and centrality. These are
the possibilities and challenges of growing Sino-American rivalry on ASEAN.129 The
China-US rivalry is also likely to affect ASEAN’s unity if this region becomes an
object of major power competition. America’s “pivot to Asia” and deployment of
naval power back to the Asia-Pacific has resulted in an escalating rivalry with China.
Being closer to either side is considered harmful to ASEAN’s unity and centrality.
Any change in the balance of power in ASEAN will have adverse consequences,
including the threat of an end to ASEAN solidarity since its establishment in 1967.130
4.4.2

Recommendations
In the short term, ASEAN should continue its efforts towards a skilful

balancing of the influence of China and the US. ASEAN should attempt to ensure
that major powers will neither fight nor confront each other in the region. ASEAN
should at least adjust its own policies so as not to make them adopt rival positions.
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This approach can be achieved either through unilateral or multilateral, individual or
collective cooperation together within the ASEAN framework.131
In the long term, preserving ASEAN’s integrity, centrality and unity is the
key for the region in international relations. Southeast Asia will be strong and
confident in its relations with great powers only when the regional states act more
cohesively together. Unity and centrality have led to success and increased strength
for ASEAN throughout its development. The ASEAN Charter states that ASEAN’s
purpose is “to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary
driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional
architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.” 132 This guideline is also a
practical recommendation for the relationship between ASEAN with China and the
US. ASEAN enthusiasts would prefer to safeguard “ASEAN centrality” in order to
balance itself between China and the US. ASEAN knows that being too close to
China or the US will be harmful to its unity, but it can maintain its centrality by
using the “ASEAN way” of consultation and consensus to accommodate all the
voices and needs of its members. The fear of domination by major powers may
prompt ASEAN to strengthen itself and maintain unity, safeguard the consensus
principle and engage more carefully with regional powers. Through the “ASEAN
way,” the association can take into account the interests of all parties.133
The next chapter investigates the characteristics of the triangular relationship
between Vietnam, China and the US. It explores the basis and context of the
relationship, with an analysis of Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the US
from 1991 to 2001. Chapter 6 will explore the same relationship, but from 2001 to
2015. Both chapters will illustrate Vietnam’s dilemma of being caught in between
China and the US in the post-Cold War period.
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CHAPTER 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRIANGULAR VIETNAM,
CHINA, AND THE US RELATIONSHIP

This chapter will question the view that Vietnam is getting closer to the US
rather than China after normalizing bilateral ties with both countries. Vietnam’s
objective in its relationship with China is to seek friendship and friendly
neighbourliness. It aims to move in the direction of bilateral cooperation for the
mutual benefit of the two nations. The Vietnamese attach great importance to the
comprehensive partnership with the US in the spirit of putting the past behind,
overcoming differences, promoting common interests and looking towards the future.
For both Vietnam and the US, the aim is for peace, stability, cooperation and
prosperity in Southeast Asia. The main argument of this chapter is that Vietnam
suffers from a geopolitical dilemma between China and the US. It will be better for
Vietnam to keep both China and the US engaged in Southeast Asia. Vietnam also
welcomes a good relationship between China and the US for peace, stability and
development in the region.
5.1 Basis of the Triangular Vietnam, China and the US Relationship
5.1.1. Theoretical Basis of the Triangular Relations
Vietnam’s dilemma of having to play off China and the U.S. mostly comes
from an assessment shaped by ideology that both China and the US have their own
strategic concerns when entering into bilateral relations with Vietnam. Vietnam
shares a similar political system with China. According to Luong Ngoc Thanh, the
similarity in Marxist-Leninist doctrine and a one-party state has made Vietnam and
China become interdependent with each other.1 However, Vietnam also sees China in
a realist perspective. Its strategies of independence and freedom have accidentally
made Vietnam an obstacle for Chinese regional ambitions, resulting in a fluctuating
relationship between Vietnam and China. The issue for Vietnam is overcoming
differences while maintaining a friendly relationship with China in order to create
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favourable conditions for national development. 2 This matter has become more
urgent as the post-Cold War situation has made the context complicated for Vietnam,
with China’s increased diplomatic influence and trade expansion in mainland
Southeast Asia. Every diplomatic movement of Hanoi towards other powers,
especially the US, must be considered in the context of Beijing’s possible reaction.
While Vietnam’s national development strategy is different from that of the
US, there is a growing convergence of interests to underpin bilateral relations.
Vietnam faces painful memories of high tensions in the previous war with the US,
and current difficulties with respect to issues of democracy and human rights. Some
problems in the post-Vietnam War remained to influence bilateral relations between
Vietnam and the US. The issue of POW/MIA is one factor. Another is the presence
in the US of a Vietnamese-American community, now in its second generation. Most
of these people are young, born with American English as their native mother
tongue, raised and educated in the US and feel American. This community is two
million strong and has become increasingly prosperous. They are now playing a
significant role in the bilateral relationship.3 Brown notes that officially, remittances
to Vietnam total over US$2 billion per year but in reality, due to informal sources, it
is likely to be two to three times that amount.
Another legacy is the impact of the defoliant Agent Orange used during the
Vietnam War. Progressive American and Vietnamese scientific and humanitarian
groups have come together to exercise pressure on Washington to make amends and
take remedial actions to clean up this dangerous chemical.4 Vietnam and the US are
currently implementing significant progress in their bilateral relations. As
Vietnamese CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong stated:
What is of utmost importance is that we have been transformed from former enemies to
become friends, partners and comprehensive partners. And I’m convinced that our
relationship will continue to grow in the future. We have been able to rise above the
past to overcome differences, to promote our shared interests, and look towards a
future in order to build the comprehensive partnership that we have today. The past
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cannot be changed, but the future depends on our actions, and it is our responsibility to
ensure a bright future.5

The US has the best opportunity to build a positive, durable relationship
between the Vietnamese and the American peoples through education. 6 The
Fulbright program, the Vietnam Education Foundation and other private
organisations, such as Ford, Luce and Gates, along with a host of individual
universities, are working to train thousands of Vietnamese students in the US or in
Vietnam. More than 13,000 Vietnamese are now studying in American universities.
5.1.2 Practical Basis of the Triangular Relations
Firstly, the linkage of traditional relations and shared culture has formed the
basis of the triangular relationship between Vietnam, China and the US. Vietnam’s
2000-year history is marked by the struggle for independence and freedom against
foreign invasions. China’s proximity played a special role in this narrative with its
constant threat functioning as a catalyst for Vietnamese identity formation. The giant
neighbour also facilitated the diffusion of Confucian teachings during the fifteenth
and nineteenth centuries, which transformed Vietnam’s cultural environment.7
Vietnam is composed of 54 different ethnic groups. Some 85% of its citizens
are Vietnamese (Kinh) with significant historical and cultural influence from China.
Vietnam and China share aspects of identity, such as Confucianism and Buddhism,
as well as communist ideology and the one-party state development model. There are
some parallels with Korean culture. In both Korea and Vietnam, Confucian traditions
and legacies are infused in national identity. With this comes a historical
consciousness that Korea and Vietnam were members of an ancient Chinese-centred
regional order. Korean and Vietnamese identities are largely involved in resisting
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outside pressure and influence.8 External threats can help create a national identity,
which is a key component for national survival. Vietnamese national identity was
forged over centuries in opposition to Chinese hegemony. Its quest for survival
means that Vietnam remained outside the Chinese Empire for generations.9
In addition to Chinese support for Vietnam’s wars of resistance against
France and the US, the historical connection shows Chinese long-term interest in
Vietnam. Vietnam has to deal with China for the sake of its independence and
freedom. The least expected and most dramatic development in Southeast Asia
following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 was the abrupt and rapid deterioration
of relations between China and Vietnam, two former allies that had experienced 30
years of unity in the Indochina wars. A cooling of ties began in 1975, but the schism
widened in early 1978 into open accusation and counteraccusation, which led to a
massive exodus of Chinese residents from Vietnam.10
In early 1979, the two nations went to war to resolve their disputes. Hopes for
bilateral normalization of diplomatic relations faded. There were three causes that led
the two one-time comrades-in-arms to be combatants in such a short period:
territorial disputes, the departures of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China, and the
entry of Vietnam into Cambodia. The territorial disputes had historical antecedents.11
Chang argues that, ever since the Vietnamese nation state emerged as an independent
entity in the first millennium, it has had to contend with the “tyranny of
geography,”12 as Vietnam has to share a border with its giant neighbour to the north.
With a population of eighty-eight million, Vietnam would rank as a medium-sized
Chinese province. Thus, the bilateral relationship between Vietnam and China has,
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throughout history, been embedded within a structure of persistent asymmetry. 13
According to Womack, in three thousand years of interaction, China and Vietnam
have experienced the full spectrum of the relationship, from intimate friendship to
negative hostility.14
Although located thousands of miles apart, the US and Vietnam were Cold
War antagonists in the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the two poles for
Vietnam were the USSR and China, and for much of that period, Vietnam’s
trajectory was to move closer to Moscow.15 In the post-Cold War period, with the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the current poles for Vietnam are both the US and
China. In general, middle powers in Asia are thought to be “squeezed” between the
US and China or between the forces of globalization and nationalism.16
Ang argues there are two approaches that can help in analysing the dynamism
of Vietnam-China relations.17 On the one hand, historical memories have arguably
conditioned and shaped the relationship. For some ten centuries (from 3 B.C. to A.D.
1000), the Vietnamese were under the direct rule of the Chinese. During this long
period, Vietnam assimilated much of Chinese culture, although the Vietnamese
remained intensely nationalistic. 18 Thus, for Vietnamese people, the years under
Chinese rule and domination is a reminder of its huge neighbour. On the other hand,
external forces and geopolitical connections have to be taken into consideration when
examining the relationship between China and Vietnam. Vietnam-China ties are
crucially shaped by the conjunction of relations of geographical proximity, changing
ideological configurations and the evolving nature of relations among China and the
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US. The likelihood is that the relationship will be either constructive or destructive,
depending on the method of relationship management chosen by the two nations.19
5.1.3 The Position of Vietnam in the Triangular Relations
According to Luong Van Ke from the University of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Vietnam National University, Vietnam connects with other Southeast
Asian states to form a united bloc. Its central geo-strategic role in Southeast Asia will
make any power want Vietnam to be its ally. Whether it is China, the US, Russia or
India, it will have similar strategic interests in Vietnam. This finding is based on
geopolitical research on the geographical characteristics of Southeast Asian states.
Ke claimed that a medium-range ballistic missile (with a range of between 1,000 and
3,000 km) placed in Vietnam could threaten all of maritime Southeast Asia, the
middle of China to the Yangtze River in the north, or the furthest islands of
Indonesia and Malaysia in the south. Vietnam is easily accessible due to its seaports
and airports along the coastline.20
As a result, any power that can dominate or control Vietnam can earn crucial
strategic preponderance in maximising national interests in Southeast Asia, which is
the gateway to the Pacific. It plays a role for a relations in Northeast Asia because
Southeast Asia faces the East Sea (for the Vietnamese) or the West Sea (for
Filipinos) or the South China Sea (to the Chinese), as well as controlling the vital sea
lanes to major powers including China, South Korea and Japan, and part of Russia in
this century of globalisation and commercial development.21 Huỳnh argues that since
normalisation of ties, Vietnam’s geo-political location in Southeast Asia has played a
key role in American policy decisions concerning Vietnam. 22 Although American
relations with China have progressed, the US has enhanced its close relationship with
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Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam through diplomacy, commerce, education,
security and defence.23
Vietnam has to deal with China and the US, representatives of two conflicting
ideological systems. While China represents the socialist world as the largest
communist state left on Earth, the US is the symbol of the capitalist world as it has
the largest free market economy; China represents the East while America represents
the West. In the perception of the US, it is aware of Vietnam’s important role in the
struggle against China’s strategy to expand its influence over Southeast Asia. No
country in Southeast Asia has more experience than Vietnam in responding to the
Chinese threat due to the long historical connections and cultural harmonization.24
Vietnam has experienced both positive and negative historical relations with China.25
Brown shares this viewpoint, showing that Vietnam has had 2,000 years of
experience in dealing with China and is a master of the “politics of the asymmetry.”26
Womack also makes the essential point that although China is much more powerful
than Vietnam, China cannot easily force Vietnam to do what it wants, as Vietnam’s
motive for survival will surely be stronger than China’s motive for domination.27
Consequently, if only Vietnam could become the strategic partner of the US,
then Washington could be convinced about a front line, where it could exert more
leverage in its relations with China. Simultaneously, the US expects to see Vietnam’s
positive reaction to the opportunity of becoming an American security partner, as the
relationship is equal and less burdensome than tributary ties with China.
Furthermore, American ambition in Vietnam is more about promoting discourses of
human rights and democracy than seeking control or power over Vietnamese national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is different from the Chinese assertive
actions in territorial disputes with Vietnam.28
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Vietnam is now well on the way to nation-building and development. While
taking a glance at outside powers’ development, Vietnam looks to both China and
the US. Womack explained that ‘China will always be more important to Vietnam
than the US, and China will always be more important to the US than Vietnam.’29
The Vietnamese mind-set, however, is to trust the Americans more than the
Chinese.30 American values of democracy and freedom were acknowledged by Ho
Chi Minh in the Declaration of Independence in 1945 and enshrined in the country’s
first constitution of 1946
"Hỡi đồng bào cả nước,
Tất cả mọi người đều sinh ra có quyền bình đẳng. tạo hóa cho họ những quyền không
ai có thể xâm phạm được; trong những quyền ấy, có quyền được sống, quyền tự do và
quyền mưu cầu hạnh phúc…!". 31 [Trans: Dear martyrs compatriots, all men are born
equal: the Creator has given us inviolable rights, life, liberty and happiness…!]

Such rights of to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were acknowledged
in the US 1776 Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.32

Thus, the Vietnamese view Chinese ambition of dominating Vietnam as
stronger than that of the Americans, due to historical tributary relations, traditional
connections and cultural exchanges between the two countries over a thousand years.
The Vietnamese are suspicious of Chinese leaders’ long term and unchangeable wish
to exercise a controlling influential power over Vietnam, since it means the control
of land and natural resources. Vietnam is located in the path of Chinese leaders who
want to go further into Southeast Asia, a zone rich in natural resources and an
29
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abundant labour force beneficial to the development of China.33 Consequently, the
author shares Ke’s analysis, indicating that the Vietnamese see Americans as less
threatening than the Chinese. The US has an advantage over China because the
former needs Vietnam in its struggle to counterbalance the Chinese.
5.1.4 The Effects of Sitting between a Regional Power and a Global Superpower
On the one hand, when the two major powers cooperate, then Southeast Asia,
and especially Vietnam, will enjoy a peaceful and friendly atmosphere where all can
collaborate and develop together. From talking with scholars in this field, the author
learns that there are many cooperation mechanisms between these two countries in
the economic, political and security sectors. According to Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan,
Director General of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Vietnam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were at least 70 mechanisms of cooperation
between China and the US leading up to 2012. Some of these mechanisms have not
been very useful, but there are others that presently remain useful.34 According to a
report from Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Vietnam National Assembly in receiving the delegation from the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), there have been more than 90
cooperation mechanisms between the US and China as of 2015.35 China and America
are separated geographically by the Pacific and do not have territorial claims on each
other, nor is there any acute military threat towards each other. Most importantly, the
American and Chinese economies complement each other. China urgently needs to
get access to US technology and industrial goods while the US can find no wider
market than in Mainland China.36 As a result, cooperative Sino-American relations
can be beneficial as a win-win solution, not a zero sum game for the two sides.37
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On the other hand, when the two major powers compete, they need other
countries to be on their side, so as to gain more leverage. This situation places
Vietnam in a difficult situation: if both major powers try to enhance bilateral
relations with it, then it has to decide which to align itself more closely with. At
present, US strategy includes military commitments to its allies, such as Japan and
South Korea, as well as a more strategic ambiguity to deter Beijing from using force
against Taiwan. Obviously, this commitment does not mean a security guarantee for
Vietnam, but the US hegemonic role in the region is indeed helpful to enhance
strategic stability to balance rising Chinese power. This strategy has also provided a
beneficial context for the gradual normalization of relations with the US, including
Vietnam’s access to the American market, technology transfer, foreign investment
and other benefits for Vietnamese economic modernization.38
Above all, in the current situation, both major powers are experiencing
cooperation and competition in a dynamic world. If US engagement in Southeast
Asia plays the role of strategic balancer against a rising China, Vietnam can face the
disadvantage from developing a dependency on the US to maintain stability in this
area. This will make it vulnerable to American major policy shifts in the region. If
the US carried out a policy of offshore balancing, such as the conclusion of its
security alliance in the region and with the withdrawal of 100,000 military personnel,
and no longer commits itself as a hegemonic stabilizer in East Asia, this would be
devastating for Vietnam. A small country like Vietnam will become more vulnerable
than before and subject to greater regional instability. Under offshore balancing,
Vietnam will have to rely on Japan to help balance China, or to accept a position
relative to China’s emerging power. The US will presumably make the effort to limit
China’s power by playing off Tokyo against Beijing, but this design will be of little
help for Hanoi to deter China. In this situation, the best alternative for Vietnam and
the region will be co-operative security to retain the existing US-dominated
hegemonic regime in place, as it has been for the last twenty-five years. This cooperative mechanism will still allow countries involved to remain independent on US
hegemonic regional stability. Cooperation is likely to enhance ASEAN’s security
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arrangement. At this point, East Asian nations, including Vietnam, will enjoy more
strategic autonomy and grasp the chance to work together to shape their own regional
security model.39
In sum, to address the full impact of sitting between a global superpower and a
regional power, Vietnam attaches great importance to its neighbours. According to
Pham Binh Minh, ASEAN is of strategic significance to Vietnam, as Vietnam’s
security and development environment is connected directly with Southeast Asia.
Thus, cooperation with ASEAN states both bilaterally and multilaterally has been
identified as a priority in Vietnam’s foreign policy.40 Le Dinh Tinh and Hoang Hai
Long argue that Vietnam has recognized that working with ASEAN can be more
effective in dealing with regional and global issues, rather than by acting alone.
Thus, ASEAN is considered as Vietnam’s bridge to the wider world and a safety net
amid regional or international problems. ASEAN helps Vietnam integrate politically
into the larger Asia-Pacific region.41
5.2 Context of the Triangular Vietnam, China and the US Relationship
5.2.1 International Situation
In the international situation where the US is the global superpower and
China is the emerging challenger, any nation will find it difficult to choose either
China or the US exclusively. Most countries will seek to pursue a relationship with
both powers. Vietnam is not an exception. Thus, it is essential to understand the
international situation that led to Vietnam being involved in a complex triangle with
China and the US in the first decade of the post-Cold War era.
After the Cold War, the world experienced major changes in a restructured
global economy – a fundamental transition in state economies, readjusted national
strategies and re-organised international relations. Regional organizations flourished
39
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as states attempted to grapple with emerging trans-national problems, such as crime,
pandemics, natural disasters and climate change. The realignment of power from USSoviet relations to Sino-American relations in world politics marked a shift of the
centre of the world from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, necessitating strategies for
readjustments by Southeast Asian states. In the face of these challenges, nations
including great powers had to readjust development objectives and external relations
strategies.42
For many countries, adjustments and changes of national strategy became
indispensable tools in the attempt to create or at least to try to achieve favourable
conditions in the new world order. Such adjustments have a great impact on small
and medium countries, the pieces on the world’s grand political chessboard played
by the leading powers. In the process of adjusting diplomatic strategies, all major
countries focused on strengthening and expanding foreign relations to maximize their
full influence, to gain benefits in all aspects and to set up the most advantageous
position in the new world order. Being influenced by these characteristics, large
powers adjusted their foreign policies to simultaneously serve national interests and
enhance their already powerful positions in the world. Consequently, medium and
smaller states had to adjust their foreign policies to cope with the new environment
in order to enhance their role in the international and regional arena.43
Kao has examined Deng’s idea of modernization in China. He argues that
China in the post-Cold War era wanted to develop its backward economy and so
understood the need to maintain peaceful and stable relations with major powers and
neighbouring countries. Beijing consistently followed Deng’s view of de-escalating
tension with its neighbours, such as the former Soviet Union, Vietnam or India, as
well as establishing diplomatic relations with the US in 1979. Thus, Chinese foreign
policy during its process of modernization was not to expand influence abroad but to
create an environment conducive to domestic economic development. In this case,
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Beijing hoped that the peaceful and stable environment surrounding China could be
maintained without any disturbance.44
Zhao has argued that China by the mid-1990s came to be regarded as a
regional power. It no doubt remained a major player in East and Southeast Asian
regional affairs. He also argued that China has reassessed the political, military and
economic importance of Southeast Asia in its foreign policy. Since the death of Mao,
China has adopted a practical approach to relations with the region. To that end, it
has boosted bilateral ties between China and Southeast Asia through normalization of
bilateral relations – with Jakarta (August 1990), Singapore (October 1990) and Hanoi
(1991), and through active involvement in UN peacekeeping forces in Cambodia
from 1992.45
Zhao also argues that the US has consistently recognized the importance of
Beijing’s cooperation on East and Southeast Asian affairs, especially over issues
such as Korean unification and the Cambodian peace settlement, although the
international competition for the Chinese market is also a major consideration for US
foreign policy toward China.46 From a global political perspective, the American and
Chinese national interests are not fundamentally in conflict. With the end of the Cold
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping issued a
sixteen-character instruction to guide China’s policy towards the US:
Zengjia xinren (增加信任): to increase mutual trust
Jianshao mafan (减少麻烦): to reduce trouble
Zengjia hezuo (增加合作): to enhance cooperation
Bugao duikang (不搞对抗): not to seek confrontation.

47

Specifically, in terms of the bilateral relationships with Vietnam, an
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relations in 1995. This resulted in a focus on present and future benefits rather than
dwelling on past disagreements, such as the effects of the Vietnam War.
From the early 1990s, the bilateral normalisation process commenced with a
number of steady but cautious steps set up by single-interest groups, such as the
League of Families of Prisoners of War and Missing in Action who were searching
for their loved ones, war veterans looking for reconciliation, Vietnamese refugees
wanting reunification with family members, humanitarian and educational institutes,
and American businesses seeking to export and invest in Vietnam. Vietnam was
motivated primarily by its desire for access to the US market and by the prospect of
US support for admission to the world’s leading international organizations, such as
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Vietnam also succeeded in pressing the US to address some longstanding
legacies of the war, including funding assistance for dioxin removal from Agent
Orange hot spots like the Da Nang air base. With strengthened bilateral ties with the
US in the 1990s, both sides could work on enhancing economic cooperation. This
served as the foundation for future economic cooperation between the two nations,
for example, in the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) of December 2001, followed
by textile, civil aviation, maritime and nuclear energy cooperation agreements. Later,
Vietnam joined the WTO in January 2007 after tough negotiations on accession
agreements with its major trading partners, including the US.48
Normalisation of ties with China did not occur until November 1991 and only
then when Vietnam agreed to China’s demand for a comprehensive political
settlement in Cambodia. Since then, the two nations have exchanged high-level party
and state delegations. Major areas of cooperation and expectations for future
cooperation were set out in agreements, such as joint communiqués issued in 1992,
1994 and 1995. Contentious border issues were assigned to specialist groups for
negotiation, and military-to-military contact was resumed. The general period from
1990 to 1999 can be seen as a transition stage from “hostile asymmetry” to “normal
asymmetry.”49
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Hanoi used the 1990s to improve its relationship significantly with China,
Japan, the US, ASEAN and the EU. Vietnam and Malaysia agreed to establish a joint
development zone in the Gulf of Thailand.50 Vietnam also signed and ratified a treaty
on maritime delimitation with Thailand. In the last half of the 1990s there were a
number of incidents between the Philippines and China, Malaysia and even Vietnam.
However, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship continued to improve despite the
disputes in the South China Sea. This situation placed Vietnam in a new and
challenging position between China and the rest of ASEAN, a position that could
give Vietnam a key role in developing a multilateral approach to managing the
maritime and territorial disputes. It required Vietnam to stay on good terms with both
China and Southeast Asian states. With its location bordering China, and sharing
many cultural features, Vietnam might promote diplomatic efforts as a connecting
bridge between Southeast and Northeast Asia.51
5.2.2 Domestic Situation of Vietnam in the early Post-Cold War Era
Politically, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is one-party state with
four formal structures making up the regime: the Communist Party of Vietnam
(CPV), the People’s Armed Forces, the State Bureaucracy (Central and Local
Government) and Vietnam Fatherland Front (a group of mass organizations). The
one-party state has been in transition from a “hard authoritarian” to a “soft
authoritarian” nation since 1986. This was a crucial year for Vietnam, which
launched doi moi (renovation/reform), as an open-door policy to the international
community. This new strategy presented Vietnam with new political decisions as its
economy became increasingly integrated into the global economy.52 These policies
have led to an enhanced economic position, and as a domestic strategy doi moi has
helped Vietnam recover from the aftermath of the war in an effort to keep pace with
surrounding nations and powers. Welle-Strand, Vlaicu and Tjeldvoll argue that since
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1986, Vietnam has opened up to the outside world through trade, investment and
official development assistance (ODA). Consequently, from a country devastated by
war and domestic division, Vietnam has moved from one of the poorest countries in
the world to a middle-income nation, from a distant player to an active member in
the regional and international arenas.53
After the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the CPV leaders
sought an ideological alliance with China, hoping China would take up leadership of
the world’s socialist forces. This Vietnamese approach was carried out when
Vietnam still faced regional and global isolation after the counterweight of the Soviet
Union was no longer available. As a result, in order to prevent Chinese aggression
when faced with a disproportionately powerful neighbour, Hanoi had to pay
deference to Beijing. Accordingly, Hanoi was rewarded with the normalization of
bilateral relations with Beijing in November 1991 under the form of “comrades but
not allies.” 54 Without an anti-Western alliance, the integration agenda regained
momentum in Vietnamese policy with ASEAN members. It led to the opening of a
new and friendly chapter in Vietnam’s relations with neighbouring countries. This
was a geopolitical turning point in Vietnam’s foreign policy when top priorities were
set for both regional cooperation and better relations with the great powers and other
worldwide economic centres.55
Many outside observers have concluded that Vietnam had by 2000 recovered
from the worst effects of economic blockade from the early 1980s. 56 By 1989,
Vietnam also began to recover from its domestic economic crisis caused by
bureaucratic mismanagement, soaring inflation rates and rising debt problems. For
the first time, agricultural production was on target at 19 million tonnes. Industrial
output was up 9% and for the first time, the consumption of output was in line with
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government priorities, with consumer goods and exports leading the industrial sector.
By 1989, inflation had fallen to a rate of 10% per month or lower. Vietnam’s foreign
trade grew by a massive 21% in 1988. Ho Chi Minh City began to see increasing
numbers of Japanese, Thai and other foreign businessmen. By April 1989, an
agreement for some US$450 million worth of western capital as Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) had been signed, mostly for offshore oil and gas exploration and
food processing for export. Vietnam has surprised many by emerging as a major rice
exporter in 1989, with rice sales to Africa, India, the Philippines and even China.
In the late 1970s, China and the US both expected that Vietnam’s economic
isolation would “break” Hanoi. However, by the late 1980s, China had to accept that
Vietnam was not broken, even though it had suffered from the economic isolation.57
Since the normalization of bilateral relations with China, senior Vietnamese and
Chinese leaders have met at least once annually since November 1991 to both review
and advance the bilateral relationship, with discussions broaching all aspects of SinoVietnamese relations. During President Le Duc Anh’s visit to China in November
1993, the first visit by a Vietnamese President since 1955, his counterpart Jiang
Zemin observed that economic and trade relations had been rapidly restored and
developed since normalization. 58 However, Jiang also noted the relationship’s
potential could be deepened.
Between 1991 and 1997, CPV Secretary-General Do Muoi visited Beijing
three times to discuss ways of strengthening economic, trade, science and
technological cooperation.59 A number of economic agreements were signed at that
time. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited Hanoi in November 1992 and again in
June 1996, while President Jiang also stopped off in the Vietnamese capital in
November 1994 as part of a four-nation tour around Southeast Asia. So despite the
existence of the maritime disputes between China and Vietnam, the Sino-Vietnamese
bilateral relationship remains very broad-based. Apart from reciprocal high-ranking
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visits of leaders, there have been numerous exchanges between governmental
(military and non-military) and non-governmental officials on an almost daily basis.
By the late 1980s, the Reagan Administration feared that a Sino-Soviet
détente would exclude US influence from mainland Southeast Asia, so it began
cautiously to distance itself from Chinese policy while at the same time making
efforts to counter Soviet influence. This led to a decision to move quietly towards
normalising relations with Hanoi, which was enthusiastically welcomed by Vietnam.
Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hanoi government radio stated that
“The USA plays an important part in bringing about peace and stability in Southeast
Asia. The Vietnamese people are prepared to turn to a new chapter of history and to
facilitate the development of relations of friendship and cooperation between the two
peoples.”60
5.2.3 Vietnam’s China Policy 1991-2001
Vietnam and its giant northern neighbour improved their bilateral relations
following the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1991. Sloreby argues that the
cause of this improvement of bilateral relations between Vietnam and China was due
more to internal reasons rather than the external environment. After losing support
from its main Cold War ally, the Soviet Union, Vietnam was left isolated and
vulnerable. Meanwhile, Vietnam could develop rapprochement with China because
both countries have an identical political system and similar economic strategies.61
Amer also noted that between 1991 and 2001, both neighbours expanded bilateral
cooperation in many sectors and agreed on methods of negotiations. It helped
manage any tension that existed between Hanoi and Beijing. This rapprochement
brought about the settlements of the land border on 30 December 1999, the Gulf of
Tonkin on 25 December 2000 and the South China Sea territorial disputes.62
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Vietnam’s policy towards China in the first decade after the Cold War was to
pro-actively enhance bilateral ties between the two neighbours. Nguyen Thi Phuong
Hoa examined the positive solidarity of Vietnam’s China policy in this period. 63
After the normalization of bilateral relations in 1991, the leaders of both Vietnam
and China stated in the 1991 Joint Declaration to “develop the relationship of
friendship and friendly neighbourliness.”64 In another Joint Declaration in 1994, the
two leaders re-affirmed to “consolidate and enhance the friendly neighbourliness and
bilateral cooperation for the mutual benefits of the two nations, to nurture the
relationship to be stable and long-lasting.”65
Furthermore, Vietnam carried out the guidelines of the 1991 and 1995 Joint
Declarations to “commit to improve the bilateral cooperation with China in the fields
of economics, commerce, sciences, technology and culture on the basis of equality,
mutual benefits and mutual development” to achieve the goal of “boosting the
economic and commercial ties between Vietnam and China for constant development
on the basis of long-term stability.”66 On the basis of complying with the guidelines
in these joint declarations and the mutual understanding of leaders from the two
communist parties, the two nations have raised the level of bilateral ties to “friendly
neighbourliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-lasting stability, looking forward
to the future” in the Joint Declaration of 2002. Vietnam is also committed to
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“enhance the friendship exchange between youths of the two nations, adding to the
comprehensive cooperation between China and Vietnam, transferring to future
generations.”67
In addressing the existing problems between Vietnam and China, Vietnam
was aware of the importance of gradually resolving territorial disputes with China,
but this should not come at the expense of general bilateral cooperation. Vietnam and
China affirmed in the 1991 Joint Declaration “to preserve peace and security and
encourage two-way travel of peoples at the border areas in order to build the
Vietnam-China border into a border of peace and friendship.”68 Vietnam also agreed
with China in the 1994 Joint Declaration to “reaffirm high-level agreements since
1991 to continue to look for solutions for the two countries’ territorial and border
disputes and the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.”69 The efforts and cooperation
displayed by both sides resulted in the China-Vietnam land border delimitation treaty
signed in Hanoi on 30 December 1999. It marked an encouraging start to SinoVietnamese bilateral relations in the new millennium.
5.2.4 Vietnam’s US Policy 1991-2001
Vietnam employed a new approach in its relations with the US from the late
1980s. The new strategy was the result of Renovation (doi moi) and reassessment of
US-Vietnam ties by the CPV during its Sixth National Party Congress in December
1986. The CPV 13th Resolution clearly stated to “issue a newly comprehensive
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strategy towards the US to seek support from the American people and the world, as
a convenient condition to maintain national peace and economic development.”70
This improvement led to the normalization of bilateral relations between the
two nations on 12 July 1995. However, there were still two sides to the
rapprochement between Vietnam and the US. The cooperation came from mutual
benefits that the two countries could gain from each other. The most successful
feature of Vietnamese-American cooperation could be seen in the economic sector.
Vietnam stressed the importance of trading and commercial ties. The US, with its
practical mind-set, found in Vietnam a potential market for American goods due to
Vietnam’s huge population, cheap labour force and geographical location. The US
also found that improvement in bilateral relations with Vietnam could help it to
escape from “the Vietnam Syndrome” that split American society after the Vietnam
War.71
However, competition still existed due to the antagonistic national strategies
between Vietnam and the US. Vietnam’s national objective was to establish a
successful socialist state while the US favours encouraging other states to join the
American orbit and respect American values of democracy and capitalism.72 Thus,
Washington and Hanoi were still suspicious of each other’s long-term strategic
intentions. While the US wanted greater access to Vietnamese ports for its warships,
Vietnam wanted the US to remove its restrictions on arms sales. The Vietnamese
government welcomed the presence of the US Military Sea Lift ships at the
commercial facilities in Cam Ranh Bay only for minor repairs at competitive prices,
but these ships have to have civilian crews. Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
Dung invited all countries in the world to avail themselves of the commercial repair
facilities in Cam Ranh. Meanwhile, the US was still considering lifting restrictions
on the sale of lethal materials that could have helped Vietnam modernize its
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military. 73 Indeed, contemporary news reports indicate that Minister of National
Defence General Phung Quang Thanh addressed the lifting of restrictions on arms
sales during his trip to Washington, D.C. in late 2009. He later raised it with
Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta when Panetta visited Hanoi in 2012.
5.3 Characteristics of the Triangular Vietnam, China and America Relationship
5.3.1 Security Characteristics
The interaction of the two major powers in Southeast Asia means that there
are pros and cons for Vietnam in its defence and security policy to preserve its
national sovereignty. In its relations with China, Vietnam experienced a long history
of conflict and cooperation. Regarding conflicts, the two sides fought a border war in
1979 and there were two skirmishes over disputes in the South China Sea, one in
1974 and the other in 1988. The first resulted in China taking possession of part of
the Paracels, which were then under the control of the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam). Ravindran even argued that Vietnam would not hesitate to go to war with
China over the disputes in the South China Sea, in spite of the overwhelming
superiority of the Chinese military.74
China and Vietnam have conflicting interests not only in the South China
Sea, but also in other areas, such as China’s dam building in the Upper Mekong
River and the widening trade deficit. Thus, according to the conflict-expectation
model, Vietnam’s expectations of a future conflict with China are high. 75 These
arguments present one side of the problem only. For the Vietnamese, as Ho Chi
Minh has stated, “nothing is more precious than freedom and independence”76 and
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Vietnam has struggled bravely throughout its history for national integrity. Blazevic
argues that for Vietnam, the sea carries great geostrategic significance. Vietnamese
authorities do fear that China’s intentions are to enforce its claim by force if
necessary, which threatens Vietnam’s claims, freedom of navigation and trade.
Specifically, they perceive that China’s strategy is not defensive, but rather meant to
alter the status quo and reorder the balance of power in the immediate region and
beyond. They perceive threats not only to the national security of Vietnam but also
regional and global security. According to Nguyen Duc Hung from the Southeast
Asian Research Foundation, “China’s claim in the South China Sea is comparable to
a claim by one person to all the oxygen in the air that South East Asia can be
dominated, and nations that need to traverse through the South China Sea can be
choked.”77
However, Vietnam will not go to war with any power if its national integrity
is threatened. According to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Lieutenant
General Nguyễn Chí Vịnh, Vietnam is now at peace, so Vietnam needs to do its
utmost to maintain a peaceful relationship and friendship with neighbouring
countries. 78 Peace must be associated with independence and self-reliance. The
Vietnamese people will never accept an unequal and dependant peace that results in
the loss of Vietnam’s independence and the violation of its national sovereignty. As a
result, the concept of peace as a Vietnamese motivation is related to national
survival.79 Consequently, although the likelihood of conflict between Vietnam and
China is probably high, it is not Vietnam’s desire or in its interests to go to war to
resolve the matter. Moreover, there is cooperation between the two neighbours.
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On the political level, relations between the two countries have been good
since the normalization of bilateral ties in 1991, and sharing the same communist
ideology has contributed to this rapport. The two nations also achieved a land
boundary settlement agreement in 1999 and a maritime settlement in the Gulf of
Tonkin in 2000. 80 In addition, Sino-ASEAN relations have, in general, steadily
improved and the relationship between China and Vietnam has remained consistently
cordial. In November 2009, Beijing and Hanoi signed an agreement concluding three
decades of border negotiations.
The triangular relationship between Vietnam, China and the US since the
9/11 attacks in 2001 could be a stable security triangle if the two great powers
developed a more positively cooperative relationship. As US President Barack
Obama stated, the US can no longer dominate the globe unilaterally, and China will
be a factor:
We can’t predict with certainty what the future will bring, but we can be certain about
the issues that will define our times. And we also know this: The relationship between
the United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as
any bilateral relationship in the world.81

The US recognition that it can no longer shape the world solely in its image
means it will have to consider China as a partner in setting an agenda for global
security in the new century.82 As a result, China and the US will cooperate more with
each other in security matters. Christensen argues that the US continues to compete
with China directly and through its alliances, as well as with its security partnerships
such as the US-Japan alliance, but this is only one part of the whole picture. The
September 11 attacks and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have revealed important
common interests between China and the US, but there remain tensions and there
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must be room for discussion on how to pursue a resolution to the shared problems.83
Consequently, both powers need a security environment of peace and stability and
this is the condition that Vietnam needs for its nation’s establishment and
development. A Vietnamese American Studies specialist argues that there is a
mutuality of interests between China and the United States: for the US, there is the
benefit in maintaining Southeast Asia as a peaceful and stable region in America’s
orbit, and it is in Vietnam’s interest that this status quo continues.84
China’s fast political, economic and military ascent has caused Southeast
Asian nations to look for a counter-balance. Apart from its ties with the US, Vietnam
has looked to Russia, Japan, India, and Australia. However, Vietnam’s strategic
collaborations with the US must be low-key so that it can be seen to be acting
independently, while keeping its options open with China. Carl Thayer has noted that
it is better to have both the US and China keep each other at bay rather than have a
situation where one is dominant. 85 Although the US now has given priority to
Southeast Asia in its strategic pivot, and the Vietnamese-American rapprochement
has led to better relations, this progress does not mean a neglect of Vietnam’s giant
northern neighbour China. The US and Vietnam conducted joint field activities to
locate the remains of both Vietnamese and American soldiers who were listed as
MIA in the Vietnam War. There were also other on-going efforts to deal with the
effects of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Thayer argued that Vietnam and the US have
only a “comprehensive partnership,” while Vietnam has a “strategic partnership”
with China.86
If Vietnam goes with one power and neglects the other, a security challenge
can grow into threat. Le argues that a stronger US-Vietnam relationship will likely
put unwanted strain on Vietnam’s relations with China, especially when Sino-
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American relations worsen due to strategic competition. It is not in Vietnam’s
interest to experience again the painful time of the 1970s and 1980s. 87 While
Vietnam and the US may be moving closer to one another for economic reasons,
Vietnam will be eager to avoid the perception that it intends to use the US as a
counterweight to China in the region.88 Although Vietnam and the US have gotten
closer as a result of recent diplomatic exchanges and military cooperation, this
rapprochement is only on the surface, and is so far without a firm foundation. During
the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, the two countries have drawn
closer together. Since 2010 the two sides have initiated naval exchange activities
(now renamed naval engagement activities). These are held in conjunction with the
annual US Navy visit to Tien Sa port at Da Nang. In Hanoi on 29 October 2010, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned the possibility of establishing bilateral
contacts in the military sphere. The visit of US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta to
Vietnam in early June 2012 has put this issue on a practical plane. Although there
will be neither the possibility of Vietnam and the US signing a formal treaty alliance,
nor the US leasing bases in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s three no’s policy, they do plan
to cooperate on arms supplies issues.89 The US has lifted restrictions on the sale of
lethal weapons on a case-by-case basis.
However, despite the diplomatic progress, bilateral relations between
Vietnam and the US still encounter obstacles. The continuing International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions has been an irritant in bilateral relations until
they were partially lifted in 2014. The Vietnamese-American relationship has not yet
seen any further detailed practical military cooperation. All Vietnam needs from the
US is an American presence in the region for a more influential voice to counterbalance China’s aggressive behaviour in the territorial dispute in the South China
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Sea. This does not, however, mean that Vietnam wants an alliance with the US, as
such an alliance can lead to retribution from China.90
A US-Vietnam alliance may just create difficulties for Hanoi. First and
foremost, Vietnam will face Chinese resistance. For the past 20 years, Beijing has
avoided sharp moves towards its southern neighbours, but visits by US Navy
warships to the deep water harbour of Cam Ranh Bay (or the appearance of US
military instructors in Vietnam) would likely create a perception of threats to China’s
southern borders, which China definitely would not leave unanswered. Secondly,
China and other Southeast Asian states see Vietnam as a country with an independent
foreign policy, but if Vietnam were to become a US ally (like the Philippines or
Thailand) then Hanoi’s ability to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy will be
questioned, which would affect Vietnam’s status in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, a
Vietnam-US alliance would affect the content of the Bangkok declaration, which
promotes peace and stability in the region by following the UN Charter. Although
the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia was a
non-binding political declaration, it highlighted ASEAN’s commitment to neutrality.
The Manila Declaration also urged all conflicting parties to settle the dispute in the
South China Sea exclusively by peaceful means. Thus, if Vietnam became a military
ally of the US, Hanoi could become involved with outside powers in inter-regional
conflicts.91 To become an American ally is therefore not in the Vietnamese national
interest, however Vietnam should consider alternative options, such as becoming a
strategic partner or security partner of the US.
5.3.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics
The socio-economic strategies of the two major powers towards Southeast
Asia have created both advantages and disadvantages for Vietnam. According to
Ravindran, the bilateral economic relations between Vietnam and China have grown
tremendously since the normalization of relations in 1991. China is Vietnam’s largest
trading partner, with bilateral trade amounting to US$30.094 billion in 2010, up from
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US$32.23 million in 1991. 92 Trade with China amounted to 36.3% of Vietnam’s
GDP in 2011. 93 China has become the largest export destination for Vietnam’s
primary commodities, with 71.78% of Vietnam’s total exports going to China. 94
From an energy perspective, approximately 4.65 billion kWh of power was imported
from China in 2012.95 As a result, any disruption of this supply could cause serious
harm to the Vietnamese economy. Above all, China’s economic hold over Vietnam
is so strong that it can inflict heavy damage to Vietnam’s economy through trade
sanctions. Though China has to consider how sanctions would affect its investment
in this nation, this does not remove the high degree of vulnerability that Vietnam is
exposed to.96
Vietnam’s economic relationship with China is also under severe stress due to
problems of a huge trade imbalance, the smuggling of goods and services as well as
controversial Chinese investment projects. These disadvantages have made trade
with China appear to be a threat. Vietnam’s receipt of Chinese FDI does not fare any
better, especially from the perspective of ordinary Vietnamese. As of June 2009,
according to official statistics, China is ranked 15th in terms of source of FDI in
Vietnam, with an accumulated total of 640 projects, amounting to more than US$2.5
billion. This was relatively small in comparison to the US$17.6 billion (ranked 3rd)
and US$8.6 billion (ranked 7th) from Japan and the US, respectively.97
Meanwhile, there was economic improvement between Vietnam and the US
after the latter lifted the embargo in 1994 and the two countries officially established
diplomatic relations in 1995. 98 Since then, bilateral relations have advanced into
many areas, facilitating the increasing closeness of the two former adversaries.
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Vietnam has clearly gained significant benefits from its economic relations with the
US. In 2000, the two nations reached a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement
(BTA), which allowed Vietnamese goods to enter the huge American market with a
crucial reduction in tariff rates. In exchange for this convenience, the Vietnamese
Government made a series of commitments to give American businessmen and
investors a level playing field. Vietnamese implementation of these commitments is
to move its economy to be close to a rule-based, free market one. Since 2001, the
United States Agency for International Development, through its Support for Trade
Accelerations Project (STAR), has provided Vietnam with technical assistance in
realizing BTA commitments. STAR has assisted Vietnam by providing advice and
training sessions for various government agencies, from national to local, in an effort
to help Vietnam revise and adopt a number of new laws in accordance with BTA’s
requirements. This assistance has resulted in remarkable improvements in Vietnam’s
legal administrative systems, which increasingly made Vietnam an attractive
destination for foreign investors in general. At the same time, Vietnamese goods
have continued to flow into American markets with increasing quantities. The US
has become Vietnam’s largest export market with major products, such as garments,
footwear, wood products and seafood. These calls are for labour-intensive production
and Vietnam clearly has a comparative advantage. Increasing exports to the US has
helped Vietnam significantly in providing more jobs for its labour force.
Vietnam can achieve better socio-economic stability and development if it
can maintain the influence of both China and the US in the region since China’s rise
strengthens the American economy and future prosperity. China is the largest growth
market in the world for American goods and services. Trading with China, which is
the third largest export market for the US and the leading market for US agricultural
products, has helped the US recover from the Global Financial Crisis.99 At the same
time, the richer China becomes, the greater will be its stake in the security of sea-
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lanes, the stability of the world’s trade and financial regimes. China will not get
ahead if its rivals do not prosper.100
Chinese influence in the region, and in Vietnam, has a long history and this
has grown with trade and investment. Most of the major projects in Southeast Asia
are currently financed by China. However, Vietnam needs both China and the US to
remain engaged. This is a reciprocal benefit as Vietnam can use both sources, the one
to its north and the offshore superpower. China and the US both need Vietnam too as
it moves towards becoming an important economy in ASEAN. Vietnam is in a
significant strategic location as an economic corridor from India to the South China
Sea with major important harbours, such as Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau.
With this geo-strategic position, Vietnam connects China and India with the rest of
the Pacific.
China seeks to invest in the international market due to the expansion of the
size of its domestic economy. Bordering southern nations, such as Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, are attractive targets for investment. However, among these countries,
only Vietnam is ready to adapt to Chinese FDI, because of its infrastructure and
economic conditions. In seeking to set foot in Asia Pacific, Vietnam is among the
few countries that has caught the attention of the US. If the US can establish a
stronger base in Vietnam, it can expand into the rest of the continent. Vietnam’s role
of “connectivity” links it with Myanmar and to China’s engine growth provinces of
Yunnan and Guangdong, or the FDI hub of Nanning province, which is also close to
Hanoi. Thus, Hanoi is the gateway of ASEAN northwards towards Korea and
Japan. 101 With Singapore as the entrepot of Southeast Asia and Myanmar as the
access for India to mainland Southeast Asia, Vietnam can play an important role for
China to extend its influence southwards. China is financing numerous infrastructure
projects to link its southern provinces to mainland Southeast Asia in which Kunming
in Yunnan province plays a key role as a transport hub.
If the China-US relationship moves into rivalry, it may cause social
instability and economic challenges. Each power will try to gain allies and ASEAN
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will be polarised due to different national interests. Countries such as Laos and
Cambodia are likely to support China because of their economic dependence. Other
countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore are already clear American
allies. Some countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia will choose to remain neutral.
Vietnam is considered to be among the non-aligned group. According to a leading
Indonesian analyst, Vietnam is not likely to become an American ally unless it is
invaded or attacked by China, which would make it rethink its strategy.102
Increased regional tensions involving China can have dire consequences,
such as military conflict over Taiwan’s political status, or between China and Japan
over sovereignty over a group of uninhabitable islands and offshore energy sources
in the East China Sea, or over the ownership of islands and energy resources in the
South China Sea. In the worst scenario, those conflicts can escalate, accidentally or
unintentionally, into a nuclear exchange.103
5.3.3 Human Rights and Democracy
Vietnam faces more difficulty in its relationship with the US than with China
over questions of human rights, democracy and media freedom.104 While Vietnam
shares a similar political ideology (the one party state) with China, ideological and
political differences with the US can lead to tensions in bilateral relations. Such
issues are considered as American values that the US often pressures other nations to
implement. Vietnam regards cooperation in other sectors as the first priority, while
human rights and democracy come later.105 While welcoming the improvement of
bilateral relations with America, the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton affirmed
that the issues of human rights and democracy need to be addressed in the USVietnam bilateral relationship:
And we prepared to take the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to the next level of
engagement, cooperation, friendship and partnership. It is true that profound
differences exist, particularly over the question of political freedoms. And the United
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States will continue to urge Vietnam to strengthen its commitment to human rights, and
give its people even greater say over the direction of their own lives.106

President Barack Obama also reiterated the issue of human rights and
freedom of religion in the US-Vietnam relationship:
There remain to be - there remain differences in the bilateral relationship, and we
discussed candidly some of our differences around issues of human rights, for example,
and freedom of religion.107

Interviews for this thesis with a Vietnamese scholar of American studies
suggest that Vietnam’s position between China and the US looks like a boat between
two banks: if China is too aggressive for Vietnam’s liking in territorial disputes,
threatening Vietnam’s national independence and territorial integrity, then the boat
will be driven onto the American side. Meanwhile if the US uses human rights or
democracy to change the political system of Vietnam, then the boat will be driven
back to China’s side.108 The issues about human rights refer to point 9 in the July
2013 US-Vietnam Agreement of Comprehensive Partnership. The US called for
Vietnam to make “further progress on human rights, including the freedom of
association and of expression.”109 This is the condition for the US before bilateral
relationships can advance. Yet the US announced a year later it was lifting the sale of
lethal weapons to Vietnam on a case-by-case basis. In other words, there is some
give and take in the US position towards Vietnam.
However, in spite of the difficulties in US-Vietnam relations regarding
human rights and democracy, there is a difference between the activities of the US
Government and those of the anti-Communist overseas Vietnamese living in the US.
According to Professor Nguyen Manh Hung, there are misperceptions of American
intentions in Vietnam, which has caused suspicion among Vietnamese leaders who
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believe that the US aims to overthrow the communist regime through “peaceful
evolution.” In fact, while the U.S. desires to see a more liberal and democratic
Vietnam, it has no plans to overthrow the government. The U.S. wants a strong,
stable and independent Vietnam and so a sudden change of Vietnamese governments
does not serve American strategic interests. 110 US President Bush reiterated his
government’s support for Vietnam’s national sovereignty, security and territorial
integrity. 111 President Obama has also “affirmed the United States’ support for
Vietnam’s independence, sovereignty, prosperity and integration into the
international community.”112
5.4 Vietnam between the US and China over the South China Sea Territorial
Disputes from 1991 to 2001
The South China Sea is contested by rival sovereignty claims to the Paracel
Islands (east of Vietnam and southeast of Hainan) and to the many islets, reefs and
atolls spreading over a large area called “Spratly Archipelago” between southern
Vietnam, east Malaysia, Brunei, and Palawan island in the Philippines. “Spratly” in
English was the name of one island only, located in the western part of the area and
called “Trường Sa” in Vietnamese. Vietnam, Taiwan, China, the Philippines and
Malaysia keep garrisons on some of the isles in the larger Spratly area. The Paracel
Islands, to which the Vietnamese claimed sovereignty, have been fully occupied by
China since 1974.113
The South China Sea territorial disputes have become the “testing ground”
for China’s “peaceful rise” strategy and the American dominant position in the
region, as well as ASEAN’s unity. The disputes over the South China Sea are unique
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because of the sheer number of parties involved and the importance of sea-lanes. To
some extent, this dispute has turned into a power struggle between China and the US,
with Southeast Asia caught in the middle.114 China is making efforts to enhance its
influence in Asia, and in Southeast Asia in particular, on the way to become a global
power. In this process, the South China Sea or East Sea is regarded as an effective
backyard115 to protect Mainland China against maritime threats. On land, China can
only create strategic influence over three neighbouring countries, Laos, Myanmar
and Vietnam, but on the sea, especially with control of the South China Sea, China is
likely to gain controlling influence over all of Southeast Asia. As a result, this
maritime zone is used as a springboard for China to advance its interests beyond the
region.
The US wants to protect its direct interests in the South China Sea. It will be
difficult for the US to compromise with China over this dispute because American
interests are related to the leadership position that Washington wishes to maintain in
the current global system.116 From Vietnam’s perspective, what China and America
do in the South China Sea territorial disputes demonstrates the two major powers’
attitude towards Southeast Asia, and especially Vietnam. With 70% of its imported
oil transported via the South China Sea, China sees this sea area as its lifeline. For
many years, China has staked its claims in this zone. As early as 1909, it began to
occupy the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Archipelago.117 In 1974, China used force to take
over the entire Paracel group, which at that time was under the administration of the
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), killing at least 53 South Vietnamese sailors.
In 1988, China took procession of the Johnson Reef in the Spratlys from the
Vietnamese. Chinese gunboats sank Vietnamese transport ships supporting a landing
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party of Vietnamese soldiers, killing 64 Vietnamese soldiers and injuring many
others. However, these actions have become less frequent and during the latter half
of the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, China was still biding its time under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping to carry out “charm offensives” in Southeast Asia and
the world. 118
Blazevic has argued that competition and conflict in the South China Sea
involves many nations due to its resources, vital sea-lanes and the ability to serve as
a security barrier.119 Of the involved parties, China increasingly serves as a “common
denominator” by intensifying anxiety for its South China Sea maritime neighbours.
China has been perceived by those states as the most assertive actor due to the
“aggressive scope” of its claims in the sea with “increasingly belligerent actions” and
“growing military capacity.” Among those states, Vietnam is most affected, as it is
first line in the path of Chinese ambitions. The majority of China’s disputes in the
sea, which are with Vietnam, certainly reveal Vietnam’s vulnerability in the region.
For Vietnam, things are more complicated, as it must balance claims with China’s
position as its major source of finance, investment and trade. For China, there is not
only the fear over any threats to the sea-lanes but also the concern over seabed
resource control, due to their increasing need for energy.120
The next chapter examines the development of the Vietnam-China-US
relationship from the 9/11 attacks in the US to 2015.
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CHAPTER 6. THE VIETNAM-CHINA-US RELATIONSHIP SINCE 2001

This chapter will continue to examine Vietnam’s position in the triangular
relationship with China and the US since 2001. It will assess Vietnam’s foreign
policy with respect to these two powers amid the changed global situation and the
triangular relations of the 21st century. It will focus on the pros and cons of Vietnam
in its relationship with China and the US in the situation after the 9/11 attacks in
New York. From the advantages and disadvantages of Vietnam’s alignment with the
US, the main argument of the chapter is that if Vietnam uses the rapprochement with
the US to counter balance Chinese power on its way of development, then the costs
outweigh the benefits. Rather, Vietnam needs to be very skilful in the triangular
relations with China and the US.
6.1 Background to Triangular Relations in the 21st century
6.1.1 The New Global and Regional Situation after 9/11
Prior to 9/11, many American security analysts lamented that the US had
neglected Southeast Asia in its strategic agenda, describing relations between the US
and the region as “a policy without a strategy” or “a policy backwater in
Washington.”1 Some American officials and strategists even placed Southeast Asia
as “marginal to security in Asia”2 paying more attention to threats in the Taiwan
Strait and the Korean Peninsula. For most Americans, the region remained “obscure
and poorly understood.”3
Since 9/11 however, the US has reversed that policy and placed Southeast
Asia back on its strategic radar, declaring it the second front in the war on terror.
Vaughn and Morrison also noted that for the global superpower the region went from

1
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one of relatively low priority to one with renewed US attention.4 Since 9/11, there
has been a shift in the international focus on security and Southeast Asia has gained
strategic significance for the US.5
Rabasa has argued that, with large population and vast natural resources,
Southeast Asia is an area of enormous strategic significance that has not always
received the level of attention it deserves.6 Southeast Asia is a region with one of the
largest concentrations of Muslims in the world. Indonesia alone has over 200 million
Muslims. Muslims are also a majority in Malaysia and constitute significant
minorities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. This is an important
feature in regional security because many militant groups are associated with radical
Islamist ideologies. While these represent a small minority of Muslims, they have the
potential to influence a larger substratum of the Muslim population. Moreover, the
deterioration of economic and social conditions after the economic crisis in Southeast
Asia and the associated political upheaval in Indonesia has produced an environment
favourable to the activists of terrorists, radical groups and separatist movements.
Such groups are a direct threat to the United States, operating in a political
environment that has been profoundly affected by the 9/11 attacks, and by the US
response.
As a result, there is a changed calculus of US security interests in the region.
Rabasa claims that the US is concerned that its war on terrorism not be viewed as an
anti-Islamic crusade, and so the support of moderate Muslim-majority countries,
such as Indonesia, is of crucial importance. Therefore, US actions should be framed
by a strategy of strengthening security structures in the region and promoting
stability and democracy in states facing internal dissent. In this line, economic
reconstruction is critical to political stability. The US and other allied countries can

4
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help rebuild ASEAN economies by encouraging trade, investment and economic
reform.7
As US global and regional interests are linked in Southeast Asia, the primary
concern for regional stability and security, and to US interests in the region, is
China’s emergence as a major regional power. It is linked to China’s maritime and
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Much of this concern reflects an
underlying, sometimes unspoken fear that China’s assertiveness will increase as its
power grows. As a result, many Southeast Asian nations rely on the US to guarantee
regional stability with a view to balance the rise of China. 8 In this situation, the
bilateral relationship between China and the US is an important factor in regional
stability and development. Vaughn and Morrison have argued that the most
important bilateral relationship of the 21st century is likely to be that between China
and the US, and that likelihood of conflict and economic trauma will be great if it is
poorly managed. However, the benefits, in terms of economic prosperity and world
peace, will be great if it is handled well.9
Furthermore, Southeast Asia’s rising importance in the international order has
been achieved through its regional cooperation mechanism in the aftermath of the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The region has become the driving force for
regionalization in East Asia with multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the
“ASEAN plus three” (ASEAN+3, linking the ten states of ASEAN, China, Japan and
South Korea), “ten plus one” (ASEAN+1), and the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN (CAFTA).10
In addition to its growing significance, Southeast Asia after 9/11 has also
posed a strategic dilemma with respect to the interactions of great powers in the
region. Banlaoi argues that what worries Southeast Asia is the negative reaction of
major powers to the rise of China and the impact of 9/11 on major powers’ rivalries
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in the region. The 9/11 attacks have not altered the security fundamentals in
Southeast Asia. Regional security problems in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean
Peninsula and the South China Sea persist. These problems continue to encumber
Southeast Asia with security concerns, making the region highly vulnerable to major
power politics. Southeast Asia has often been a factor in the politics of large powers
and the emerging landscape of 9/11 has intensified the situation.
Banlaoi argues that major powers are now using the war on terror in the
region as an excuse for active military engagements in Southeast Asia, in preparation
for any contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula and the South China
Sea. Thus, in this rivalry, Southeast Asian nations are placed in a strategic dilemma
in how they manage their relations with the major powers.11 Banlaoi states that the
reinvigorated American presence in Southeast Asia aims both at waging a war on
terror and hedging against a rising China, which has given China an impression that
the US wants to encircle China. Like the US, China also wants to maintain its
presence in Southeast Asia, which China considers as vital for its own growth and
prosperity.12
Eight years later after Banlaoi’s claims in 2003, the US engagement with
Southeast Asia has become a strategy. According to Thayer, President Obama
launched the multidimensional policy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific
(including Southeast Asia) in November 2011.13 Instead of curbing the rise of China,
the Obama Administration seeks engagement and cooperation with China and
encourages China to support a rule-based international system. 14 As a result,
Southeast Asian states are in a bind when both China and the US now express their
strategic interests in the region and plan to assert their influence.
6.1.2 Domestic Situation of Vietnam in the New Century
Vietnam’s foreign strategy of “multi-lateralism and diversification” of its
international relations has helped it to integrate with the world and the regional
11
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economy. Its foreign policy of openness is to be a friend and to cooperate with all
countries in the world on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. To date, Vietnam
has established comprehensive/strategic partnerships with all UN Security Council
permanent members. 15 Vietnam has also established strategic partnerships with
Southeast Asian nations. According to Thayer, Vietnam elevated its bilateral
relations with Thailand as a strategic partnership in June 2013, which marked
Vietnam’s first strategic partnership with an ASEAN member. Vietnam also raised
bilateral relations with Indonesia to a strategic partnership that same month. In
September 2013, Vietnam signed a strategic partnership agreement with Singapore in
Hanoi.16 Vietnam upgraded its comprehensive partnership with Malaysia to strategic
partnership in August 2015.17. The country has been granted MFN status by more
than 70 countries and territories, including countries and regions with large capital
resources, high technology and vast markets, such as the US, Japan, EU and newly
industrialized countries in East Asia.18
Vietnam is actively integrating into the global economy: its economic ties
with other countries and international organizations have expanded. Vietnam is now
a key state in ASEAN and an active member in APEC, ASEM and other
international economic organizations.19 Vietnam is also committed to the ASEAN
Free Trade Area. Economic cooperation with major economies, such as the US, EU,
Japan, Russia, China and India have been broadened. Vietnam signed a bilateral
trade agreement and is negotiating an investment agreement with the US. Vietnam is
also negotiating a Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the
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EU and an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan. In January 2007, Vietnam
joined the WTO, marking its full integration into the global economy.
These achievements demonstrate Vietnam’s active efforts in enhancing
economic cooperation with major powers, including its former enemy the US, for
advantageous national development. In the post-Cold War period, countries that have
sought to deepen their integration in the world economy have had to engage in
economic, social and political negotiations with the US. Vietnam, having once been
at war with the US, proceeded to set the past aside in favour of negotiating trade
terms with Washington as a path towards its entry into the WTO.20
Since the policy of Doi moi (renovation), Vietnam’s foreign trade has
increased by 20% annually. Starting from approximately US$0.5 million before doi
moi, total exports reached US$48.4 billion in 2007, US$62.7 billion in 2008 and
US$56.6 billion in 2009. Imports also headed in the right direction, falling from
US$80.4 billion in 2008 to US$68.8 billion in 2009. 21 The 1987 Foreign Direct
Investment Law of Viet Nam has been amended and supplemented many times,
notably in 1996 and 2002, which created a more open and attractive environment to
draw foreign investors into crucial industries, such as export-oriented processing and
manufacturing. Moreover, the 2005 Investment Law and Enterprise Law have served
to create an attractive investment environment for Vietnam’s development.
In sum, there has been positive economic development in Vietnam in the new
century. Thayer argues that Vietnam’s international role has been improved by its
successful hosting of APEC and ASEAN summit meetings and as a non-permanent
member in the UN Security Council. Vietnamese foreign policy to maintain
independence and economic development has promoted regional security and
contributed positively to global security. 22 These achievements were due to
Vietnam’s efforts to enhance its relations with major powers and neighbouring
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countries, including ASEAN states, in a proactive agenda for international
integration.
6.2 Development of the Triangular Vietnam, China and the US Relationship
6.2.1 Fluctuations in Sino-Vietnamese Relations
Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations in the new century continued to improve
despite the occasional tensions with persisting territorial disputes over the South
China Sea. Amer claims that positive development can be seen in the political and
economic cooperation between Vietnam and China up to 2000. The exchange of
visits between the CPV and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enhanced overall
relations and resulted in the ratification of the Land Border Treaty in 2000, the
Tonkin Gulf Agreement in 2004 and the completion of the demarcation process of
the land border in 2008. However, there have been tensions over the South China
Sea between 2009 and 2011.23
This is because Vietnam is a security-conscious state with an acute sense of
vulnerability due to its long coast, the difficulty of keeping the north and the south
together, a history of national independence struggles against foreign invasion, and
the lack of a hinterland. Meanwhile, China, in spite of its huge hinterland, also has a
sense of vulnerability to foreign threats and encroachments. The Chinese are envious
of Vietnam for its long coast, with the feeling they are being unjustly deprived of
“maritime territory” by the presence of foreign states in Chinese maritime spaces:
Korea and Japan with the Ryukyus, the Philippines islands and Vietnam. 24 In
addition, some islands off the coast of China are not under Beijing’s control, but are
under the jurisdiction of Taiwan. For instance, Quemoy, an island just 2 km off the
coast of Xiamen, is under Taiwanese control.
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6.2.2 Vietnam’s China Foreign Policy in the New Century
First and foremost, Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China from 2001 to
2015 is the continuance of the implementation of a policy of multi-lateralisation and
diversification by Hanoi at a time of regional and international integration. At the 9th
CPV National Congress in 2001, this desire was then supplemented with a
declaration that Vietnam is ready to be a friend, reliable partner and responsible
member of the international community. Progress in this strategy was reported and
the declaration further reaffirmed at the 10th CPV National Congress in 2006. The
long transition from Vietnam’s “wish to become a friend” to “ready to be a friend” to
“is a friend” and finally to “is a friend and reliable partner as well as a responsible
member” has shown a crucial change in Vietnam’s foreign policy. This is because
“friend” aims only at the meaning of friendship relations, while “partner” shows the
cooperation in a number of sectors, through politics, economics, education, and
security and defence coordination.25
Consequently, amid the situation of fluctuating relations with China and the
perception of it as a current threat to Vietnam, the latter still seeks to carry out a
strategy of cooperation and struggle with its northern neighbour. Le Hong Hiep
argued that the “hop tac versus dau tranh” [cooperation versus struggle] approach
has served as the primary tactic of Vietnam’s China policy in the new century.26
Lemon argues that while enhancing cooperation with China, Vietnam has also
balanced China’s position through multilateral forums, such as ASEAN. Those who
adhere to the “balancing camp” believe Hanoi uses ASEAN to “partly transform
bilateral Sino-Vietnamese disputes into multilateral agenda involving Beijing and
ASEAN as a group.”27
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Lemon argues that Vietnam found itself concerned about China’s actions, but
also without an ally to balance against China. 28 As a result, Hanoi tried quiet
diplomacy with China while it slowly engaged ASEAN to counter China. This is the
reason why Vietnam stepped up efforts to enmesh itself in regional fora and the
international community. Vietnam’s ASEAN membership aims to counter the China
threat in the South China Sea because several ASEAN states share Vietnam’s
concerns about China’s activities in this territorial dispute. ASEAN membership also
serves as a strategic safety net that Vietnam could leverage to mitigate direct
confrontation with China over disputes.
Moreover, Vietnam has given few hints at possible security cooperation with
the US in the region to balance China’s influence. Vietnam’s leaders privately view
the US as a stabilising and balancing force in Southeast Asia.29 Le argues that along
with growing economic ties, political development is also expanding in the bilateral
relations between Vietnam and the US, which serves as a big surprise for a number
of international observers. Over the past decade, many high-ranking visits have been
exchanged between the two states. Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai
visited Washington in 2005. President George W. Bush paid a reciprocal visit to
Hanoi in 2006. There were later visits to Washington by Vietnamese President
Nguyen Minh Triet in 2007 and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2008. China’s
rise and its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea territorial disputes are
undoubtedly major factors behind Vietnam’s efforts to forge a closer relationship
with the US, which is a task that seems to have been facilitated by the US strategic
‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.30
Le analysed that with China’s rise and aggression in the South China Sea,
Vietnam wants to be closer to the US in an attempt to bargain with China in this
territorial dispute. This argument is not, however, supported by the views of
Vietnam’s strategists interviewed during fieldwork for this thesis who say Vietnam is
doing a balancing act between the powers. In addition to military cooperation with
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the US, Vietnam also has defence cooperation with China. Interestingly, there have
been more high-ranking exchange visits of political officials between Vietnam and
China than between Vietnam and the US from 2008 to 2013.31 Thus, the evidence
does not support the view that Vietnam has enhanced its relations with America as a
response to China. China itself has boosted its bilateral relations with the US through
a number of bilateral cooperation mechanisms, but scholars do not believe that this is
a reaction to American domination. The matter of one nation moving to strengthen
its relations with another country derives from its own national requirements and
interests. Furthermore, the US strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific (including
Southeast Asia) comes after the US had made its own calculations over the benefits
of reappearing in the region with the presence of a rising China.
Vietnam’s military enhancement is also a recent issue after it found it has not
put enough attention into defence recently32. Thus, escalating tensions in the South
China Sea disputes have caused Vietnam to strengthen its defence capacity to ensure
safety, security and territorial integrity. Another reason for Vietnam’s military
enhancement is to create more strength in discussion with great powers because once
Vietnam possesses a stronger military capability, major powers have to factor its
role, position or even reactions in their strategic calculations. 33 This strategic
calculation has resulted in the concept of “strategic trust,” which was mentioned in
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore
in 2013:
We all understand that if this region falls into instability and especially, armed
conflicts, there will be neither winners nor losers. Rather, all will lose. Suffice it to say,
therefore, that working together to build and reinforce strategic trust for peace,
cooperation and prosperity in the region is in the shared interest of us all. For Vietnam,
strategic trust is perceived, above all, as honesty and sincerity. To build strategic trust,
we ourselves need to abide by international law, to uphold the responsibilities of
nations, especially of major powers, and work to improve the efficiency of multilateral
security cooperation mechanisms. Countries, both big and small, must build their
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relations on the basis of equality and mutual respect and, at a higher level, on mutual
strategic trust.34

Vietnam clearly wishes to send this message to great powers. Given the
power shifts in the Asia-Pacific, Vietnam needs to address the triangular relations
using all its diplomatic skill and innovation. Indeed, Vietnam President Truong Tan
Sang made official visits to China and the US in June and July 2013 respectively.
These visits aimed to enhance bilateral relations between Vietnam with these two
major powers to build up “strategic trust” between all parties. In addition to China
and the US, Vietnam also attempted to boost relations with other regional powers
through high-ranking meetings with Russia, Japan and India, with a focus on
economic issues with Japan and greater cooperation in defence and energy with
Russia and India.35 Technology and military issues are recorded as the main features
of cooperation between Vietnam and Russia, with the first Russian submarine
handed over to Vietnam on 7 November 2013. The Vietnamese government,
however, insists that the presence of the submarine is not a threat to any other
nation.36
6.2.3 The Vietnam - US Rapprochement
According to a number of international observers, Vietnam is seeking to get
closer to the US in an attempt to counter balance the tensions with China.37 Zhao
suggests Vietnam regards the US as an important counter-weight to China. The
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Vietnam-US relationship cannot go beyond the constraints imposed by both states, as
the Vietnamese have concerns over the Chinese reaction, and to the US congress,
which has hindered the US Government’s effort to build closer ties with Vietnam.
Yet, a number of visits have been made. In August 2010, the aircraft carrier USS
George Washington travelled along Vietnam’s coastline and received visits from
high-ranking Vietnamese military officials.38 The US Navy has sought service and
re-supply facilities for its vessels in Vietnam, with three vessels repaired there for the
past three years. The last vessel was the USNS Richard E. Byrd, a civilian-crewed
ship in the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command. This was a logistics ship and the
status of Vietnam-US rapprochement made it easier to call on Cam Ranh Bay for
minor repairs in August 2011. During that month, the two countries concluded their
first military agreement since the end of the Vietnam War. 39
More impressively, in a visit to Vietnam in June 2012, the US Defence
Secretary Leon Panetta stressed the importance of extending defence relationship
with partners like Vietnam as the US shifts its emphasis to the Asia-Pacific:
It’s only natural that we look for future opportunities, for partnership with Southeast
Asia nations such as Vietnam… We want to explore ways to expand that relationship,
building on the comprehensive memorandum of understanding that was signed by our
two nations last year, and that will extend our practical cooperation…In particular, we
want to work with Vietnam on critical maritime issues including the code of conduct,
focusing on the South China Sea, and also working to improve freedom of navigation
in our oceans…We are rebalancing our forces to the Asia-Pacific region so that in the
future, 60% of our forces will be located in this region. For that reason, it will be
particularly important to be able to work with partners like Vietnam…We need to
obviously build a stronger defence relationship with countries like Vietnam.40

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the time was ripe for a shift in bilateral
relations between Vietnam and the US. The end of the Cold War shattered the status
quo in Southeast Asia, leaving Hanoi to admit that improvement in the relationship
38

The above discussion is drawn from Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Dispute and China-ASEAN
Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1), 2013, pp. 27-43 at 35

39

Zhao, H., ‘The South China Sea Dispute and China-ASEAN Relations’, Asian Affairs, 44(1), 2013,
pp. 27-43 at 35.

40

News Transcript of Media Availability with Secretary Panetta in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 3 June
2012. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5051(Date of visit
9 August 2015)

217

with the US would serve Vietnam’s national interests, not only economically but also
strategically, as China had always been Vietnam’s prime concern. 41 However,
Vietnam should always bear in mind that for the US, the key to a strategic
relationship should not cause China to believe that there was an AmericanVietnamese plot to threaten China’s national security. China will always be more
important to Vietnam than the US, and China will always be more important to the
US than Vietnam.42
From a realist perspective, countries must rely on themselves and seek
alliances against outside threats. Vietnam is a small country so it cannot always
choose to use its military to protect itself. Historical lessons have shown there is a
heavy price for Vietnam using the military approach. Unlike Japan, which has
strategic relations with the US, Vietnam had no choice in terms of an alliance after
Vietnamese-Chinese relations were broken and the Soviet Union collapsed. The
differences in ideologies and obstacles from the past have prevented Vietnam from
approaching the US as a “supporter” to fill in the “power vacuum” in Southeast Asia
to counterbalance the rise of China.43 As Vietnamese Deputy Minister of National
Defence, Lieutenant-General Nguyen Chi Vinh mentioned in an interview with a
Vietnamese journalist:
In bilateral relations, we plan to be independent and self-reliant in relations with each
country. We do not engage in relations and issues of other countries, especially major
ones, if they are not related to Vietnam’s interests or peace and stability in the region.
We do not go with or agree with one country to be against another.44

Thus, according to Deputy Minister Vinh, with its strategic geo-politic
position, Vietnam is pushed into a situation where major powers seek to win it over
to their side. In this case, the only choice for Vietnam is independence and selfreliance:
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We should not let other countries compromise on our back…However, I want to stress
the fact that may be hard to accept: that respect, solidarity and friendship can only be
gained and be practical when Vietnam is strong, independent, self-reliant and capable
of protecting itself.45

As a small country, Vietnam may face huge challenges in its bilateral relations
with major powers, especially over territorial disputes. The solution is to seek
support by using multilateral mechanisms and institutions. Lieutenant General Vinh
stated:
The factor is to open and make transparent all the issues for the world to know what is
right and wrong. Openness and transparency are weapons for minor country to protect
itself, protecting the countries that are confident that they have the truth and we have
the truth. Those countries do not want to be open and transparent in international
relations when they do not have enough confidence in their rightness.46

The approach of bringing the world’s attention to the territorial disputes
between Vietnam and China would seem to international observers that Vietnam is
internationalising the South China Sea issue. Those opinions, however, are a onesided view, and do not see the whole picture of Vietnam’s foreign policy, as they
lack a systematic insight into Vietnamese international affairs strategies. According
to

Lieutenant

General

Vinh,

openness

and

transparency

do

not

mean

internationalisation:
If defining internationalisation is to attract a country that has no sovereignty interests to
solve the issue, to be a referee or even depends on the strength of this country to gain
advantages in negotiation and solving territorial disputes, Vietnam will never do that.
However, when we are open and make transparent all the issues to the world and listen
to the ideas from the international community in bilateral and multilateral fora, it
cannot be considered internationalisation.47

In this direction, the US-Vietnam rapprochement does not necessarily mean
that Vietnam is luring a third party to act as a counterpoise in dealing with a rising
China and Chinese aggressiveness in the South China Sea. This is clearly mentioned
in the Deputy Minister Vinh’s address to the Tuoi Tre journal:
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We enhance relations with many different countries at the same time and it is natural
that some of those countries have conflicting interests. But out of our independence in
policy, Vietnam’s relationship with other countries does not depend on any other
outside party and we don’t mind when one relationship affects another relationship.
Why is it so? Because in all of our relationships, we have one common principle:
relationship between Vietnam and another country does not harm the interest of a third
country. So in dialogues with other countries, we never talk ill behind the back of
48

another country.

6.2.4 Vietnam’s US Policy in the New Century
Vietnam’s foreign policy toward the US follows the CPV’s resolution49 to
carry out a strategy of self-reliance through multilateralism and diversification.
Multilateralism means Vietnam wants to broaden its external relations with all
foreign countries while diversification means this policy is implemented in every
sector from economic, political, security and military areas, including cooperation
between the CPV and other parties in the world. This successful approach may be
considered Vietnam’s soft power, which has resulted in more leverage and strength
in its bilateral relations with major powers.
The bilateral trade agreement (BTA) between Hanoi and Washington signed
in 2001 allowed Vietnam to further expand trade and cooperation with the US. The
BTA was a major step toward fully normalizing US-Vietnam commercial relations,
as it restored reciprocal most-favoured-nation (MFN) status. To achieve this deal,
Vietnam has undertaken a wide range of market-oriented economic reforms, but for
the US, extending MFN treatment to Vietnam meant significantly reducing US tariffs
on most imports from Vietnam.50 Deepened economic and diplomatic ties with the
US brought about multiple advantages for Vietnam and balanced China’s increased
economic, political and cultural influence in Southeast Asia. Economically, the US is
a vast market for Vietnam’s export-driven economy. Economic interdependence has
had two-fold results. On the one hand, trade and investment from the US helped to
48

‘Vietnam Seeks No Outside Help over China Issues’, 30 October 2011,
http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/publications/vietnamese-publications/621-vietnam-seeks-nooutside-help-over-china-issues (Date of visit 16 December 2013)

49

Interview 3, February 2012.

50

Manyin, M.E., ‘The Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement’ in V. Largo (ed.), Vietnam: Current
Issues and Historical Background, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2002, pp.29-46 at 29.

220

develop Vietnam’s domestic economy, strengthen its financial position and allow it
to modernize its military. On the other hand, Vietnam’s security is increased through
interdependence with the US.51
Vietnam sided with Japan that the US should be invited to the EAS in
December 2005. China wanted to exclude the US. Vietnam lost this particular
diplomatic point, but Lemon has argued Vietnamese leaders believed their national
interests could be better secured in maintaining a tacit strategic relationship with the
world’s leading power, rather than by succumbing to the aspiring hegemon next
door.52 Yet as with Le, Lemon overstates the case53, as it is not a zero sum game but
a question of balance. Vietnam believes that moving closer to the US will better
serve its security than surrendering to the neighbouring giant China entirely. The
question of whether to follow China or the US has occupied Vietnamese scholars for
decades and it is always a hotly debated issue, even in modern times. After the SinoSoviet split during the Cold War, Vietnam had a hard time balancing its relations
with the two antagonistic powers. This led to a downward spiral in Sino-Vietnamese
relations in the 1970s, which reached a climax when China invaded Vietnam in early
1979. According to Farley, China’s rationale for this invasion was to punish Hanoi
for its action in Cambodia, and for its association with the Soviet Union.54 This is
why, according to a Southeast Asia official55, it is never wise for Vietnam to align
with one power while neglecting another. It is a matter of realist politics: the US is
far away from Vietnam while China is so close. As a result, Vietnam needs to be
very skilful in the triangular relations with China and the US. Vietnam has
historically considered China as its most important friend, so Vietnam will not now
shift to the US and leave China. Vietnam values its partnership with China over the
US.
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With other ASEAN states, Vietnam has welcomed US rebalancing to the
region, viewing this as providing opportunities for the two countries to boost bilateral
relations. 56 The US presence in Southeast Asia brings about both pros and cons to
Vietnam. While Vietnam considers America’s return as a good opportunity for
improvements in political, economic, security and military coordination, the
American return can create challenges, such as competition with China, which puts
ASEAN between a rock and a hard place. Vietnam sees these developments as more
positive than negative because they create more possibilities for the country to
enhance its relations with the world’s leading power. Vietnam’s general foreign
policy favours multilateralism and requires Vietnam to position itself as a friend, a
trusted partner and a responsible member of the international community. For this
reason, it will not go with the US for fear of China.
6.3 Vietnam between China and the US since 2001 to 2015
6.3.1 Security Affairs
The very first security dilemma that Vietnam faced in the triangular
relationship with China and the US is the difficult situation of being squeezed
between the two powers. Sutter argues that the security interests of each power in the
South China Sea overlap. Through a long series of initiatives, culminating most
recently in the Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific,
the US seeks to protect its allies and related interests. This is, however, occurring in
the same areas where China is seeking to protect is coastal waters, with key security
and sovereign interests in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and territorial claims in the
Yellow, East China and South China Seas.57
From Vietnam’s perspective, it is not desirable to have to choose between
China and the US. China is economically necessary but politically feared, while the
US is no longer the enemy and an indispensable partner. While the Asian giant
guarantees development, the US guarantees security. These are different priorities
compared to the past and Vietnam must adjust to these new realities. Strengthening

56

The following discussion is drawn from Interview 3, 14 February 2012.

57

Sutter, R., ‘The US and China in Regional Security: Implications for Asia and Europe’, 6th Berlin
Conference on Asian Security (BCAS), Berlin, June 18-19, 2012, pp. 1-7 at 3.

222

the state and developing a strong nation can only occur through complete economic
robustness. 58 Ott argues that the ascendance of the US as the world’s “sole
superpower,” and the rapid emergence of China as East Asia’s preeminent regional
power, present Vietnam with a dilemma. The rise of China has posed a potential
threat whereas the pivot of the US to Asia has offered a potential solution.59 This is
why the relationship with both powers is equally important to Vietnam’s national
stability and security. Following this perception and approach, party leaders and
commentators in Hanoi pointed out that Vietnam has considerable experience in
constructive engagement on bilateral issues, particularly with China and the US.
However, it should resist the temptation to fuel US suspicion with regards to its
relations with China, given that such efforts are likely to fail.60
The South China Sea territorial disputes created a security dilemma for
Vietnam. While Vietnam wishes to address the territorial dispute multilaterally,
China wants to settle the problem bilaterally. Thus, US willingness in solving this
dispute is regarded as threatening Beijing’s interests. In 2010, when US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton suggested that the US was interested in resolving the South
China Sea disputes, Hanoi celebrated.61 Hanoi is a critical gauge of some of the most
intractable problems facing Southeast Asia with regards to China. Among Southeast
Asian nations, Vietnam arguably has the longest history and most extensive
experience of dealing with China, and recently there have been close ties, but the
Chinese decision to move to shows of force has been a sore point. While China’s
neighbours seek greater US economic, diplomatic and military involvement in the
region to counter-balance Chinese growing power, every country in the region also
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desires a close relationship with Beijing.62 In other words, the littoral states of the
South China Sea are pursuing a two-pronged foreign policy: one is to induce the US
that it should remain available to provide support, including military support, and the
other is to keep their relations with the Chinese.
Despite the difficulties in dealing with these two superpowers, Vietnam is not
likely to opt for one power over another, and any argument claiming Vietnam will
move closer to the US to counter-balance the rise of China is at variance with
Vietnam’s stated policy. According to Ott, Vietnamese party leaders, through foreign
affairs channels, inform Beijing frequently and explicitly that Vietnam can never
accept China’s maritime claims. At the same time, Vietnamese leaders made efforts
to cultivate and increase a closer relationship with the US.63
Starting with the cautious cooperation in resolving POW/MIA cases in the
1980s, actual U.S.-Vietnam military-to-military contacts began in the mid-1990s.
These have blossomed into regular annual US naval visits to Vietnamese ports, a
structure of “strategic dialogue” between the two countries and regular references by
senior Vietnamese officials to a “strategic partnership” with the US.64 From 2005 to
2010, the US-Vietnam defence relationship had strategic implications, touching upon
core issues of military-to-military relationship with a comprehensive expansion of
cooperation and strategic dialogue. 65 In 2011 and 2012, American and Vietnamese
defence cooperation was aimed at deepening strategic-level dialogues, with a focus
on the capacity of building efforts and opportunities for service-specific activities.
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The annual US-Vietnam Political, Security and Defence Dialogue and the USVietnam Defence Policy Dialogue gradually expanded the way the military forces of
both countries meet new security challenges, further strengthening bilateral
cooperation in defence and other security issues.
According to Ott, the largely unspoken and unmistaken driver for this close
relationship is a shared concern about China. Hanoi’s growing rapprochement with
the US, is the most significant manifestation of Vietnam’s ability to steer a middle
course between the US and China and reconcile its strategic dilemma.66 Vietnam-US
relations are more nuanced and influenced by Vietnamese domestic concerns as well
as the legacy of the past. Indeed, in the US rebalance to Asia strategy, ASEAN is
considered as the leading priority in an E3 (Expanded Economic Engagement), as
well as in other regional cooperative forums proposed by ASEAN. In all of these,
Vietnam is an active member. Meanwhile, ASEAN has been China’s comprehensive
strategic partner for ten years with a number of bilateral commercial cooperation
programs.67
In the specific case of Vietnam, Hanoi’s relationship with Washington has
improved, but it does not have a mutual defence treaty to fall back on, unlike the
Philippines. With the US refusal to sell arms to Vietnam prior to October 2014,68 and
then the US lift of the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam on a case-by-case basis,
there is no guarantee that the US would rush to Vietnam’s defence, especially in the
event of a war against China. Moreover, due to the geographical location, China is
the neighbour, so moderation and steady diplomacy are essential for Vietnam to
move forward by strengthening the relationship with the US while maintaining an air
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of polite opposition to China. 69 Jordan, Stern and Lohman also argue that the
Vietnamese have realized that engaging more with the US does not necessarily mean
engaging less with China.

70

Vietnam continues to acknowledge the critical

importance of an effective and friendly relationship with China. This means that the
Vietnamese will not risk damage to their relationship with China in order to
strengthen their relationship with the U.S.71
6.3.2 Socio-economic Affairs
Regarding the socio-economic dilemma that Vietnam faced in its interactions
with China and the US in Southeast Asia, the first question is how can Vietnam be
skilful enough to avoid being caught up in the strategic rivalry between two major
powers at the expense of national security. As Chinese economic growth expands, it
is embracing the whole of Southeast Asia, particularly those nations along the subMekong River Delta nations (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand) as
a springboard to go further to the outside world. Vietnam needs to continue to affirm
its stable and sustainable development in the bilateral relationship with China, a
matter of crucial significance to the two countries and the region. During the GFC
the world’s leading developed economies suffered from financial crisis, but China
continued to import goods at a growing rate. China now contributes to 10% of the
world’s GDP, equivalent to that of the whole EU.72
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China’s economic expansion over the past few decades has created a new
middle class dedicated to consumption, thus boosting Chinese domestic demand. In
addition to that, the higher value of Chinese currency has also paved the way for
more convenient conditions for other foreign countries to export to China. Under the
slogan of “preserve internal resources, increase exploiting and using external
sources,” 73 China is also relocating the abundant energy, ingredients and labour
sectors, which contribute to pollution in less-developed neighbours in the region,
especially in the sub-Mekong River Delta. China’s huge demand for energy and
ingredients can be considered a possible threat to other nations, especially to
neighbouring countries. In comparison with the US, Vietnam is more dependent on
China in terms of its economic development. Although the US has become Vietnam's
biggest export market, China remains Vietnam’s largest import market, and without
China, Vietnam’s economy may suffer major blows.74
US economic assistance for countries in Southeast Asia is also something that
Vietnam should take into consideration. As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated
during his trip to Vietnam:
On December 16, Secretary of State John Kerry announced an initial commitment of
US$ 32.5 million in new regional and bilateral assistance to advance maritime capacity
building in Southeast Asia. Including this new funding, our planned region-wide
funding support for maritime capacity building exceeds US$ 156 million for the next
two years.75

According to Tiezzi, this funding was seen as a response to China’s growing
assertiveness in the regional territorial disputes. Vietnam has become a new recipient
of US maritime security assistance in its strategy to rebalance Asia. The US wants to
extend its ties beyond its long-term allies of Japan, South Korea and the
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Philippines. 76 Vietnam would receive US$ 18 million from the United States as
commitment from Secretary of State John Kerry:
As an example of our commitment to strengthen maritime securities in Southeast Asia,
the United States intends to provide up to US$ 18 million in a new assistance to
Vietnam to enhance the capacity of coastal patrol units to deploy rapidly for search and
rescue, disaster response, and other activities, including through provisions of five fast
77

patrol vessels in 2014 to the Vietnamese Coast Guard.

This is where an economic dilemma for may turn out to be a security
dilemma, as China views the American economic assistance for Vietnam’s defence
as part of a larger containment strategy towards China through a closer relationship
with Vietnam. The Global Times reveals how China perceived the US security
assistance to Vietnam:
First of all, provocations from the Philippines and Vietnam, with the support of U.S.
troops, make the possibility of Sino-U.S. military conflict larger than in the past…A
U.S. military aircraft or warship may use an “accident” to provoke war.78

Yuen claims that the U.S. commitment to assist Vietnam with US$18 billion
for buying patrol boats to improve its maritime capabilities may provoke more
conflict in the South China Sea.79 Zhu Feng, a professor of international security at
Nanjing University, was quoted as saying that:
The US is trying to expand its political and maritime security influence in the South
China Sea by providing financial support to Southeast Asian countries, so that it can
confront China’s power in the region.80
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Another Chinese analyst, Xue Li, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy
of Social Science, stated that:
The more the U.S. involves itself in the South China Sea issue, the more China will do
to counter the situation, which will eventually lead to more conflict and harm relations
between China and Southeast Asian countries.81

6.3.3 Cultural Affairs
The dilemma of Vietnam choosing between China and the US in the cultural
sector can be seen in the political system and ideology. Vietnam has the same
political structure as China in the single-party state mechanism and shares similar
cultural values. A closer US-Vietnam relationship requires change from within
Vietnam’s political system, including giving ground on human rights and democracy.
These two issues are a barrier between the ruling CPV and Washington. Although
the US is a realist power taking action on the basis of its national interests, it never
loses its enthusiasm for promoting Western values, such as democracy, freedom and
human rights. Liberalisation could jeopardise the legitimacy of the Vietnam’s ruling
party. This dilemma between Hanoi and Washington will probably turn into a long
term issue, as Vietnam’s ruling party will retain its leading position while it
continues to demonstrate success in national development, although issues of human
rights or democracy will not disappear from Washington’s diplomatic program.82
Vietnam is still a single-party state under the rule of the CPV. With its poor
record on human rights and democracy, American human rights activists and
politicians are questioning Washington’s increasing business cooperation with
Hanoi. They believe that increased trade should be accompanied by civil and
political reforms. As Vu argues, if Hanoi wants the US to be a true friend, it may
have to change itself first.83 If Vietnam has to choose at the end of the day, China is
in many ways a more difficult problem to address than the US. While the US
demands human rights and democracy for Vietnam, this threat is only for political
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reform. It does not touch on national independence or freedom. If Vietnam has to
choose between the two powers, the choice will be between party interest and
national interest. In theory these should be the same, and the answer for Vietnam at
the present time is how to be a friend of all major powers, including both the US and
China.
Another concern is that Vietnam may suffer in the triangular relationship
between Beijing and Washington and become a “two-faced” nation. Vietnam will
neither pledge an alliance to Washington, nor will it constantly maintain a
brotherhood with China.84 In fact, Vietnam has adopted the diplomatic strategy of
engagement and “not choosing” between China and the US. Hanoi has displayed
some solidarity with Beijing since diplomatic normalisation in 1991, with robust
mechanisms for managing the relationship, such as 100 delegations exchanged
annually. China has become Vietnam’s largest trading partner. Vietnam and China
also have joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, reciprocal naval port visits by Chinese
and Vietnamese naval visits, and exchange visits by the two Defence Ministers.
Vietnam, however, has also sought to repair its bilateral relations with the US
as a strategic insurance against China by providing permission for US naval ships to
visit its ports or hosting the US Defence Secretary’s visit to the country. These
signals have proved that the bilateral relationship has reached a new level. Owing to
its engagement of both major powers, Vietnam may either be regarded with
suspicion by both powers, or its dual strategies of engagement and enmeshment
could be recognised as dividends.85
6.4 Vietnam in the South China Sea Territorial Disputes 2001-2015
Contrary to the charm offensive with “soft power” strategy towards Southeast
Asian nations, China has currently demonstrated its aggressiveness in the territorial
disputes by declaring the South China Sea as its “core interest.” Beijing will not
allow any discussion or questions about their policies and it will probably engage the
military presence of any power. China has even recently warned US oil companies
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not to take part in any joint exploration agreement in the South China Sea with
Vietnam.86
China has undertaken a number of assertive actions in this sea area, such as
clarifying the U-shaped claim, increasing military and paramilitary as well as civilian
activities in the area to achieve a de facto control over the zone set by the line.
China’s military build-up, especially naval modernization and the construction of a
naval base in Sanya, could serve as a gateway to the South China Sea. China has also
deployed systematically patrol vessels and boats from various Chinese maritime law
enforcement agencies to the South China Sea. During the time of the unilaterally
declared fishing ban between May and August 1999, which has since been imposed
annually, Chinese maritime security forces have repeatedly detained Vietnamese
fishermen, confiscated fishing boats and charged fines ranging from US$8,000 to
US$10,000 for their release. Since the summer of 2007, China has threatened a
variety of oil and gas companies to stop joint offshore exploration operations with
Vietnam or face the consequences when dealing business with Chinese
counterparts.87
Consequently, as Tonesson argues, the assertive actions of China could be a
threat to the Vietnamese’s territorial integrity. They provide Vietnam with a choice
between two main strategies: either defend its claims to the Spratlys (Truong Sa) and
insist that China return the Paracels (Hoang Sa), or define the main aim of keeping
and promoting regional peace to enhance human security. 88 In the first scenario,
Vietnam requires a military build-up, nationalist mobilization and renewed attempts
86
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to find allies abroad to present a counter-balance to China. In the second, Vietnam
needs to increase regional and international trade to engage China. It is pointed out
that there are two basic problems with the first choice when Vietnam is still a poor
country and can hardly afford to build naval and air forces that can match Chinese
naval power, despite Vietnamese strength and determination to maintain a minor
deterrent role with modern Russian-built fighter aircraft and warships. Moreover,
Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN does not represent a counter-balance with China,
because the only power that can counter-balance China is the US. As a result, the
only situation to make the first choice available is to radically improve its
relationship with the US, while Sino-American relations deteriorate. In this case,
success gained with the US means a serious damage to Vietnam’s relations with
China. Tonnesson supposed that it seemed logical for Vietnam to either apply a
passive, reactive foreign policy or choose the second strategy to actively engage the
region in the new global situation.
The argument of this thesis is that Vietnam is not using enhanced relations
with the U.S. in an attempt to counter balance its relationship with China. Vietnam
uses balancing strategy with both China and the US and does not play one power off
the other. It seeks to be friends with both powers while keeping an eye on both of
them. Vietnam is practical and careful not to annoy the US and China in a system of
global interdependence. Vietnam’s priority is to protect its territorial integrity against
China’s assertive claim over the South China Sea. Vietnam need not have to
cooperate with the US and downgrade relations with China. It has many diplomatic
channels of cooperation. Vietnamese foreign policy since the time of Renovation
(doi moi) has been multi-lateral and diverse and this has been reiterated since the 6th
Congress of the CPV in 1986.
For the last 60 years, Vietnam has had both positive and negative relations
with China. Today, Vietnam has affirmed its friendship and cooperation with China.
This type of relationship plays an important role in the development of each nation,
along with peace, stability and security in the region. However, both nations face
unsolved matters of history. These problems include the territorial disputes over the
South China Sea. For the US, with its “back to Southeast Asia strategy” in the “AsiaPacific Century,” Vietnam views U.S. policy of rebalancing to the region as a chance
to create more opportunities for countries in the region to boost their bilateral
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relationships with the US. However, Vietnam is also aware of the fact that the
American return to Southeast Asia can create challenges. In the multilateral
perspective, US rebalancing to the region amid the rise of China can put ASEAN
countries, including Vietnam, in the difficult situation of a possible competition
between these two powers.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are concerned about whether Vietnam will lean
towards the US as a hedge against China. This is the situation that Vietnam has
faced. Vietnam always considers China as its most important friend. Vietnam has
never considered the US ‘back to Southeast Asia’ policy as a method to reject China.
Vietnam’s foreign policy acts under the Party’s resolution to carry out the strategy of
independence and self-reliance. This tactic can be seen as a Vietnamese exercise of
“soft power,” which has brought about more leverage and strength for Vietnam in the
relations with outside partners.89
The next chapter explores the implications of the Sino-American interactions
for Southeast Asia and Vietnam.
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM

This chapter will focus on exploring the possible impacts of Sino-American
interactions in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. This is followed
by an assessment of implications on how to maximise regional and state advantages
while minimising possible disadvantages.
7.1

Implications for Southeast Asia

7.1.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
Whether Sino-American interactions can bring about an opportunity or a
threat to Southeast Asia is a matter of debate among international relations scholars.
As Zhu has argued, China’s ascent has aroused boundless discussion about its
implications on international politics and global security. The most common
discussion centres on theoretical and policy debates about whether a rising China
constitutes a threat or an opportunity, whether it is a conservative status quo power to
be engaged with or a rising revisionist state to be contained. 1 Cha reiterated the
prediction of popular American international relations scholars since 1993 that Asia
would be “ripe for rivalry”2 due to a combination of nationalism, power rivalries,
historical animosity, arms build-ups and energy needs. Aaron Friedberg, an
international relations scholar at Princeton, predicted the term “ripe for rivalry” in
Asia in 1993:
While civil wars and ethnic strife will continue for some time to smoulder along
Europe’s peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely to be the
cockpit of great power conflict.3
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However, other observers argued that China’s style of diplomacy, together
with political culture and its domestic socio-economic structure, suggests that it will
not necessarily threaten its neighbours, and that it may even make a positive
contribution as the “balance of influence” in Asia.4 In summary, this relationship is
likely to result in both pros and cons.
Advantages may be seen when harmonization is maintained, and when
cooperation is carried out in the interactions between China and the US in Southeast
Asia. This means when China is more “peaceful rise” than “China threat,” Southeast
Asia is likely to enjoy the positive impacts from the Sino-American relations in the
region. Van der Putten envisaged a positive scenario where the US and China could
accept each other’s status as great powers, before taking on a five-power approach to
regional security with Japan, India and Indonesia. These five countries would then
work with other countries in South, East and Southeast Asia in regional fora, such as
ASEAN and EAS.5
Shirk claims Southeast Asian countries do not want to have to choose
between the US and China as they grow closer to China. They hedge their bets by
trying to keep the US engaged in the region. Shirk also argues that China’s success
depends on cooperation with the US.6 If the US declared China the enemy in a new
Cold War and tried to tie an economic noose around it, China’s economic growth and
job creation would be slowed, and domestic problems would increase even if few
American allies joined US efforts to contain China. A hostile US military posture
would drive the Chinese military, and the public, to demand the Chinese government
put more resources into building the military, thus increasing the risk of a war. Citing
an example, with respect to conflict with Great Britain in the nineteenth century, one
Chinese specialist explained the experiences and lessons of history prove that a late
power can only rise with the cooperation of the dominant power in the international
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system. The best way for China to rise peacefully is to behave like a responsible
power and to accommodate the current global superpower.7
China’s peaceful rise can help forge a good impression on neighbouring
Southeast Asian states, creating reciprocal advantages and benefits. According to a
source from the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, one of
China’s central objectives is to secure and ensure access to resources in Southeast
Asia for continued Chinese economic development. China wants to maintain a secure
buffer zone around it.8 When China was under Mao, Southeast Asian governments in
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines had distanced
themselves from it, fearing that China would export revolution to them. However,
within less than a decade after the establishment of diplomatic relations with all ten
Southeast Asian states by 1991, China’s skilful diplomacy has made regional states
view China as a partner and a market opportunity, rather than as a potential threat.
Public opinion polls in Southeast Asia9 show China is viewed positively; one poll
found that 76% of Thais believed China was Thailand’s closest friend, while only
9% of Thais chose the United States.
Disadvantages will emerge when China and the US engage in strategic
rivalry, and when China is more “China threat” than “peaceful rise.” 10 K.
Shanmugam, the Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the wary view of
Southeast Asian people about the Sino-American competition for regional power and
influence:
The relative weight of China is growing. I’m not one of those who believe that the US
is in permanent decline. But nevertheless, the respective levels of influence, there will
be a relative shift. And Singapore’s position has consistently been to be good friends of
both. …Would that be a challenge-free approach? It really depends on how the state of
relationship between the US and China develops. It could develop in a way that makes
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it challenging for all of us who are friends with both countries and we will just have to
adapt to that.11

Problems will arise if the US mishandles the economic rise of China. Even if
the two sides manage to avoid military conflicts, a Cold War with China would
wreak havoc in the US and the entire world. The US is China’s largest export market
(buying approximately 20% of its total exports) and China loans most of the dollars
it earns from trade to the US Government, which uses the money to pay off its large
budget deficits. Thus, if Washington imposed economic sanctions on China and
China retaliated by selling off some of the billions of dollars of American
government debt it owns, American interest rates could shoot up and a global
recession could result.
A hostile relationship with China would also make it impossible for both
countries to work together to solve global issues, such as AIDS, the avian flu
epidemic, global warming and terrorism.12 In sum, at the moment, it is not likely that
China and the US will engage in devastating rivalry or potential war because neither
side will benefit. There is evidence that some Chinese believe optimistically that
future Sino-American ties will be as close as the Anglo-American alliance today.
However, as both countries have different political systems of governance, it is hard
to imagine a perfect harmony between the US and China.13
7.1.2 Direct and Indirect Impacts
The direct impact of Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia on regional
nations will influence their economic dynamism, the spread of China’s ideological
and cultural influence, and the return of American presence in the region.
Suryadinata argues that China has rapidly become a major economic power, a
“dynamo” of Asia or “world factory” for mass production, flooding the regional
markets. This has resulted in a profound socio-political and economic change in
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Southeast Asia. 14 China’s rapid rise directly impacts regional states and China’s
economic growth augurs well for East Asia’s continued economic growth.15 China
can harness the region’s vast trade and investment opportunities to stimulate its
domestic economy.
Southeast Asia’s growth potential has benefited from China’s increasing
integration with the region through the Southeast Asian Chinese. Enterprises
managed by the ethnic Chinese have become increasingly dependent on China’s
economy and this has forced them to be cautious in doing business in China. AntiChinese riots had occurred in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the past,
but strong resentment against any perceived economic and cultural invasion from
China has surfaced in Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.16
In relation to indirect impacts of Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia,
China’s ambition is a spectre haunting Southeast Asian nations. In 1979, the
Vietnamese government argued that Southeast Asia was a region where Chinese
rulers felt they could widen their influence and use “their cash with no strings” aid as
a trump card in gaining support across the world.17 Chinese policy towards Southeast
Asia over the last three decades points to the extremely important position this region
occupies in its global strategy, and also reveals their great power expansionist and
regional hegemonic ambitions. The Chinese government has orchestrated an
impressive campaign to reassure its Asian neighbours, the US and the rest of the
world of its “peaceful rise” even when it grows stronger. In 2014, Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi claimed Chinese leaders’ responsibility to uphold peace:
Premier Li Keqiang spoke the mind of the Chinese people and showed that China
shoulders the responsibility to uphold peace. We fully support his statement. …China
is committed to the path of peaceful development, and we hope other countries will
also take the path of peaceful development. The Chinese Dream belongs to the Chinese
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people, and as it is closely connected to the dreams of other nations as our interests are
well intertwined.18

Chinese President Xi Jinping also reiterated China’s commitment for peace
development in his keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference
2015:
What China needs most is a harmonious and stable domestic environment and a
peaceful and tranquil international environment. …The Chinese nation loves peace and
has, since ancient times, held high such philosophies that “harmony is the most
valuable”, “peace and harmony should prevail”, “all men under heaven are brothers”.
…Close neighbours are better than distant relatives. This is a simple truth that the
Chinese people got to know in ancient times. That explains China’s firm commitment
to building friendship and partnership with its neighbours to foster an amicable, secure
and prosperous neighbourhood.

On the other hand, Kirshner doubted the success of China’s strategy of
promoting its own “peaceful rise.” History has witnessed the rise of new great
powers that tend to upset the international system. China’s rise is not guaranteed to
be a peaceful one, as its interests could clash with those of other nations.19 There is a
saying of Napoleon Bonaparte about China, which is to “let her sleep, for when she
wakes, she will shake the world.”20
There are some worrying aspects to Beijing’s international behaviour, which
is a contradiction to its leaders’ repeated claims about China’s “peaceful rise.”
Beijing’s defence budget has been increasing for almost two decades but its military
intentions remain unclear. According to the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission (USCC) report 21 , China’s official projected defence budget
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increased from 720 billion RMB (approximately US$119.5 billion) in 2013 to 808
billion RMB (approximately US$131.6 billion) in 2014, a 12.2 % increase. With the
exception of 2010, China’s official defence budget has increased in nominal terms by
double-digits every year since 1989.
The source from the 2014 USCC report to Congress22 revealed that China’s
actual aggregate defence spending is higher than the officially announced budget due
to Beijing’s omission of major defence-related expenditures, such as purchase of
advanced weapons, research and development programs or local government support
to the PLA. The estimation from the US Department of Defence (DoD) revealed
China’s actual defence spending in 2013 exceeded US$145 billion, approximately
21% higher than its announced defence budget. The evaluation from the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute calculates that China’s actual defence
spending in 2013 was US$188 billion, approximately 57% higher than its announced
defence budget.
Thus, China’s unclear purposes in military expansion and its assertiveness in
regional territorial disputes might lead it to test the limits of American global
dominance as it attempts to play its own role in world politics. This is not necessarily
alarming, so long as China continues to seek common ground with the US. In the
situation of a possible new Cold War and the very real possibility of a hot one, a
good deal of patience and self-restraint will be required.23
7.1.3 Short term and Long term Impacts
ASEAN has to face the dilemma of maintaining their regional balance and
centrality amid Sino-American interactions in the region. Owing to China’s recent
aggressive manner with some Southeast Asian states in the territorial disputes in the
South China Sea, there are suspicions about the peaceful rise of China. According to
Shambaugh, despite Beijing’s efforts to assuage its neighbours, China’s “charm
offensive”24 could not win the heart of every nation along its periphery. Concerns
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about a looming “China Threat”25 still exists occasionally among security specialists
in Hanoi, New Delhi, Singapore, Tokyo and certainly Taipei.
These arguments fall into three categories. First, regarding ideological and
cultural factors, the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration felt the fact that
China was officially communist was an impediment that exacerbated a clash of
civilizations. In this worldview, an unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian
civilizations is the principal threat to the West. Accordingly, in this perspective this
worry caused a sensible response from the US with short-term containment policy
and

long-term confrontation,

bringing

about

the

promotion

of

peaceful

transformation within China. Secondly, from realists’ perspectives, China has to
pursue equivalent respect and influence due to its position as a major power in size,
territory, population and economy. That is why nationalism is likely to drive a rising
China in the direction of a clash with the US, if the latter rejects a space for the
former in the global leadership.26
Thirdly, the possible collapse of China (if it were to suffer a Soviet-style
sudden-death syndrome) could create even greater uncertainty and an even worse
scenario. Chinese refugees from its 1.3 billion population, a failed state and/or
presence of warlords, civil war, transnational crime, proliferation and nuclear
weapons - all of these are possible outcomes for the world to deal with. Owing to
these considerations, the US often tends to oscillate from “demonization to
romanticization,” from containment to engagement with China in “the sweet and
sour Sino-American relationship.” 27 Hernandez claims that should China’s rise
continue without serious interruption, it could be a “towering giant” that will
dominate not only the US, but also major regional powers, such as Japan and
Russia.28 Should China’s rise be derailed, leading to an implosion, the fallout would
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affect Southeast Asia very negatively. The vision of Chinese migrants spilling out of
the mainland to its immediate neighbours would be a nightmare for Southeast Asia.
As for the long-term view, there are two scenarios about the impacts of the
Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia that depend largely on continued Chinese
economic development. First, China’s economic rise could slow, resulting in harmful
long-term impacts not only for the Sino-American relations in general, but also for
Southeast Asia. For the time being, there are two leading characteristics of the world
economy, namely Chinese economic growth and American consumer markets. The
former is a crucial component of the global economy due to its size and potential.
However, in spite of its fast growth over a few decades, Kirshner doubts the
continuance of Chinese ascension, as it was unusually high and vulnerable to internal
and external factors that could result in disruptions. Consequently, if Chinese
economic growth decreased, domestic political stability and foreign policy would be
affected.29
The 2014 USCC Report to the US Congress notes that China sustained
economic growth at or near its official target rate of 7.5% through the first three
quarters of 2014.30 Accordingly, China’s GDP growth has been under 8% for ten
consecutive quarters, entering a “new normal” 31 period. China’s oversupply of
property and industrial over-capacity in sectors such as steel and solar panels
continues to put Chinese economic growth at risk. It could harm US manufacturing
and exports by dumping excess supply into global markets.
Next, if China’s economic rise continues at the same rapid pace as today, then
Sino-American relations may enter into unavoidable engagement and friction, which
is a long-term dilemma for Southeast Asia. It has been predicted by a number of
scholars that China is likely to have on-going economic development. Lee and
Nedilsky have examined the notion that China has claimed the twenty-first century
as its own, and have projected that rising Chinese economic and political strength
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will surpass that of the United States.32 The International Monetary Fund forecasted
that by 2016 China would replace the US as the largest economy. With an average
GDP growth rate of 9.7% per year in the last three decades, Chinese economic
growth is remarkable. No other country has enjoyed this rate of economic growth
recently.33
Kirshner admits that if China continues its economic ascension, its expanding
economy will create both challenges and frictions for the US. With greater Chinese
economic strength comes an increase in its national prestige domestically, regionally
and internationally. As China is a leading engine of the global economy, together
with the US, Chinese economic and political creditability can challenge US
hegemony and foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. China can cause more tension
for regional and international economic conflicts, which may frustrate the US.
However, Sino-American frictions will not result in a war because the issues are
merely irritants to bilateral relations and strategic rivalry. 34 An armed conflict
between the two major powers could be evidence of strategic competition, as China
and America may not be able to avoid conflicts. However, the right policy choices by
both powers can keep the two on the path of more cooperation than conflict, avoiding
the “doom and gloom scenario” painted by a number of scholars.35
7.1.4 Implications
The most important way for Southeast Asia to maximise regional benefits is to
maintain what the ASEAN Secretariat calls “ASEAN centrality,” and to maintain
equilibrium between the current interactions of the US and China. ASEAN’s
objective of maintaining its centrality in regional affairs has contributed to Southeast
Asia’s stability and economic development, despite regional and global financial
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crises. ASEAN registered an economic growth of up to 6% in 2014, proving that
regional integration since the ratification of the ASEAN Charter for “an ASEAN
Community” has worked well for political, security, economic and socio-cultural
cooperation. This achievement also makes ASEAN attractive to major powers.
While the US has considered ASEAN as a leading priority in its pivot to the
Asia-Pacific, China and ASEAN celebrated the 10th anniversary of their strategic
partnership in 2013. While individual countries in Southeast Asia could enjoy good
diplomatic ties with China and/or the US, it is crucial that these ties do not compete
with the collective interests of ASEAN and that “ASEAN centrality” remains
sacrosanct.36 ASEAN countries themselves depend on fostering good relations with
both major powers, but also on good Sino-American relations. ASEAN serves as an
influential platform due to its central position in regional initiatives. 37 Solidarity
through ASEAN centrality is smart power for the association, as the strategy assures
both the US and China that ASEAN is not a pawn in their rivalry, but rather a
regional mechanism for cooperation and development. ASEAN could make an effort
in “dynamic balancing” between China and the US in order to ensure that any SinoAmerican rivalry would not adversely affect the region. The response by ASEAN
nations is to engage with the US and China together as a regional forum.38
The region’s solidarity can work effectively on disputes in the South China
Sea. Division and suspicion will arise through any interference by foreign powers in
Southeast Asian internal affairs. ASEAN solidarity can help to resolve the
differences between China and the US through multilateral dialogues or other
“confidence building” strategies. These trust building measures, such as the ADMM
Plus and the ARF, can be set up regularly to address regional territorial disputes.
These regional fora can discuss Chinese military modernization objectives and
China’s manner in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. In this light, procedures
to upgrade the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) into a full Code of Conduct (COC) in
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the South China Sea territorial disputes should be addressed by ASEAN in its
engagement with China.39
Shirk believes that it would be in the interest of Southeast Asian nations if their
navies could invite Chinese and American naval vessels for joint patrols of the Straits
of Malacca and other sea-lanes that have been plagued by piracy and terrorism. The
responsibility for the security of the Straits of Malacca, for instance, rests with the
littoral states that have rejected the involvement of outside navies. Southeast Asian
states, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, have organized
combined naval and air patrols. There has also been a regional anti-piracy initiative
promoted by Japan known as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
However, China could maintain a strong military presence in Southeast Asia
without raising suspicion from the US.40 Once the US and China are assured of their
mutual benefit (as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) in Southeast Asia, ASEAN
nations also gain favourable conditions for regional security and development. The
US has no territorial disputes in the region. It has been more broadly committed to
free trade and to keeping its market open. Southeast Asia regards American
leadership as a key to regional stability, and it will be a challenge to replace the
American role in the region. The region’s future depends now on the US response to
an increasingly assertive China.41
7.2 Implications for Vietnam
For thousands of years Vietnam has struggled against imperialism and foreign
invasion. It is now faced with being caught in a dilemma of a great power rivalry.
This section offers some approaches and proposals for the better national
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development of Vietnam. These are intended as positive strategies to assist
Vietnamese policymakers.
7.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
Vietnam can gain from Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia.
Vietnam can seize this opportunity to promote its own economic development. The
geographical position of Vietnam also makes it a potential buffer zone for Chinese
ambitions to expand southwards. However, the US could use Vietnam to contain the
rise of China. With an increasing presence of Chinese soft power, the US could
promote its influence in Vietnam in order to create a critical distance between China
and Southeast Asia. Moreover, improvement in US-Vietnam relations can be
justified from any of the three American attitudes towards China. If China is a threat,
Vietnam could help block China’s influence and contain China. If China is a
challenge, part of an American response is to improve its own soft power in countries
like Vietnam. If China is an opportunity, then Vietnam can be another smaller
country with a similar opportunity.
Accordingly, the rise of China is predicted to provide a positive influence on
US-Vietnam relations, regardless of their direction in the future. However, if the
relationship between Washington and Beijing worsens, then American interests in
containing China could present Vietnam and countries in the region with a painful
choice. A triangular asymmetric situation of Washington-Beijing-Hanoi adds new
levels of complexity because there is a natural temptation for the strongest and the
weakest state to ally against the middle. The middle is the greater potential threat to
the strongest, and the weakest can hide behind the strongest. However, such an
alliance puts the weakest in a precautious position.42 Most Southeast Asian nations
are clearly hedging their bets with regards to China’s rise. While simultaneously
advancing close economic and trade relations with a rapidly rising China, their
exports also have to compete with those of China in the US market. Historical
memories of Chinese power in the region, and the fear of Chinese military expansion
have contributed to the regional countries’ desire to balance against China’s
ascension. Accordingly, most ASEAN nations have sought to maintain or strengthen
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their defence relationships with the US, and remain wary of any Chinese efforts to
exclude America from emerging East Asian mechanisms.43
In relation to the disadvantages caused to Vietnam by the interaction of China
and US in Southeast Asia, the most difficult aspect for Vietnam is to avoid being
squeezed between global superpowers and regional powers in their strategic rivalry.
This dilemma poses the risk of forcing Vietnam to choose sides, which could
threaten its stability and national security. As Hugh White has argued, the status-quo
arrangement in the region reflects a balance of power system, in which the two
strongest powers build alliances to balance each other and a structurally adversarial
relationship emerges between them. In this case, regional countries will then be
forced to choose which power to bandwagon with, causing a division within
Southeast Asia.44
With China, Vietnam risks territorial disputes that threaten its integrity. With
the US, Vietnam risks interference in its current political system. Le Linh Lan argued
that the US has come to recognize the importance of Vietnam in Southeast Asian
security because Vietnam is a significant and integral part of the sub-region. 45
Vietnam’s strategic location in the region means it is a crucial partner for the US.
While Washington has important interests in seeing the vital sea-lane in Southeast
Asia free for navigation and overflight, the increasing salience of the South China
Sea disputes has also raised the significance of Vietnam in the years to come.
Moreover, Vietnam’s active membership in ASEAN makes it an important
player in regional affairs and the wider Asia Pacific region. Vietnam’s membership
in ARF and its participation in APEC add more avenues for Vietnam-US
cooperation, raising the US stake in seeing Vietnam become a stable and prosperous
nation. Thus, the changing and complex configuration of power in Asia has
undoubtedly stressed the importance of Vietnam as an independent actor in
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America’s strategic calculations. One problem, however, is the US inclination to
impose its values on other nations with different political systems. According to Le
Linh Lan 46 , the US has never hidden its agenda in spreading democracy, human
rights and American values to countries with different political systems, including
Vietnam. As President Clinton stated:
I believe normalisation and increased contact between Americans and Vietnamese will
advance the cause of freedom in Vietnam, just as it did in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. I strongly believe that engaging the Vietnamese on the broad
economic front of economic reform and the broad front of democratic reform will help
to honour the sacrifice of those who fought for freedom’s sake in Vietnam.47

Such a position is obviously problematic for the Vietnamese government, as
opening up the political system runs the risk of the CPV losing power.
7.2.2 Short-term and Long-term Impacts
The short-term impacts of the triangular relationship between Vietnam, China
and the US can turn into long-term impacts if current tensions are not resolved. The
most obvious risk for Vietnam is China’s encroachment in the South China Sea
territorial disputes, as these actions threaten Vietnam’s territorial integrity and
national sovereignty. China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea may be
seen as a “soft invasion” occurring within its “peaceful rise.” Clearly, however,
Vietnamese policymakers need to study these events carefully. China has opted for
civilian forces like simple fishing boats, paramilitary forces, or business corporations
like oil companies, rather than naval forces, to assert sovereignty over islands in the
disputed areas. Moreover, the Chinese have established military bases, observation
posts or oil drilling platforms to occupy the sea areas that are claimed by Vietnam,
and this had caused difficulties in the supplying routes from the mainland to the
islands. ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan expressed concern that the South
China Sea could become Asia’s Palestine in his address to the Financial Times:
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We have to be mindful of the fact that the South China Sea could evolve into another
Palestine if countries do not try harder to defuse rather than inflame tensions.48

According to Luong Van Ke, Chinese tactics are to “win without attack” to
isolate the Spratlys to an unbearable limit, forcing Vietnam to leave the islands. This
is a patient strategy. Despite being not overly hostile, it still carries a long-term risk
to Vietnam national territorial integrity. Thus, the first dilemma is China forcing
Vietnam to leave by itself.49
Taking both positive and negative implications into consideration, Vietnam
would prefer to see the positive scenario come into being to avoid suffering a loss in
its bilateral relations with China. In order to influence the situation in a positive
direction, Vietnam has adopted several short and long-term strategies. In the short
term, regarding the South China Sea territorial dispute, Thayer recommends that
Vietnam needs to monitor Chinese actions carefully using proper naval escorts to
look after Vietnamese ships that enter the disputed waters around the Spratly islands.
Vietnamese vessels should operate with Vietnamese Marine Police escorts. 50 In
addressing sophisticated territorial disputes, the armed forces are required to firmly
adhere to the policy of “‘3 Nos,” “4 Avoids” and the “6 Ks”51:
“3 Nos”: Không liên minh quân sự với nước ngoài [Trans: no military alliance with
foreign countries], Không cho nước ngoài đặt căn cứ quân sự ở Việt Nam [Trans: Do
not allow foreign nations to place military bases in Vietnam] và Không cho bất kỳ một
tổ chức chính trị, quân sự nào lợi dụng địa bàn lãnh thổ Việt Nam để chống lại nước
khác [Trans: and Do not let any political or military organization take advantage of the
Vietnamese territory against another country];
“4 Avoids”: Tránh xung đôt về quân sự [Trans: Avoid military conflict], Tránh đối đầu
[Trans: Avoid confrontation], Tránh bị cô lập về chính trị [Trans: Avoid being drawn
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into political isolation] and Tránh bị lệ thuộc chính trị với nước ngoài [Trans: Avoid
political dependence on foreign countries] (this motto is to show the independence
perspective of the Vietnamese);
“6 Ks”: Kiên quyết đấu tranh bảo vệ chủ quyền lãnh thổ [Trans: Determined struggle
to defend national territory], Kiên định độc lập dân tộc và giữ vững chủ quyền toàn
vẹn lãnh thổ [Trans: Consistent manner in defending national independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity], Khôn khéo: vừa đấu tranh ngăn cản, vừa tránh va
chạm và tuyên truyền đặc biệt [Trans: Skilful tactic of preventing military conflict and
using special propaganda], Không khiêu khích: tạo cơ hội cho nước ngoài đánh chiếm,
gây xung đột [Trans: No provocative manner which can create reasons for powers to
cause conflict or invasion]; Không mắc mưu khiêu khích (rơi vào bẫy âm mưu của
nước ngoài) [Trans: Not tricked by provocation, which can be drawn into the plot of
powers]; Không gây bất ổn, giữ vững an ninh, chủ quyền quốc gia [Trans: Not cause
instability, and maintain security and national sovereignty].

With reference to the long-term impacts to Vietnam from Chinese and
American interaction in Southeast Asia, Vietnam believes that China’s leaders will
attempt to control the region in an effort to progress towards world hegemony, and
that the US is trying to contain the rise of China. As Mao Zedong stated in August
1965 during a meeting of the Political Bureau:
We are bound to recover Southeast Asia, which includes South Vietnam, Thailand,
Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. Southeast Asia is very rich in minerals and to recover
it is worth all the efforts we make. This region will be advantageous to China’s future
industrial development, and will make up for all the losses. The east wind will prevail
over the west wind when we have recovered Southeast Asia.52

Indeed, Chinese rulers regard Southeast Asia as a natural region for Chinese
expansion, for they consider all the land, sea and islands there as their territories.
Southeast Asia has a fertile soil, a large population and it is rich in natural resources.
Moreover, with a sea route going from east to west and linking the North and South
Pacific Oceans and the Indian Ocean, it occupies a strategic position in Asia. Once
this region is under Chinese control, the Chinese rulers will be able to increase their
strength and assume hegemony in Asia, then in the world. Furthermore, Southeast
Asia is considered as more vulnerable to Chinese expansion because it is comprised
of small countries, and there is no great power like the Soviet Union, Japan, or India.
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China has two potential advantages in this region: the large overseas community of
Chinese residents, and the so-called “revolutionary” Maoist organisations.
By channelling Chinese aid into Southeast Asia, the Chinese use it as a their
bargaining chip with the world powers, including the US and Japan.53 Thus, with
Southeast Asia being the location of Chinese strategic region calculations, Vietnam
is involved in Chinese plans for expansion to the south. This is the long-term impact
that Vietnam risks. Meanwhile, in the American ‘pivot to Asia,’ Vietnam also figures
in the calculations of the US to engage and counter balance China. In the long-term,
Vietnam’s national stability and security is endangered if caught between the two
giants.
7.2.3 Direct and Indirect Impacts
A more direct impact that Vietnam is likely to suffer from the triangular
relationship with China and the US is a direct Chinese threat in the territorial
disputes as a message to Vietnam communicating China’s strong disapproval of
deeper US-Vietnam security ties. Since the normalisation of relationships with the
US in 1995, Hanoi is still cautious about boosting its defence cooperation with
Washington in order not to offend China. Thayer determined that there are two major
obstacles holding back US-Vietnam cooperation. One is the fear held by
conservatives in the CPV about any American support for peaceful evolution that
could result in a change in its political system from a one-party state into a pluralist
democracy. The other is Vietnamese leaders’ concern that “moving too close to the
United States will incur costs in Vietnam’s relations with China.”54
Thus, Vietnam has to be very cautious in the triangular relationship with
China and the US to be clear of the type of Chinese threat that is more direct and
dangerous so that it may adopt suitable tactics. The territorial dispute with China in
the South China Sea is currently Vietnam’s biggest diplomatic and security concern.
Vietnamese overtures to Washington are the consequence of a lack of direct military
threats from the US.
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The indirect impacts on Vietnam stem from Chinese and American
interactions in Southeast Asia with the risk of economic downturn and social
instability. Vietnam may suffer from environmental problems if China and the US
could not agree on gas emission targets to mitigate the impact of climate change.
New environmental worries arise over the impact of China’s efforts to supply its
southern provinces with much needed power, often through dam construction on the
Upper Mekong River that are felt downstream. China’s growing influence in
ASEAN also affects US interests in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. With
Southeast Asia containing some of the busiest sea-lanes in the world, it is an
overstatement to claim that the US response to Chinese action will have an impact on
global strategic and economic stability. Between 1999 and 2000, China has
conducted a low-level, systematic campaign to restore ties and improve relations
with each ASEAN nation individually. In every ASEAN country, Beijing forged
agreements to strengthen cooperation over a broad range of areas, including trade,
defence, culture and tourism. By the close of the 1990s, all ASEAN countries had
deeper ties with China.55
Moreover, in order to deal with a possibly aggressive northern neighbour
while maintaining a relationship with its former adversary that is carrying out a
policy of engaging and counter-balancing China, Vietnam is modernizing its military
capacity for national defence. Thus, the Vietnamese budget for military and defence
will be at the expense of other sectors, such as education and health care, adding
more risks and difficulties for Vietnamese social stability. According to Hiebert and
Phuong Nguyen56, between 2004 and 2013, Vietnam boosted its military spending by
113%, which is the largest increase among Southeast Asian countries. Vietnamese
total military expenditure was USS$3.3 billion in 2012 and US$3.4 billion in 2013.
Hiebert and Phuong Nguyen notes that since 2011, Vietnamese defence spending has
been enhanced after the CPV Central Committee issued a detailed 2011-2020
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maritime strategy.

57

Consequently, the protection of Vietnamese maritime

sovereignty and economy are key national security pillars. The Vietnamese
government sees its largest threat from maritime security, as Vietnam has a long
coastline of 3,260 kilometres facing the South China Sea and 50% of its population
live along the coast.
7.2.4 Implications
What should Vietnam do to move forward while walking between two
giants? Vietnam’s words and deeds will have practical effects for its national
independence and freedom to protect national sovereignty, to preserve national
security and to foster national development. Vietnam’s creative diplomatic activity
will be a test of how well it serves the nation.
Vietnam could project a better image of the country through a national
reconciliation with the overseas Vietnamese communities. These communities were
created after the fall of Saigon in 1975. South Vietnamese officials and military
officers had fled abroad; others followed later as “boat people.” Overseas
Vietnamese have been (and are being) welcomed back should they choose to return,
especially if they bring skills and capital that can benefit the country. National
reconciliation in this case also means the reconciliation of different voices,
viewpoints and experiences.
Last but not least, national reconciliation also means the reconciliation of
internal economic conflicts, such as the issues of land ownership that are addressed
through the constitution. Overall, national reconciliation covers the reunification of
people at all levels, both domestic and overseas. All economic perspectives must
ensure the sustainable development of the nation with a view to make Vietnam
become the beloved homeland for all Vietnamese. In order to achieve this goal,
Vietnam needs to follow the value system that all progressive peoples in this world
are following: the value of liberalisation for social stability. This is the fundamental
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basis to boost domestic strength, and it would give a solid impetus to conduct its
external affairs.58
The result of such integration will be 90 million united Vietnamese, from the
officials to the people, from the central to the rural to create the overall consensus for
national security, stability and development. Sharing this viewpoint, Deputy Foreign
Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for Overseas Vietnamese, Nguyen
Thanh Son, told Thanh Nien News in an interview that it is essential to unify
Vietnamese people from all over the world, as overseas Vietnamese play an
important part in the country’s development, and unification should include those
who fled the country after the Vietnam War ended on 30 April 1975.59 The past
feelings about the communist government must be put aside so as to build up the
trust that “the overseas Vietnamese play a really important role in contributing to the
protection and development of the country.”
Indeed, annual remittances from overseas Vietnamese could be worth as
much as US$20 billion annually, which is one-fifth of the country’s GDP or
equivalent to the trade value between Vietnam and Europe. There are over 400,000
people of Vietnamese descent working in leading agencies across the world in
various sectors, such as space technology, economy, education and health. 60 The
remittances from the Vietnamese community living abroad (Viet Kieu), most of
whom reside in North America, Australia, Europe, South Korea and Japan, fluctuates
due to changing economic conditions over different time periods. Between 1975 and
1990, the Viet Kieu sent back to Vietnam was at least between six and eight billion
dollars. According to the World Bank, 2.2 million Viet Kieu generated more than
US$42.8 billion in total remittance inflows between 2000 and 2010. However, the
global economic crisis significantly affected remittances, recorded at US$6 billion in
2009, down from US$6.8 billion in 2008. When the global economy recovered,
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remittances bounced back to US$8.2 billion in 2010 and an estimated US$8.7 billion
in 2011.61
In terms of foreign affairs, Vietnam needs to place its national interests as the
highest strategic objective of its foreign policy.62 Accordingly, Vietnam needs to be
vigilant when the Chinese leadership, under the guise of communist ideology and
socialist orientation, attempts to limit the capacity of Vietnamese leaders to respond
to developing issues. Indeed, despite the depth of comprehensive strategic
partnership between Vietnam and China, under the 16 golden words and four goods
motto as discussed in earlier chapters, China’s aggressive actions towards Vietnam in
the South China Sea as well as the unbalanced trade relations with Vietnam have
revealed a changeable Chinese behaviour towards its southern neighbour.
The Vietnamese people are fully aware of a difference in words and actions
but feel China’s real ambition is to turn Vietnam into a satellite or quasi-satellite
state. Both the Vietnamese people and their leaders are aware of this risk, but the
similar political system and socialist model of development have affected how
Vietnamese leaders respond. This is a worrisome point as it affects the unity and
solidarity of the Vietnamese people under the leadership of the elite. Above all,
Vietnam needs to be very cautious about the ideological dominance from China.63
Meanwhile, in the rapprochement with the US in security affairs, Vietnam
also needs to be alert to the inherent problems of engaging on democracy and human
rights, as this may weaken its control of the state by allowing hostile forces to
undermine the leadership of the CPV.64 As a result, Vietnam should strictly obey the
guidelines in the Political Report adopted at the 11th National Congress of the CPV
in 201165 that defined major defence and security objectives and tasks relating to
these risks namely, (i) protecting national independence, sovereignty, territorial
integrity, (ii) protecting the Party, State, People and the Regime, ensuring political
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stability, social order and security, as well as actively preventing and defeating any
hostile attempts and activities to damage the state and (iii) readily responding to
global non-traditional security challenges.66 In general, national interests and benefits
are the most crucial goals that Vietnam needs for national establishment and
development.
Secondly, Vietnam needs to integrate fully into the regional and global
community to create a smarter way of dealing with major powers. According to
Pham Binh Minh, as Vietnam integrates into the international community, it must be
aware of the need to satisfactorily settle relations between international integration
and ensuring independence, self-reliance, a firm maintenance of national sovereignty
and national strength.67 If China continues its assertive manner in the South China
Sea territorial disputes, Vietnam may be forced into a security partnership or
strategic partnership with the US. Such a security partnership between Vietnam and
the US could also mean partnership with NATO. Vietnam will therefore not establish
a security alliance with any power that opposes a third power. However, it is the
legitimate right of Vietnam to seek partnership, not to oppose a third country, but to
defend its national interest and benefits.68
Thirdly, Vietnam needs to enhance its motto of being a friend and reliable
partner to all foreign countries. According to Hoang Binh Quan, Head of the Party
Central Committee’s External Relations Commission, Vietnam has now established
diplomatic relations with more than 200 political parties in various countries,
including over 100 communist and workers’ parties and nearly 80 others involved in
national parliaments.69 As Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated:
Vietnam consistently persists with a foreign policy of independence, self-reliance,
multi-lateralisation and diversification of external relations, being a friend and reliable
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partner to all nations, and a responsible member of the international community.
Vietnam wishes, and has spared no efforts to build and deepen, strategic partnership
and mutually beneficial cooperative partnership with other countries. It is also our
desire to establish strategic partnerships with all the permanent members of the UN
Security Council on the principles of independence, sovereignty, non-interference in
internal affairs of each other, mutual respect, equal and mutual beneficial cooperation
are committed to and seriously implemented.70

Fourthly, Vietnam should continue the high value strategy of contributing to
ASEAN as the principal regional multilateral organization. Accordingly, Vietnam
needs to combine its national interests with regional interests. The interests of
ASEAN are also Vietnam’s interests; any benefits to ASEAN will be benefits to
Vietnam. This is a smart combination of national power and regional power.
Vietnam should contribute effectively to multilateral fora and regional mechanisms,
as when ASEAN has become an attractive partner of foreign major powers, then
Vietnam, as an active member of the organisation, can profit from the general
benefits of regional cooperation. 71 Ha Hoang Hop claimed “a united and strong
ASEAN is a top priority in Vietnam’s foreign policy.”72
Indeed, in the modern time of globalization and international integration,
Vietnam should take advantage of its positive relationship with other major partners
to deal with China and the US. For this, an active role inside ASEAN is crucial. By
going alone in the relations with the US and China, a smaller nation like Vietnam is
likely to suffer from disadvantages, but within ASEAN it will be more protected.
Indeed, the triangle of Vietnam, China and the US means the dilemma between the
rock and a hard place is in three dimensions. First, Vietnam is being squeezed as a
small nation between two major powers. Second, Vietnam has been suffering
difficulties with China, with which it shares a similar political system but is facing
territorial disputes. Vietnam has also been suffering grievances with the US, with
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which it has the chance to upgrade its bilateral relationship but faces significant
institutional differences. Third, Vietnam also suffers from the dilemma of the
triangular relationship between ASEAN, China and the US.
As a result, Vietnam has considered ASEAN as a crucial regional
organization for the exercise of influence and has concentrated on building ASEAN’s
role and position.73 This approach is in line with the speech of the CPV General
Secretary at the 28th diplomatic conference in Hanoi on 16 December 2013:
Viet Nam has played up its role as an active member of regional and global
mechanisms. Our country has participated deeper and wider in Southeast Asia and
Asia-Pacific linkages through such organizations and fora as ASEAN, the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) and East Asia
Summit (EAS). Viet Nam joins eight bilateral and regional free trade agreements and is
negotiating six other agreements including two biggest ever agreements, which are the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP). Viet Nam has together with other member countries
made active contribution to the process of building the ASEAN community and
enhanced its position and profile in the regional community. For the second time, Viet
Nam has officially stood for non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for
the 2020 - 2021 term; is ready to host the 32nd International Parliamentary Union
74

General Assembly in 2015 and the APEC Summit for the second time in 2017.

Vietnam needs to continue a smart balancing act in its relationship between
China and the US. Vietnam should do its best to prevent the bilateral relationship
between China and the US from becoming a rivalry. If there exists a strain in that
relationship then Vietnam should act to ease the tension. This is because when the
competition between China and the US becomes worse, it will create instability and
insecurity in the region, meaning none can benefit from the situation. Vietnam
should establish an equally close and equidistant relationship with both powers.
Indeed, China is now the comprehensive strategic cooperative partner of Vietnam
and this places China at the top of Vietnam’s hierarchy of strategic partners. The
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bilateral relationship with the US has also improved through a number of cooperative
mechanisms.
Vietnam’s good relationship with China has created a favourable foundation
to have better bilateral ties with the US. Similarly, Hanoi’s improved cooperation
with Washington in economic, political, defence and security affairs has created a
better stance for Vietnam to maintain its relationship with China. Above all, the
relationship between Vietnam with both China and the US is a relation of
complementary support. Vietnam should not choose between the US and China
because it derives different types of benefits from both relationships. Vietnam should
stick to its national interests and protect national benefits from boosting the bilateral
ties with both China and the US.75
Regarding the territorial disputes in the East Sea (South China Sea), Vietnam
does need creative diplomacy when faced with direct pressure from China, and
should take advantage of American support.76 This is because if the disputes escalate,
Vietnam is in a situation where internally it has to introduce more effective measures
to protect national territorial integrity, maritime interests and the welfare of its
people, while externally it has to avoid making the situation worse. The difficulty
also lies in how to demonstrate a firm position on national interests to its people
while trying not to be seen as adopting a confrontational approach to other claimants.
Vietnam faces the dilemma of national defence by investing more in military
capabilities to effectively support its claim without losing track of the priority for
national economic development and incur the risk of causing suspicion or military
conflict with other claimants.
Thus, Vietnam needs to show the world it is willing to resolve the territorial
dispute in a positive manner. As Vietnam’s Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi
Vinh affirmed:
Vietnam is a party among others to the dispute in the South China Sea. The policy of
the Vietnamese state and that of Vietnamese national defence is consistently trying to
resolve the dispute through peaceful means while resolutely defending sovereignty and
territorial integrity based on international laws and forging greater friendship and
75
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understanding between Vietnam and neighbouring countries, including those
77

concerned to the South China Sea.

Vietnam needs to carry out a skilful approach in dealing with China,
especially with the US pivot to Asia placing a greater focus on Southeast Asia. The
triangular relationship of China-ASEAN-US in the South China Sea is, for the time
being, unbalanced, due to China’s aggressive activities in the territorial disputes area
and its domination in regional forums.
However, China’s assertiveness is more temporary than permanent because if
China continues to be aggressive then it is likely to lose more than it will win. China
is facing the biggest loss in regional trust and confidence. The Chairman’s Statement
of the 26th ASEAN Summit clearly mentioned this:
We, the Head of State/Government of ASEAN Member States, gathered in Kuala
Lumpur and Langkawi, Malaysia for the 26th ASEAN Summit on 26-27 April 2015.
…We share the serious concerns expressed by some leaders on the land reclamation
being undertaken in the South China Sea, which has eroded trust and confidence and
may undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea.78

The other loss that China may suffer is the suspicion from the region’s people
and the world community about China’s peaceful rise. It is clear that virtually all
countries in the region and the major powers in the international community are
looking at China’s behaviour in the South China Sea as a test for its “peaceful rise” –
will it be a state that obeys international law, or a rogue state with an attitude that it
can bend and break rules as it sees fit?
According to Kemp79, the South China Sea territorial disputes are originally
long-festering disputes over sovereignty among the littoral states (principally China,
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Vietnam and the Philippines but also involving Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia) that
have been transformed into a dangerous confrontation between major powers (China
and the US). Kemp analysed that the South China Sea has become the most
important testing ground for the Sino-American relationship as it raised a raw contest
for power and influence between an incumbent superpower and an emerging one.
This territorial dispute also raised the questions about whether states can be bound by
the decision from international tribunals against their will. When the Philippines
wanted China to go for the arbitration, China insisted it would not consent to the
arbitrators’ authority. In the case of Vietnam, China allowed the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to announce that the company would open
foreign bids for nine oil and gas blocs located deep within Vietnam’s continental
shelf and overlap lots 128 to 132 and 145 to 156 where PetroVietnam has been
operating for a long time.80 It shows Beijing’s disregard for international law.
Creative diplomacy by Vietnam can help resolve its territorial disputes with
China, with a view of winning support from regional states and the international
community. Domestically, there has been growing discontent in Vietnam over
Chinese intrusions into the South China Sea. However, the government’s prohibition
of public demonstration on these matters and the arrest or jail sentences given to antiChinese demonstrators or protestors have shown Vietnam’s intention to attempt a
peaceful resolution to the territorial disputes that is based on international law,
especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).81
There have been constant diplomatic attempts by Vietnam to prove its legal and
historical claims to the islands to the international community. Vietnam’s passing of
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the Sea Law to protect its sea and islands in Vietnam’s 13th National Assembly
session is a step towards ensuring its sovereignty over the islands.82
In dealing with the “soft invasion” of the Chinese in the South China Sea
territorial disputes, Vietnam needs to learn from China on how to harness the
patriotism of the people in protecting national territory. China did not use naval or
military forces, so Vietnam cannot respond militarily. Vietnam needs to expend
funds on maintaining patriotic citizens to live in the islands day and night to protect
the territory. One official noted that this is with a historically proven strategy of
leaning on the people and raising their patriotism, which can result in national
solidarity to protect the motherland. 83 Thayer has argued regional states should
undertake an initiative to hold Senior Official-level discussions on the UNCLOS so
as to further clarify unclear or disputed problems, such as the claims to extended
continental shelves and the presence of foreign military vessels in another country’s
EEZ. He proposed the use of regional security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific or in
East Asia.84
Finally, more research is required on Vietnam’s international relations to
develop thorough policy strategies and practical approaches in dealing with major
powers. Vu Khoan argued that a deep and comprehensive assessment of the world
situation is essential to map out a grand strategy and to reorganize a contingent of
external relations researchers under unified leadership. In the common strategy,
studies about great powers’ policies and Vietnam’s position in their calculations
should be attempted, so as to deal with the question of which threat is the most direct
and worrisome.85 Such research will create the foundation for appropriate countering
82
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measures to be identified to safeguard national interests. Accordingly, territorial
sovereignty and integrity should be linked to peace, stability and external relations.
On that basis, Vietnam needs to be persistent in its policy of independence and selfreliance and to maintain a policy of multi-lateralisation and diversification to take
advantage of the support and assistance of the broad international community.
Vietnam is intrinsically connected with regional and global trade. An in-depth
understanding of the world’s situation is an indispensable condition for defining
national tasks.86
The dissertation’s conclusions will recapitulate the main points: the
recommendations of win-win approaches in foreign policy to manage the triangular
relations of Vietnam between China and the US; the proposal to keep ASEAN
centrality to retain balance of powers, and the smart balancing strategy of Vietnam to
move forward.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION

Since 1991, Southeast Asia has risen in importance in the triangular
relationship with China and the US. This dissertation has examined the position of
the Southeast Asian region and especially Vietnam within this triangular relationship
to propose policy responses to issues that have multilateral and bilateral implications.
On that basis, the dissertation has argued that Vietnam has not adopted a strategy of
aligning closer to the US to counter China, and that a win-win solution is the most
beneficial approach for all parties in any interactions with China and the US in
Southeast Asia during the Post-Cold War era.
In the world today, despite its hegemony, the US has to recognize its inability
to resolve global affairs unilaterally. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first
century, its hegemony was challenged by the combined efforts of China and, to a
lesser extent, India, Brazil and a resurgent Russia. US global power has been
negatively affected after its failure in 1994 to use trade as leverage in improving
China’s human rights record, and two very costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
between 2002 and 2014. Despite American concerns, India, Pakistan, North Korea
and Iran continue to develop nuclear weapons. The expenses of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan coupled with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) impacted globally,
including Southeast Asia.1
Thus, in the atmosphere of a relatively declining US and a rising China, the
position of the region in general, and Vietnam in particular, has been calculated
against this great power rivalry and the two major powers’ strategic tactics. The
Southeast Asian region has strategic importance as a bridge between the Indian and
Pacific Ocean with vital sea-lanes that give China, Japan and the US access to the
Middle East and the eastern coast of Africa. 2 In addition to its geographical
significance, the main regional organisation of Southeast Asia, ASEAN, holds
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importance for major powers. ASEAN has achieved significant success in creating
regional unity and solidarity against interference from outside powers. ASEAN has
managed to avoid military conflict among its member states, despite rivalries, interethnic tensions that cross national boundaries, and border disputes. It has also
continued to be a successful diplomatic community acting as convenor, facilitator
and regional architect for many regional groups involving the great powers, notably
ARF, ASEAN+3, EAS, ADMM Plus and the EAMF (Enlarged ASEAN Maritime
Forum).3
In terms of trade, Southeast Asia is beneficial to the US economy. As the US
deepens its engagement with Asia, the ten Southeast Asian nations of ASEAN are
prominent on its policy horizon. With a dynamic economy and nearly 600 million
people located at the crossroads of huge markets, it straddles critical shipping lanes
and controls substantial agricultural, mineral and energy resources. As a region it is
strategically and economically significant. ASEAN is an emerging economic
powerhouse. Its GDP exceeds US$2 trillion (3% of world GDP) and is likely to grow
at an average rate of 6% for the next two decades. After the Asian financial crisis of
1997-1998 and the GFC from 2008 to 2009, FDI inflows rebounded to a record
US$76 billion in 2010, exceeding flows into India and closing in on China. ASEAN
is a major US trade partner in several important products. For example, the US
exports 15% of its electrical equipment to Southeast Asia, especially the main
markets of Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. ASEAN exports mainly rice,
apparel, footwear and manufactured goods. Vietnam is the second largest supplier of
footwear to the US behind China.4
From China’s perspective, Southeast Asia is viewed as a region within its
sphere of influence and a potential market for its goods. Since the end of the Cold
War, Chinese interest in Southeast Asia can be seen in three distinct phases. It started
with normalisation of ties with each Southeast Asian nation from 1990 to the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997. This phase was followed by economic cooperation from
1997 to 2009. Since 2009, China has deepened its strategic partnership with ASEAN.
3
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China is now ASEAN’s largest trading partner and ASEAN is China’s fourth-largest
trading partner.5 Among ASEAN members, Vietnam plays a crucial strategic role in
the region amid Sino-American interactions in the region. Geographically, Vietnam’s
S-shaped coastline provides an easy access linking maritime and continental
Southeast Asia. This position has made Vietnam an attractive destination of both
China and the US. Through its economic reforms, Vietnam can deal with ambitious
global powers from a position of independence and relative strength.
Continuing rivalry between China and the US offers both risks and rewards to
the leaders in Hanoi, as the world’s two most powerful countries seek deeper
strategic and economic influence in Southeast Asia. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s
visit to Hanoi highlighted the importance of the Vietnam-China bilateral relationship:
China and Vietnam are linked by mountains and rivers, with cultural affinity, the same
political system and in-depth development of exchanges and cooperation in all
fields.…Both sides agreed, based on enhancing political mutual trust and consolidating
traditional friendship, to properly manage and control differences, not to let the South
China Sea issue interfere with the big picture of bilateral cooperation, to effectively
implement the consensus reached between both sides and to push the working group
for consultations on joint maritime development and other cooperation mechanisms to
make substantive progress as soon as possible, so as to promote bilateral practical
cooperation in all fields, to implement the spirit of ‘good neighbors, good friends, good
comrades and good partners’ and to bring tangible benefits to the people of the two
countries and of the region.6

Meanwhile, Washington is also eager to bring Vietnam more firmly into its
strategic Asian orbit. Despite the Vietnam War, Washington arguably has history on
its side because for most of Vietnam’s history, neighbouring China has been its most
fearsome enemy. Vietnam can utilize its geopolitical advantage in the rising
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competition for influence between China and the US.7 The Americans worry about
Chinese expansion and from historical experiences, they know Vietnam has been the
biggest barrier against Beijing’s southward drive.8 Indeed, Vietnam is considered as
a testing ground for China’s ambitions to the south in its global strategy.
Following modern economic reform in China and Doi moi (renovation) in
Vietnam, both nations have continued their transitional path to a market-oriented
economy putting industrialization and trade issues at the forefront, with territorial
disputes generally left on the back burner. The year 2010 marked the 60th
anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic ties with official
normalization of relations being in place in the 1990s. China and Vietnam will
remain intertwined because of geographic, economic and political realities.9
The dissertation has asked whether Vietnam has responded to the rise of
China and Chinese aggression in the South China Sea by aligning itself with the US.
Based on interviews the author conducted with 28 Southeast Asian government
officials, the conclusion is that Vietnam is engaged in a balancing act. It is not
getting closer to the US or China.
Although the US has security commitments to Asia and plays a role as a
counterweight to China that is welcomed by ASEAN, ASEAN and China share
important principles in their thinking about international relations, and China is both
more active and more influential in the sphere of multilateral cooperation. ASEAN
and the US have clashed on human rights issues on many occasions. Although
ASEAN appreciates the US contribution to regional stability, the moral advice that it
comes with is not appreciated.10 Vietnam is an active member of ASEAN, but an
approach that favours either China or the US is not seen as a responsible regional
foreign policy. Vietnam’s foreign direction has tended towards multilateralism and
7
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diversification. This means Vietnam wishes to cooperate with China, the US and
other powers in defence and other sectors, while still retaining a sense of dynamic
balancing: a maxim might be “ keep them all equally close and equally distant.”
ASEAN states can achieve maximum benefit if China and the US interact with each
other in a cooperative manner, rather than engage in rivalry.
Any time China moves aggressively, Vietnam finds itself in a more
precarious position. If the Vietnamese government is to continue to be successful in
maintaining a balance, it must avoid close alignment with one country at the expense
of ties with the other. This is a unique time in Vietnam’s history when it is unified
with enough economic and political conditions to stand up to China in the region,
though whether it will be successful in the long-term remains to be seen. Given the
past history of both nations and in an effort to engage in global economic integration,
Vietnam is pursuing a foreign policy of having “more friends, fewer enemies.”
Stable, normalized economic and military relations with both China and the US are
the current state of affairs. Vietnam has also placed an emphasis on general global
integration, and this has resulted in political and economic engagement with a wider
range of countries that is aimed at countering the influence of Beijing in the region.11
This is the Vietnamese foreign policy of independence and self-resilience with
multilateralism and diversification of diplomatic relations for national security and
development amid the strategic calculation of major powers.
As a result, the claim that Vietnam is getting closer to the US to counter
balance China is not persuasive. It is more the case that Vietnam is engaging
multilaterally with as many states as it can. China is a large market and it is a source
of financial assistance and a model of development for Vietnam. 12 Only when
Washington and Beijing achieve a bearable approach towards one another in both the
cooperative and competitive dimensions can bilateral ties between them achieve a
win-win solution for all parties, including Vietnam. A devastating war between the
two great powers is not likely to happen; if it does it will be a worst case scenario, as
it is a disaster for all concerned parties, and Vietnam is no exception. On the other
11
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hand, if China and the US can handle the bilateral relationship in a cooperative
manner, Vietnam in particular and Southeast Asia in general can gain more
advantages and benefits.
So far the main response of the Southeast Asian countries to China’s rise has
been to encourage the US, Japan and India to remain involved in the region and to
foster strong bilateral relations with China at the same time. The downside of this
approach is that should China’s relations with one or more of the other powers
deteriorate, then the neutrality and relative unity of Southeast Asia could be at risk. A
conflict among the great powers would also affect the economic prosperity of
Southeast Asian nations. Therefore, ASEAN’s direct interest to moderate relations
between the region’s great powers will test its best abilities. 13 Balancing in a
dynamic manner between China and the US is the best solution for regional nations,
including Vietnam, amid the dilemma of sitting between the global power and the
regional giant.
On the basis of an empirical analysis presented on the importance of
Southeast Asia and Vietnam from Sino-American relations in Southeast Asia in the
post-Cold War era, the author proposes policies for the region and Vietnam as to how
to maximise the regional and individual benefits while mitigating the risks of rivalry
between the two major powers. Regionally, ASEAN centrality is the key to solving
the dilemma of regional countries while sitting between a global superpower and a
regional power. ASEAN members are now increasingly stable and politically
confident with the enhancement of ASEAN centrality in regional and global
decisions. This new centralised approach requires coordination of members to further
common interests. It is often seen as a benchmark for the region’s external
relationships, especially with partners like the US. Cooperation among ASEAN
countries, following on the heels of serious conflicts among them, has already paid
large dividends by generating political stability. In turn, stability has provided a
platform for economic development and productive engagement with larger foreign
powers. Consequently, ASEAN centrality can act in a positive manner for regional
nations in dealing with the Sino-American interactions in Southeast Asia.
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Objectively, dynamic balancing is another solution for Southeast Asian states
to get maximum advantages from both major powers. This is also the responsibility
of regional nations to make efforts to nurture the relationship of China and America
in the region so as not to be drawn into strategic rivalry. For Vietnam, the
dissertation argues there are internal and external implications to avoid being
squeezed between China and the US. Domestically, it is vital for Vietnam to
consolidate its comprehensive strength that has derived from national independence
and reconciliation. Externally, Vietnam needs to continue to stick to completing and
developing the renewal direction approved during the 11th National Congress of the
CPV with national interest as the highest priority. In order to maximise state benefits,
Vietnam needs to fully integrate into the regional global economy, community and
society under the motto of “being a friend and reliable partner of all foreign
countries.” Simultaneously, Vietnam should contribute actively and pro-actively to
the regional mechanism of ASEAN for regional strength against foreign invasion or
interference.
Finally, Southeast Asia (and especially Vietnam) is gathering both rewards
and risks with pros and cons in the triangular relationship with China and America.
The important feature is how Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states will deal with
the dynamic situation to be well adapted and responsive in a practical and positive
manner.
This dissertation has covered the critical 24 years from 1991 to 2015 in the
post-Cold War era to provide an analysis of the triangular relationship of Vietnam
between China and the US in the context of Southeast Asia. During this timeframe,
Vietnam normalised its diplomatic relationships with both major powers and then
developed its separate bilateral relations with the two giants in a pro-active manner.
Dynamic balancing kept both equally close and equally distant while maintaining a
practical approach to enhance cooperation for national security and development.
Smart and creative diplomacy in addressing issues in its foreign relations can
enhance Vietnam’s future security. A sense of unity with other ASEAN states to
build and strengthen ASEAN as the key regional mechanism will further boost
Vietnam’s friendship and partnership to gain regional and international support for
its claims in the South China Sea territorial disputes. A win-win solution can be
achieved as long as the major powers of China and the US approach the relationship
270

in a measured and constructive manner. If they do, Vietnam and other regional states
can benefit from a more stable regional environment as they continue to develop
economically. This will lead to an enhanced security environment for Southeast Asia,
which would be of benefit to all states and peoples.
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